Jj 


332.1 


A N 


ENQUIRY 

H - 

WEEgg 

/ 


INTO  THE 


Principles  and  Tendency 


OF  CERTAIN 


PUBLIC  MEASURES. 


is 

V ' ci  ; 

H /■ 




PHILADELPHIA: 

Printed  by  THOMAS  DOBSON,  No.  41,  South 

Second-street. 

M DCC  XCIY. 


fv^  c».2. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016  with  funding  from 
Duke  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/enquiryintoprinc01tayl 


[ iii  3 


T O T H E 

p 

president 

OF  THE 

UNITED  STATES.; 


S I R, 

In  the  fpirit  of  truth,  and  not  of  adulation, 
does  the  following  performance  folicit  your  attention. 
Nor  is  its  hope  of  acquiring  fome  fhare  of  your  coun- 
tenance diminifhed,  by  the  circumftance  of  your  not 
having  in  an  official  charafter  withheld  your  fignature, 
from  feveral  of  the  meafures  inveltigated. 

A refponfibiiity  in  the  chief  magiflratc,  for  the  efiefts 
of  every  legiflative  aft — an  avowal,  that  unforefeen 
confequences,  however  mifchievous,  ought  to  be  fub- 
mitted  to,  for  the  fake  of  confiftency  in  error — that  ex- 
periment in  fearch  of  truth,  is  to  be  rejefted  ; are  po- 
fitions  to  which  a liberal  and  enlightened  mind  will  ne- 
ver accede. 

Y our  general  affent  to  laws  ought  to  be  afcribed  to 
republican  principles,  and  not  to  an  indifcriminate  ap- 
probation of  their  contents.  To  yourfelf  therefore,  as 
well  as  to  every  other  citizen,  remains  iDtire  the  inva- 
luable birth-right  of  freedom  in  the  re-examination  of 
public  meafures.  For  furely  the  right  and  duties  of  a 
citizen  cannot  be  abforbed  by  official  functions.  ' 


3?S?/j 


t iv  ] 

Whilft,  under  the  influence  of  republicanifm,  you 
have  cautioufly  checked  the  will  of  the  people,  you 
have  a!fo  referved  your  negative  power,  to  be  exerted 
on  great  and  momentous  occalions,  for  the  prefervation 
of  their  rights.  Such  an  occafion  occured  in  a direft 
attempt  upon  the  principles  of  reprefentation,  the  do- 
feat  of  which  fufliciently  evinces,  that  you  cannot  ap- 
prove of  the  indireft  means  by  which  thefe  principles 
have  been  fo  much  more  deeply  wrounded,  than  that 
attempt  contemplated.  Can  it  then  be  delufion  to  che- 
rilh  a hope,  that  alfaults  directed  againfl;  the  vital  organ 
of  popular  government,  are  deltined  to  be  defeated  by 
the  ame  laudable  vigilance  ? 


The  AUTHOR. 


{|FuUs$W 


AN 

ENQUIRY 

INTO  THE  PRINCIPLES  AND  TENDENCY  OF  CERTAIN 
PUBLIC  MEASURES. 


SECTION  I. No  FREE  GOVERNMENT  OR  THE  BLESS- 

INGS OF  LIBERTY  CAN  BE  PRESERVED  TO  ANY  PEO- 
PLE, BUT  BY  A FREQUENT  RECURRENCE  TO  FUN- 
DAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. 

TTHE  (late  of  politics  at  all  times,  ought  to  attract 
the  attention  of  a nation,  jealous  of  its  liberty, 
lately  purchafed  at  the  expence  of  much  blood  and  trea- 
fure.  To  what  more  important  fubject,  can  a portion 
of  our  attention  and  enquiries  be  applied  ? Private  im- 

I morality,  is  often  confined  to  the  deflruction  of  an  in- 
dividual, whilft  political  immorality-  will  ruin  a nation. 
When  the  honelt  and  unfufpicious,  are  falling  into  the 
fnares  of  the  felfifh  and  cunning,  it  behoves  all  pollened 
of  a fmgle  fympathetic  fpark,  to  found  the  alarm  ; and 
when  an  alarm  is  founded,  temerity  and  folly  only,  will 
have  to  deplore  the  want  of  prudence  and  caution. 

National  watchfulnefs  is  the  only  preff  rvative  or 
liberty.  A patriot  magiftracy  hardly  appears  to  glad- 
den the  hiftoric  patre,  once  in  a century.  Shall  Ame- 
ricans  then  rely  on  a phenomenon  to  guard  tnetr  ngn.s. 
Fanaticifm  alone  will  fondly  wait  for  a miracle.  Or 
fliall  we  call  in  the  aid  of  plain  and  unerring  arithmetic, 
from  whence  to  extract  a rule  for  our  conduct.  Cal- 
I culate.  How  jnany  bad  kings  for  one  good  one  are 
I recorded  inhiftory  ? Aicertain  this,  and  the  refult 

B 


[ * ] 

dibits  the  exact  chance  for  freedom,  held  by  the  tenure 
of  a blind  and  implicit  reliance  on  the  integrity  of  the 
magiftracy. 

If  to  be  watchful  at  all  times,  is  a neceflary  effort  of 
national  prudence,  the  precept  is  pronounced  by  the 
tongue  of  liberty  to  be  indifpenfable,  at  an  epoch  of  ex- 
periment. Corrupt  morals  in  a ftate  of  infancy,  fore- 
bode a licentious  manhood,  and  a wicked  old  age. — 
By  giving  a proper  tone  to  a young  government,  and 
rooting  an  adminiftration  in  the  found  principles  or 
political  morality,  happinefs  will  be  acquired  for  our- 
felves  and  our  polterity.  By  fparing  the  rod,  we  may 
fpoil  the  child.  Like  an  ill  weed  which  grows  apace, 
it  wilifoon  become  loo  flrong  for  correction,  and  in- 
ftead  of  being  a bleffing,  it  will  turn  out  a curie  to  its 
parents. 

To  leave  the  allegory.  As  a bad  form  of  govern- 
ment, may  by  means  of  a good  adminiftration,  produce 
national  happinefs,  fo  a good  form  of  government,  may 
be  abufed  into  an  engine  of  fraud  and  corruption. 
Mifchievons  precedents,  or  innovations  upon  the  con- 
flitution,  are  matured  by  time  into  municipal  regulati- 
ons, or  fundamental  rules.  Antiquity  will  begin  to 
fhew  its  filvered  locks,  and  under  the  difguife  of  lanfti- 
ty,  will  lay  hold  of  the  firit  admiffible  moment  to  in- 
trench itfelf  behind  the  bulwark  of  prefeription.  Cuf- 
tom  will  be  arrayed  againfl  reafon.  Prejudice,  intcreft, 
ridicule,  invective,  authority  and  power,  will  appear  as 
auxiliaries  to  the  former;  whil'd  the  latter  will  have  no 
nllv,  except  argument,  andmuft  alfo  ruTume  the  qnplea- 
fant  language  of  reformation.  Combating  with  fuch 
odds,  a defeat  would  be  almoft  inevitable,  and  afflicting 
would  be  the  fenlations  of  honeftmen  in  the  reflection, 
that  by  their  fupinenefs  they  have  betrayed  the  molt 
facred  depofit,  inffead  of  tranfmittipg  it  unimpaired  to 
polterity. 


[ 5 1 

Every  acquifition  is  infallibly  loft  by  inattention.— ~ 
I.iberty,  tho’  ineftimable,  is  the  mod  difficult  to  pre-- 
ferve.  It  is  incapable  of  being  fecured  by  bars  and' 
bolts,  and  is  therefore  conftantly  expofed  to  the  pilla- 
ges of  intereft.  It  is  a general  indivinble  property, 
whence  few  feel  a particular  obligation  or  intereft,  to  be 
militant  under  its  banner.  It  is  committed  to  the  cuf- 
tody  of  magiftrates,  but  in  the  end  they  feldom  fail  to 
betray  t'neir  trull,  unlcis  awed  by  thefocial  jurifdiclion. 
Are  magiftrates  enraptured  with  her  beauties,  and  jea- 
lous left  others  ihould  participate  in  her  charms  ? Or 
do  they  deteft  a deity,  who  bellows  liberally  upon  all, 
becaufc  it  is  her  character  to  bellow  impartially  ? 

The  aflfaults  upon  the  virtue  of  men  in  power,  if  facts 
can  be  afeertained  from  etfedls,  mud  be  hard  to  with- 
ftand.  But  many  brilliant  examples  exile,  proving  that 
they  are  not  irrefutable.  A frequent  and  firm  national 
enquiry  into  the  meafures  of  government,  will  check 
political  vice,  and  reward  political  virtue.  The  ardour 
of  honefty  will  be  awakened.  ~W hat  incitement  to  pa- 
triotifm  exifts,  if  the  good  and  bad — the  noneft  and 
knaviffi — the  benevolent  and  mifanthropic,  are  depoli- 
ted  by  national  fupinenefs  in  one  common  oblivious 
receptacle  ? Sell  intereft,  chicanery,  peculation,  and 
not  public  efteem,  will  (ha pen  the  adminiftration.  M x- 
gillrates  will  provide  fuch  a recompence  as  they  love, 
and  when  fordid  paffions  are  to  be  gratified,  and  are 
their  own  carvers,  what  degree  of  moderation  is  to  be 
expected  ? The  wheat  can  only  be  feparated  from  the 
chaff  by  fifting.  Lazinefs  in  politics  is  like  lazinefs  in 
agriculture.  It  will  expofe  the  foil  to  noxious  weeds. 
The  wholefome  plants  will  {brink  from  a ftate  of  indis- 
criminate amnefty,  and  difdaining  a difhonprable  fo- 
ciety,  will  lea/e  the  held  in  the  pcffeffion  of  tares  and 
thillles. 

If  thefe  principles  are  political  axioms,  whence  hap- 
pens it,  that  the  direction  in  which  the  American  go- 


% 


i 4 : 

«rernmcnt  is  moving,  hath  hardly  attra&ed  the  public 
notice  of  the  particular  flates,  or  of  private  individuals? 
Is  this  direction  invariably  right  ? Is  it  univerfaliy  fa- 
tisfaclory  ? Have  intereft,  ridicule  or  inventive,  depri" 
ved  truth  of  her  articulating  powers  ? Or  is  fhe  brow- 
beaten by  power  or  authority  ? * 

That  this  univerfal  fatisfaclion  does  not  exift,  is  exhi- 
bited by  almoll  every  private  company.  It  is  often  af- 
i’erted  that  the  administration  is  driving  at  monarchy — : 
that  the  legiflature  is  corrupt — and  that  the  conflitution 
has  been  more  deliberately  broken,  than  it  was  formed. 

t 

Thefe  aiTertions  are  alarming.  Theydeferve  invefti- 
gation.  The  national  mind  is  moved,  and  muff  be  fa- 
tisfied.  Shew  it  the  good  or  harm  which  awaits  the 
community,  that  it  may  either  rejoice  in  the  one,  or 
repel  the  other. 

The  conclufion  of  a Prefidential  revolution,  is  a pro- 
per period  from  whence  to  look  back.  Let  us  confider 
whether  the  retrofpecl  exhibits  encouragement  to  pro- 
ceed, and  to  what  ultimate  point  the  fame  direction  will 
probably  lead  us. 

Will  you,  reader,  accompany  me  in  fuch  reflections  ? 
Ye  fovereign  flates,  will  you  contribute  your  contin- 
gents of  invelligation  ? It  may  obviate  a neceflity  for 
contingents  of  another  nature,  upon  fome  occaflon, 
which  may  not  be  very  dillant. 


SECTION  II. — The  principles  of  the  investi- 
gation. 

BUT  before  we  proceed  it  is  proper  to  form  apolitical 
compafs  to  guide  our  courfe.  If  political  principles 
pxift — if  the  rights  of  man , are  words  of  real  mean- 


[ 5 1 

ing;  if  there  are  none  favoured  of  heaven, with  an  infcrip- 
tion  of  fupremacy  on  their  foreheads,  furely  there  can 
be  no  difficulty  in  {'electing  a few  fimple  axioms,  beyond 
the  reach  of  polemical  artifice, and  containing  adegree  of 
internal  evidence,  compelling  indubitable  convidtion. 

Unhappily  we  dare  not  rely  intirely  on  the  conftitu- 
tion  of  the  United  States.  That  hath  indeed  a confo- 
lation,  in  not  having  been  treated  vrorfe  than  the  holy 
feriptures.  Political  and  religious  herefy,  being  of 
kindred  families,  will  act  from  fimilar  motives.  Nei- 
ther will  ever  want  a text  to  defend  its  ufurpations  up- 
on orthodox  principles  either  human  or  divine,  becaufe 
neither  have  in  view  the  public  good.  And  felf  inter- 
eft  is  the  moft  induftrious  principle  imaginable,  in  hunt- 
ing out  cafuiftical  arguments  and  diftinftions,  to  de- 
lude mankind  into  a Hate,  the  moft  favourable  for  its 
defigns.  It  would  be  difficult  for  inflance,  for  a man  of 
underftanding,  w’hofe  only  motive  was  the  common 
good,  to  find  in  the  conflitution,  a fingie  exprdfion 
w’hich  contemplated  the  erection  of  banks,  or  other 
corporations.  For  corporations  are  only  deeds  of  gift, 
or  of  bargain  and  fale,  for  portions  of  valuable  common 
rights  ; and  parts  may  be  difpofed  of,  until  the  whole 
is  distributed  among  a few  individuals.  But  yet,  poli- 
tical herefy,  views  of  intereft,and  a union  of  talents  and 
induftry,  may  puzzle,  perplex  and  miflead,  even  a found 
head,  and  a good  heart.  Hence  arifes  an  argument 
for  avoiding  fo  broad  a theoremic  bafts,  as  the  confti- 
tution  of  the  United  States. 

A feleftion  of  plain,  tho’  great  principles,  refulting 
from  the  conftitution,  as  the  theorems  to  guide  our  in- 
veftigations  into  the  objects  and  defigns  of  the  adminif- 
tration,is  the  only  remaining  alternative.  Without  a teft 
for  truth,  felf  interelt  and  innovation,  by  their  wiiy  ar- 
tifices, will  flip  out  of  our  grafp.  Or  by  affirming  new 
and  harmlefs  forms,  they  may  withdraw  thcmielvcs  from 
the  view7,  even  oi  an  inveftigating  eye. 


C « ] 

Are  not  the  following  propofitions  unqueftionable  ? 

1.  That  the  conftitution  contemplates  a republican 
form  of  government,  Mowing  from  and  depending 
on  the  people  ; and  that  a mode  of  administration, 
deftructive  of  fuch  dependence,  and  introductory 
of  monarchical  ingredients,  innovates  upon  and  fub- 
verts  the  conftitution. 

2.  That  Congrefs  can  impofe  taxes  for  the  common 
defence  and  general  welfare,  of  the  United  States, 
but  not  for  the  benefit  of  individuals  or  their  own 
private  emolument . 

3.  That  the  right  of  legislation,  refided,  and  yet  re- 
fides  in  the  people  cf  the  United  States. 

4.  That  this  right  is  periodically  delegated  by  electi- 
on to  their  reprefentatives. 

5.  That  the  right  of  election  is  a fubftance  and  not  a 
form, and  that  a legitimate  reprefentation,implies  an 
exifling  operative  principle,  in  the  reprefenting,  im- 
pelling them  for  the  good  of  the  reprei’ented. 

6.  That  whenever  this  principle  ceafes  to  exift,  go- 
vernment is  converted  into  an  ufurpation. 

Let  thefe  pofitions  conftitute  the  text.  Compare 
with  it  ftrictlv  the  enfuing  commentary.  Confider  if 
the  arguments  are  conformable  and  appofite.  With- 
out much  reflection  we  aflent  to  propofitions,  felf  evi- 
dently true,  but  a compofition  of  reafonings,  deducing 
political  effects  from  political  caufes,  and  trying  mea- 
sures by  the  teft  of  principle,  require  conlideration.  If 
conviction  would  flalh  in  upon  our  minds,  when  a 
public  mifehief  was  barely  named,  argument  would  be 
fuperfluous.  And  yet  too  ready  an  aifenr,  leaves  the 
mind  unprepared  to  repel  the  deceitful  efforts,  which 
will  be  made  to  delude  it  ; whereas  a conviction,  re- 
fulting  from  a deliberate  inveftigaiion  is  hard  to  lhake. 
The  following  performance  folicits  nothing,  but  a cir- 
cumfpect  confideration.  Confcious  of  human  weak- 
nefs,  it  prefumes  not  to  fet  up  for  infallibility ; and  in 
exerting  its  own  privilege  of  thinking,  only  deftgns  to 


\ 


Viduce  others  to  think  alfo.  Confeious  too  of  politi- 
cal purity,  a detection  of  its  errors  will  give  it  pleafurc, 
■tvhilft  it  will  cling  to  its  truths  with  principled  fidelity. 


SUCTION  III. — The  bank  or  the  united  states 

CONSIDERED. 

THE  bank  of  the  United  States,  is  the  matter  key 
of  that  fyttem,  which  governs  the  adminittration- 
It  could  unlock  a depofitory  of  fecrets,  which  would,  if 
expofed,  reflect  much  light  upon  the  fubiect.  But  we 
are  confined  to  the  information  to  be  extracted  from  the 
law  itfelr,  and  its  obvious  effects  ; premifing  however, 
that  fecrets  enacted  by  law,  are  fecrct  laws.  They  ope- 
rate upon  the  ignorant,  and  punifh  the  innocent ; and 
are  as  inevitable,  as  the  ttroke  of  death.  An  inttituti- 
on,  the  object  of  which  is  gain,  would  not  have  ftudi- 
oufly  legalifed  the  privacy  of  its  tranfadions,  unlefs  that 
privacy  had  begotten  gain.  The  wilue  to  fome,  of  be- 
ing in  the  fccrer,  is  precifely  the  amount  of  a fraudu- 
lent lofs  inflicted  upon  others,  who  are  not  fo. 

It  is  about  to  be  proved,  that  a defign  for  erecting 
arittocracy  and  monarchy,  is  fubfifting — that  a money  im- 
■pulfe , and  not  the  public  good , is  operating  on  Congrefs; 
and  that  taxes  are  impofed  upon  motives,  other  than 
the  general  welfare.  The  leading  evidence  evincing 
thefe  attentions,  is  to  be  extracted  from  the  bank  fcheme, 
which  was  contrived,  propofed,  and  modelled  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treafury,  and  therefore  it  is  felected 
as  the  firft  fubjecl  of  inveftigation. 

The  bufinefs  of  banking,  is  firnply  a reiterated  ex- 
change-of  obligations  for  the  payment  of  money.  A. 
gives  his  bond  to  B.  and  receives  B’s  bond  in  exchange. 
But  A.  pays  B.  an  intereft,  whereasB.  pars  A.  none.  A. 
is  the  community , B.  is  the  bank.  How  mutt  this  traffic 
end  ? 


- E * 3 

This  idea  requires  illuftration.  In  a barter  of  two" 
commodities,  two  interefts  only  are  concerned,  altho* 
each  of  thefe  interefts  may  be  compounded  of  many 
individuals.  Thus  buyer  and  feller  comprife  many 
perfons,  though  they  confift  of  but  two  claffes.  All 
thofe  who  deal  with  the  bank,  conftitute  one  clafs,  and 
the  ftockholders,  or  proprietors  of  the  bank,  another, 
lhe  dealers  depofit  their  bonds  or  notes  carrying  an 
intereft,  and  receive  in  exchange  the  bonds  or  notes 
of  the  ftockholders,  carrying  no  intereft.  And  the 
difference  between  receiving  an  intereft  out  of  paper, 
>*hilft  it  pays  none  on  fimilar  paper,  conftitutes  the 
great  ground  of  profit  to  the  bank. 

. fcheme  reprefents  the  idea  of  a perpetual  rota- 
tion, depofiting  a profit  at  every  revolution.  It  might 
have  been  compared  to  a fpecies  of  hazard,  called  the 
A.  B.  C.  table,  except  that  the  latter  propofes  to  the 
adventurers  fome  chance  to  win;  whereas  the  bank 
can  never  lofc.  I he  fable  bets  with  its  gamblers  up- 
on every  revolution  ico  to  ics £,  fio  that  in  forty  re- 
volutions, the  adventurers  bet  two  to  one.  Yet  a 
chance  for  winning  exifts.  But  in  that  refpect  the 
companion  fails.  rI  he  bank  i-s  perpetually  betting  ioo 
to,  t^le  wager  is  always  drawn,  and  the  bank  re- 
ceives the  fix  in  every  hundred,  by  way  of  forfeit. 

Suppofe  two  perfons  were  every  moment  in  the  year 
exchanging  bonds,  one  paying  an  intereft  of  fix  per 
centum,  and  the  other  not,  how  would  matters  ftand 
vvnen  a fetllement  took  place?  rihe  gain  acquired  by 
one,  would  be  precifely  fimilar  to  that  which  confti- 
tuics  the  dividend  of  banks.  In  a private  cafe,  it 
would  be  called  a grofs  device,  to  evade  the  ftatutes  of 
nfury ; and  yet  the  enactors  of  thofe  ftatutes  have  le- 
ga  ifed  the  fame  device  in  the  erection  of  banks,  and 
thus  fubject  the  whole  community  to  that  which 
would  be  a fraud  upon  an  individual. 

The  bank  evidently  conftitutes  one  clafs,  and  thofe 
wuo  deal  with  it  another.  It  evidently  appears  that 


f if  ] 

tfie  bank  muft  gain.  This  gain  neceflarily  implies  a 
lofs,  becaufe  the  traffic  is  of  an  unproductive  nature. 
’ 1'is  a traffic  in  ideas,  not  in  fubflances.  But  it  is  not 
fo  eafy  to  difcern  upon  whom  this  lofs  falls.  And 
this  is  a difficulty,  which  the  favourers  of  the  artifice 
have  taken  care  to  promote,  becaufe  a detection  upon, 
this  point  would  blow  up  the  contrivance. 

And  yet  a fmall  portion  of  reflection  mud  get  over 
it.  The  misfortune  mull;  fall  upon  fomebody.  rlhe 
immediate  dealers  with  the  bank  mull  bear  it,  or  they 
are  reimburfed  by  thofe  who  deal  with  them.  There- 
fore the  lofs  mud  fall  upon  the  whole  community,  or  a 
part  of  it.  What  defence  of  the  inftitution  would  it 
be,  to  fay,  that  it  felects  a devoted  few  for  annual  ruin* 
whilft  it  fpares  the  great  mafs  of  the  community  ? If 
the  monfter  is  to  be  fed  on  human  labour,  it  would  be 
fair  to  determine  the  victim  by  lot,  as  to  refort  to  a 
decoy; 

But  it  would  be  unjuft  to  impeach  the  bank  of  an 
impofition,  not  palliated  by  the  fubterfuge,  “ that 
thofe  imported;  on  are  able  to  bear  the  lofs.”  To  this 
fpecies  of  palliation,  it  is  certainly  entitled.  For  it  the 
lofs  neceflarily  refulting  from  the  traffic,  had  fallen 
exclufively  on  the  immediate  adventurers,  inevitable 
and  fpeedy  ruin  muft  have  enfued  from  the  enormous 
profit  of  the  bank  ; and  the  deftruction  of  feme  would 
have  deterred  others  from  adventuring  within  the 
reach  of  this  devouring  monfter.  A contrary  efl'eft  is 
clearly  obfervable  ; and  therefore  the  immediate  deal- 
ers muft,  by  lbme  circuitous  operation,  obtain  a re- 
imburfement.  Hence  the  bank  may  certainly  boaft, 
that  the  evils  fhe  difpenies,  like  the  contents  ol  Pan- 
dora’s box,  are  pretty  equally  diftributed. 

Though  it  might  redound  to  our  amufement  to 
trace  this  operation,  it  would  contribute  but  little  to 
our  edification.  The  conclufion  will  be  better  evinced 

0 


[ 10  ] 

by  a few  ftrong  lines,  than  by  an  aflemblage  of  thd 
tnoft  diverfified  colourings.  The  gain  is  made.  The 
lofs  cannot  fall  on  the  immediate  gamblers,  /or  two 
reafons.  They  are  not  ruined,  nor  do  they  work. 
Gain  can  never  arife  out  of  nothing,  becaufe  it  is  fub- 
ftantial.  It  mu  ft  therefore  be  the  product  of  labour, 
and  labour  only  ; and  that  which  produces  the  gain, 
mull  ofcourfe  bear  the  lofs.  The  gamblers  themfelves 
are  only  the  brokers  between  the  bank  and  thofe  who 
really  l'uffer  by  the  inftitution.  Brokers  add  nothing 
to  the  commodity.  They  carry  on  the  traffic  between 
their  employers  to  a great  amount  for  a profit.  If 
they  made  no  profit,  they  would  ceafe  to  purfue  the 
profeflion.  The  immediate  receivers  of  the  bank  pa- 
per, circulate  it  identically,  or  virtually,  among  their 
principals,  who  pay  both  their  profit,  and  the  gain  of 
the  bank.  This  gain  flows  in  upon  the  bank  in  num- 
berlefs  devious  ftreams,  fupplied  by  the  whole  commu- 
nity. Thefe  ftreams,  unlefs  thus  fupplied,  would 
have  become  dry,  becaufe  they  would  have  exhaufted 
a few  unfed  refervoirs.  But  they  appear  to  be  inex- 
hauftible,  and  therefore  they  muft  arife  from  the  la- 
bour of  the  community,  which  is  the  only  inexhaufti- 
bie,  ever  running  fountain  of  wealth. 

The  principals  of  thefe  brokers,  are  the  original 
fellers  of  wharever  labour  produces,  and  the  confumers 
of  the  wares  the  brokers  deal  in.  This  definition  in- 
cludes the  whole  agricultural,  mechanical,  profeflional 
and  mercantile  interefts  of  the  community,  unconcern- 
ed in  the  device.  And  upon  this  aggregate  muft  fall 
the  gain  fo  regularly  collected  by  the  bank. 

Without  perplexing  ourfelves,  to  trace  out  the  vari- 
ous modes,  by  wrhich  the  firft  dealers  with  the  bank 
are  reimburfed  from  the  wealth  ot  this  aggregate,  it 
may  not  be  amifs  to  felebt  one,  the  features  of  which  are 
fo  grofs  and  prominent,  as  not  eafily  to  be  for- 
gotten. 


[ ” 3 

The  fydem  throws  into  a few  hands,  a monopoly  of 
the  bulk  of  the  circulating  medium.  If  a man  could 
monopolize  any  neceffary  article  of  commerce,  he  would 
gain,  by  borrowing  money  at  fix  per  centum  to  effect 
fuch  an  object.  In  the  event, he  would  not  lofe  this  inte- 
red.  The  profits  refulting  from  his  monopoly,  would 
reimburse  it  manifold.  The  intereft,  as  well  as  his  pro- 
fit, would  be  reimburfed  by  thofe  upon  whom  the  mo- 
nopoly operated.  Can  any  monopoly  be  more  diffufve  in 
its  operations , than  that  of  the  great  bulk  of  the  circulating 
medium. 

Such  a monoply  is  a kind  of  general  fearch  warrant 
for  wealth,  filently  penetrating,  and  condantly  ex- 
tracting from,  the  mod  fecure  funds.  The  profits  of 
the  national  labour,  are  in  the  fituation  of  a treafure, 
gradually  diminifhed  by  fecret  and  continual  thefts. 


SECTION  IV. — The  same  subject  continued. 

THE  powers  of  a weapon  ought  to  be  thoroughly 
underflood,  before  we  venture  to  try  its  edge. — - 
A bank  is  a machine  of  fuch  wonderful  and  cunning 
contrivances,  that  we  mud  be  content  to  proceed  much 
farther  in  our  enquiries,  before  we  fhall  comprehend 
its  mechanifm,  or  be  able  to  form  a competent  judg- 
ment of  its  effects. 

If  the  reafonings  of  the  lad  fection  are  jud,  we  are 
forcibly  impelled  to  an  awful  idea.  The  reader  has 
already  exclaimed,  that  the  profits  of  the  bank  are  ob- 
vioufly  an  indirect  tax  upon  the  community.  He  is 
right,  and  it  is  impoffible  for  the  mod  cunning  argu- 
mentative delufion  to  refute  the  affertion. 

Can  the  pecuniary  neceffities  of  a government  be 
fupplied  by  any  poffible  contrivance,  wrhich  will  not 
operate  as  a tax  ? If  an  anfwer  is  given  in  the  affirma- 
tive, divulge,  we  reply,  the  glorious  l'ecret  for  man- 


[ i?  3 

kind,  by  which  they  may  enjoy  all  the  benefits  of  good 
government,  without  paying  for  them.  If  in  the  ne- 
gative, we  thus  proceed : 

The  capital  of  the  United  States’  bank  is  ten  millions, 
of  which  the  United  States  own  two.  The  dividend  is 
eight  per  centum  per  annum.  This  alone  is  an  annual 
income  of  800,000  dollars,  of  which  160,000  belong 
to  the  nation.  The  whole  dividend,  though  but  an 
article  of  the  income,  is  confiderably  more  than  fuffi- 
cient  to  defray  the  whole  expence  of  the  civil  govern- 
ment. If  it  was  the  property  of  the  continent,  it 
would  be  thus  applied,  and  in  fuch  an  event,  would  the 
government  be  carried  on,  without  any  expence  to  the 
community  ? 

Except  for  the  unaccountable  infatuation  which  ex- 
ills  upon  the  fubjeft,  arguments,  as  to  this  point,  would 
appear  puerile.  Becaufe  pofitions,  evidently  true,  re- 
quire no  proof. 

If  the  whole  profits  of  the  bank  had  been  railed  and 
applied  for  public  ufe,  as  a part  really  are,  it  mull  be 
admitted,  that  it  would  have  been  an  indirect  tax,  un- 
til it  is  proved,  that  government  poflefs  a faculty  of  fup- 
porting  itfelf,  by  paper  flight  of  hand,  without  burthen- 
mg  the  community. 

It  then  occurs  to  demand,  whether  the  nature  of  the 
contribution  is  altered  as  to  the  payers,  by  a tranfmu- 
tation  of  thofe  who  receive  the  tribute  ? Is  it  the  lefs  a 
tax  upon  the  community,  becaufe  it  is  received  by  an 
Individual  corporation,  confilling  of  a few  private  per- 
fons,  many  of  them  foreigners  ? 

But  fuppofe  we  borrow  one  of  thofe  newly  invented 
expreflions,  conveying  no  determinate  idea,  and  cal- 
culated to  deceive  : And  inltead  of  calling  the  bank  adl 
a tax  law,  baptize  it  thus,  “ a law  exercifin^  a faculty 
of  government.”  It  mull  yet  be  confefled,  that  it  is  a 
ygry  valuable  faculty.  It  is  worth  to  the  bank  of  the 


* 


C 13  ] 

United  States,  an  annuity,  more  than  fufficient  to 
I defray  the  whole  expence  of  civil  government,  and  to 
I all  the  banks  now  operating,  an  income  probably  equi- 
I valent  to  the  public  expences,  both  ordinary  and  extra- 
| ordinary. 

But  whatever  is  its  value,  it  was  undoubtedly  a pub- 
lic property,  becaufe  the  legiflature  in  exerciling  this 
faculty,  were  public,  and  not  private  agents.  The  con- 
veyance then  of  this  faculty  by  law,  was  a gift  or  bar- 
gain and  fale,  of  fo  much  public  property  to  private 
perfons.  If  the  former,  it  beflowed  upon  them  gra- 
fuitoufly,  an  immenfe  revenue,  which  can  only  arife 
| from  the  common  ftock  of  wealth  ; if  the  latter,  it  fells 

iin  a ratio  of  Sop, 000  dollars  annually  of  faculty,  for  the 
privilege  of  having  160,000  dollars  of  the  fame  faculty, 
annually  reftored.  In  either  view,  the  meafure  was  a 
J public  folly,  and  a private  gain. 

The  public  poflefs  a great  variety  of  valuable  facul- 
! ties.  In  parcelling  them  out  among  an  ariftocracy,whom 
I we  fee  growing  up  as  if  by  the  power  of  magic,  a 
I difpofition  by  portions,  would  have  been  lefs  grievous 
I than  to  give  them  all  away  at  once.  The  faculties  of 
1 fome  cities,  counties,  and  even  ftates,  bellowed  upon 
I private  corporations,  would  yet  have  left  others  in  pof- 
I ieflion  of  their  rights  and  privileges.  And  it  would 
I have  been  more  excufable  for  the  legiflature  of  a great 
I nation,  to  have  proflituted  the  public  interefl  in  a few 
I particular  inflances,  than  to  conftitute  itielf  the  bawd- 
I general,  for  fupplying  the  infatiable  luff  of  an  ariftocracy. 
1 The  attempt  of  Appius  upon  Virginia,  was  more  tole- 
. rable,  than  a general  ariftocratical  invafion  of  the  na- 
| tional  chaflitv.  And  yet,  preferring  death  to  proflitution, 

I;  her  bright  example  aroufed  the  Roman  fpirit,  and  the 
j virtue  of  a fnnple  maid,  reftored  the  liberty  of  a whole 
I people. 

The  public  faculties  are  the  offsprings  of  labour. — 
j Leaving  therefore  unmeaning  terms,  which  may  mif- 


[ *4  ] 

lead  or  perplex  us,  xve  will  refume  expreffions,  which 
convey  a determinate  idea. 

Bank  flock  is  public  debt.  It  is  public  debt  of  the 
vrorfl  kind,  fince  it  bears  an  enormous  and  incomputa- 
ble intereft,  as  will  hereafter  be  (hewn.  Nothing  but  a 
tax  can  pay  this  intereft,  unlefs  it  is  proved  that  the  in- 
tereft on  the  funded  debt,  might  have  been  paid  with- 
out a tax.  And  if  this  could  be  proved,  then  it  would 
be  replied,  that  the  faculty  ought  to  have  been  dedica- 
ted to  that  ufe. 

The  bank  might  have  been  fold  to  public  creditors 
in  lieu  of  intereft.  If  the  price  had  been  ten  millions 
of  fix  per  cents,  and  the  profits  eleven  per  centum,  the 
purchafers  would  have  made  a good  bargain,  fuppofing 
they  had  depofited  ten  millions  more  of  aftual  fpecie, 
as  flock  upon  which  to  circulate  paper.  But  if  they 
could  have  circulated  ten  millions  of  paper,  upon  a de- 
pofit  of  not  more  than  one  million  of  fpecie,  as  the  bank 
probably  does,  the  bargain  would  have  been  a good 
one,  reducing  the  profit  even  to  eight  per  centum. — 
Such  a foftening  meafure,  is  dated  as  illuftrating  the 
pernicioufnefs  of  the  contrivance,  and  not  as  allowing 
that  it  would  have  been  a fufficient  ground  of  juftifica- 
tion.  Where  is  the  merit  of  afyftem  of  finance,  which 
ufes  public  property  to  increafe,  and  not  to  diminifhthe 
public  burthens  ? 

Bank  flock  is  public  debt  of  the  mod  ruinous  kind, 
and  yet  no  confederation  was  paid,  really  or  nominally  for 
it.  If  the  legiflature  had  prefented  the  bank  proprie- 
tors with  ten  millions  of  funded  debt,  in  lieu  of  this 
faculty,  the  community  would  have  been  gr«at  gainers, 
becaufe  the  profit  accruing  from  the  gift,  could  not 
have  exceeded  an  average  of  between  four  and  fire  per 
centum.  If  twenty  millions  had  been  fo  prefented, 
even  that  would  have  been  better  for  the  community, 
becaufe  the  profit  would  not  only  have  been  as  low  as 
the  gain  made  by  the  bank,  but  it  would  have  been 


[ J5  3 

known  and  limited — it  might  have  been  provided  by 
tax-laws  equalizing  the  burthen — it  would  have  been 
fubject  to  redemption — and  above  all,  it  wc  uli  not  have 
committed  a depredation  upon  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  reprefentation. 

Had  fo  much  public  debt  btznbonejlly , and  not  artificial - 
/^accumulated, it  mud  have  been  earned  by  labour, which 
would  have  produced  a general  didribution  of  it,  obvi- 
ating an  exorbitant  accumulation  of  wealth  in  a few 
private  hands. 

But  an  effect,  which  was  a leading  motive  for  the 
contrivance  would  then  have  been  defer te  1.  Its  chief 
defign  was  to  make  the  rich,  richer ; and  the  poor, 
poorer.  And  thus  I prove  it. 

Money  and  credit,  or  an  equivalent  for  them,  wer« 
to  be  depofited  as  the  only  mode  of  acquiring  bank- 
dock.  The  poor  had  neither  to  depofit,  the  rich  pof- 
feffed  both.  An  exclufion  of  the  one,  and  a preference 
of  the  other,  though  not  expreffed,  w-as  evidently  de- 
fined, becaufe  it  unavoidably  refulted  from  the  nature 
of  the  contrivance.  And  the  effedt  anfwcrs  the  defign. 
A portion  of  the  rich  clafs  of  citizens,  are  the  pro- 
prietors of  the  device,  whilit  labour  fupports  it.  An 
annuity  to  a great  amount,  is  fuddenly  conjured  up 
by  law,  which  is  received  cxclufively  by  the  rich,  that 
is  the  ariffocracy.  Will  it  n t make  them  richer?  It 
is  paid  out  of  labour,  and  labour  in  all  countries  falls 
on  the  poor.  Will  it  not  make  this  clafs  poorer  ? and 
do  fuch  effedts  tend  to  corredt  the  principles  of  either  ? 

Suppofe  a religious  fociety  fhould  be  excluhvely  in- 
corporated, and  by  hook  or  crook  provided  with  an 
ample  revenue,  payable  from  the  labour  of  all  fuch 
focieties.  Would  it  not  become  an  ejlabljhed  churchy 
and  w'ould  it  not  impoverifh  and  eventually  fwahovv  up 
all  others  ? A political  fedt,  thus  incorporated,  and 
thus  provided  for,  will  have  a political  tendency,  of  a. 


* 


C i6  ] 

nature  precifely  fimilar.  No  diftindlion  ex’ifts  between 
* the  cauies,  and  none  therefore  will  appear  in  the  effects. 
And  if  it  be  faid,  that  our  political  rights  are  nor  worth 
preferring,  let  it  be  remembered  that  they  are  the 
foie  guardians  of  religious  liberty.- 

If  the  arillocratical  fecit,  thus  incorporated,  had  ac- 
tually depofited  fpecie  in  their  bank,  it  would  yet  have 
remained  in  their  own  cuftody,  and  under  their  own 
direction  ; for  the  corporation  manages  its  own  con- 
cerns. Even  in  this  event,  labour  would  have  been 
taxed,  to  pay  to  the  rich  an  exorbitant  ufurio.us  inte- 
reft, for  their  own  money,  in  their  own  pockets,  and 
at  their  own  difpofal.  But  ufury  upon  actual  money* 
was  too  flow  a procefs  for  effecting  a vaft  difproportion 
of  wealth.  The  contrivance  is  calculated  to  beftow 
upon  the  rich,  intereft  upon  the  amount  of  their  cre- 
dit, not  of  their  cafh.  Bank-paper  is  circulated  to  an 
amount,  far  beyond  a depoilt  in  money.  It  refts  upon 
an  idea  called  credit.  And  all  intereft  gotten  for  this 
furplus  of  paper,  beyond  a fpecie  depoftt,  is  paid  by 
labour  to  the  rich,  becaufe  they  have,  what  the  poor 
ardently  with  for  ; and  therefore  they  ought  not  to  be 
taxed  for  wanting  it,  ffnce  this  precludes  even  a hopi 
of  fuch  an  acquifttion. 

How  delufive  is  a comparifon  between  bank-debts,  and 
private  loans  ? The  latter  muff;  confift  of  money  or  mo- 
ney’s worth,  and  without  one,  debts  between  individuals 
cannot  becreated;  the  former  may  be  created,  though  the 
bank  pofl'efles  neither  money  or  money’s  worth,  and  a 
banker  may  live  upon  the  labour  of  others  during  his 
whole  life,  if  he  can  conceal  the  fraud  of  his  being  a 
bankrupt.  The  latter  are  limited  within  reafonable 
bounds,  becaufe  they  are  founded  on  real  wealth,  which 
cannot  be  even  doubted  by  impreffing  hireoglyphicks 
upon  paper ; the  former  may  be  infinitely  multiplied 
by  a printing  prefs,  and  are  unlimited  fo  long  as  the 
nation  is  able  to  pay  fix  pounds  fpecie,  for  every  hun- 
dred pounds  of  idea,  which  a bank  may  be  pleaied  to 


t l7  f 

emit.  Tn  the  latter  cafe,  fomething  is  given  for  fome- 
thing  ; in  the  former,  the  community  pays  fomething 
for  nothing. 

But  a feature  of  this  monftrous  contrivance  is  now 
to  be  difclofed,  which  expofes  the  partiality  of  admi- 
niftration  to  a moneyed  intereft,  and  its  real  defign, 
beyond  a remnant  of  doubt. 

This  fame  worfhipful  ariftoeracy,  favoured  of  go* 
vernment,  for  the  bulk  of  their  bank-ftock,  were  not 
even  obliged  to  depofit  money.  Public  fecurities  car- 
rying an  intereft  of  fix  per  centum,  for  three  fourths 
of  the  whole  amount,  are  by  law  receivable  as  a depofit. 
If  actual  fpecie  had  been  locked  up  in  the  vaults  of 
the  bank,  to  be  occafionally  counted  by  public  autho- 
rity, a femblance  of  an  excufe  might  have  been  made, 
by  urging,  that  the  intereft  of  the  money  thus  depo- 
fted,  was  loft.  But  paper  certificates  are  depofited  as  a 
fund  upon  which  to  circulate  other  paper  certificates. 
Thefe  are  gaining  of  the  public  a never  ceafing  intereft, 
whether  kept  by  the  body  corporate,  or  the  individuals 
compofing  the  body  corporate.  What  an  unheard  of 
degree  of  political  iniquity  is  here  difclofed  ? To  the 
fix  per  centum  paid  by  government  on  feven  millions 
five  hundred  thoufand  dollars  of  the  public  debt,  is 
fuperadded  by  minifterial  contrivance,  the  cuftomary 
profit  gained  by  a bank,  and  the  unufual  acquifitions, 
amaffed  by  this  particular  feheme.  Legiflative  power 
itfeif  cannot  afeertain,  to  what  thefe  amount.  If  they 
extend  only  to  fix  per  centum,  then  twelve  per  centum 
is  received  out  of  the  public  labour,  by  certificate- 
holders  to  the  amount  of  7,500,000  dollars,  fome  of 
whom  may  pofiibly  poffefs  no  other  merit,  but  the  fraud 
of  having  purchai'ed  them  of  the  true  owners,  by  con- 
cealing their  knowledge  of  the  minifterial  defigns. 

A depofit  of  paper,  as  a fund  on  the  credit  of  which- 
to  iffue  other  paper,  is  a ruinous  feature,  exhibited  in 
no  other  feheme  of  the  fort  extant,  except  that  of  tha 

D 


t >8  ' ] 

United  States.  Hence  the  poor  compenfatioh  to  the 
public,  of  locking  up  fpecie  in  the  bank  ready  for  an 
urgency,  in  lieu  of  that  taken  out  of  circulation,  though 
pretended,  does  not  exift.  Inftead  of  fupporting  the 
credit  of  government,  government  muflfupport  the  cre- 
dit of  the  bank.  For  if  the  credit  of  the  government 
wavers,  public  paper  cannot  fuppoit  the  credit  of  the 
bank.  When  government  lhall  need  help,  the  bank 
will  need  it  alfo  ; nor  can  the  political  evils  refulting 
from  being  com  pleat  ly  ftript  of  the  fubjiantial  means 
of  defence,  be  alleviated  bv  unlocking  a hoard  of  paper 
certificates.  If  the  bank  had  really  collected  the  fpecie 
into  its  vaults,  government  would  have  been  rendered 
dependent  on  a private  corporation,  for  the  means  of 
national  defence.  If  the  bank  (hould  difapprove  of  de- 
fence, it  would  withhold  the  means.  Thus  it  would, 
have  become  the  arbiter  of  peace  and  war , and  in  cafe 
a combination  of  foreign  potentates,  fhould  endeavour 
to  impofe  on  America  a government  of  king,  lords,  and 
prelates,  what  would  have  been  the  arbitrament  of  a 
clafs,  from  whence  thofe  materials  muff  have  been 
taken  ? 

Banking  in  its  bcjl  view,  is  only  a fraud,  whereby  la- 
bour fuflers  the  impofition  of  paving  an  interefl:  on  the 
circulating  medium  ; whereas  if  fpecie  only  circulated, 
the  medium  would  in  palling  among  the  rich,  often  lie 
in  the  pockets  of  the  arinocracy  without  gaining  an  in- 
tereft.  But  the  ariftocracy,  as  cunning  as  rapacious, have 
contrived  this  device,  to  inflict  upon  labour  a tax,  con- 
flantly  working  for  their  emolument,  whilft.  they  alio 
retain  the  chief  ufe  of  the  call;,  and  fcldorn  part  with  its 
cuftody. 

The  Venitian  nobility  one  day  in  a tear,  convert 
their  palaces  into  gaming  houfes,  referving  and  exer- 
cifing  the  privilege  of  cheating  the  citizens  with  falfe 
dice,  who  are  on  that  occalion  indilcriminately  admit- 
ted. Worthy  Venitian  ariflocracy  ! Three  hundred 


[ 1 

and  fixtv-five  times  more  worthy  than  ihofe,  who  grow 
rich  by  means  of  apolitical  cheat,  diurnally  revolving, 
and  inevitable  by  prudence  itfelf. 


SEC  i ION  V.— The  same  subject  continued. 

THE  profits  of  the  bank  are  then  a tax  upon  the 
community.  But  a miferable  excufe  tor  this  pub- 
lic impofition  is  urged,  in  the  affertion  that  it  is  volun- 
tary. 1 he  effects  are  the  fame,  whether  it  is  paid 
willingly  or  unwillingly.  Labour  is  deprived  ot  its 
hard  earned  fruits.  A portion  of  thefe  is  gotten  from 
it,  and  bellowed  upon  eafe  and  affluence.  1 he  lols  is 
the  fame,  whether  a daring  robber,  extorts  your  pro- 
perty with  his  pitlol  at  your  bread,  or  whether  a mid- 
night thief  fecretly  filches  it  away.  Are  my  misfortunes 
palliated,  becaufe  I cannot  unravel  the  fr-aud  by  which 
they  were  brought  upon  me  ?- 

A wife  nation  and  an  honed  man,  will  view  with 
contempt  an  apology,  founded  in  a diftinciion  between 
fecret  fraud  and  open  violence* 

Miferable  as  the  excufe  is,  it  is  not  true.  Labour 
which  pays  the  tax,  has  no  volition,  or  even  agency 
in  the  t ran  fact  ion.  It  being  edablithed  by  law,  labour 
mull  pay  it  of  neceffity,  becaufe  the  law  enables  the 
rich,  to  tranfmute  the  circulating  coin  of  the  nation, 
to  their  own  paper  money,  bearing  an  intered. 

The  immediate  dealers  with  the  bank,  do  not  pay 
the  tax,  as  hath  been  proved.  If  reimburfement  had 
not  followed  their  advance  of  it,  inevitable  ruin  mud 
have  enfued,  and  a general  bankruptcy  of  the  deal- 
ers, would  have  annihilated  the  traffic.. 

A corporation  of  merchants,  and  of  the  rich,  pof- 
feffing  an  unlimited  monopoly  of  the  great  mafs  ot  the 
circulating  medium,  can  iaife  or  diminish  the  price  of  ail 


£ 3 

/commodities,  and  in  this  enormous  power  is  contained 
an  unlimited  fcope,  not  only  for  reimburfement,  but 
for  profit.  Now,  labour  produces,  and  pays  for  the 
consumption  of  all  commodities,  and  out  of  commodi- 
ties both  the  reimbursements  and  profits  arifes.  The 
bank  is  a clofe  party  in  this  monopolifing  conspiracy, 
fcecaufe  its  own  interefi:  is  combined  with  the  defigns  of 
the  immediate  dealers,  by  two  indiifoluble  links,  ill. 
They  are  the  collectors  of  the  tax  the  bank  receives. 
2d.  Without  reimburfement  they  would  fail;  an  inftant 
lofs  would  thence  fall  upon  the  bank,  and  the  crafts- 
men would  in  future  loofe  alio,  the  gain  of  printing 
pi&ures  for  the  Ephefians. 

Even  a lottery  has  ever  been  confidered  by  the  Bri- 
tiih  parliament,  as  an  article  of  the  ways  and  means 
for  railing  a national  revenue.  The  purchafe  of  a 
ticket  is  really  voluntary,  but  this  was  never  urged  as 
an  excufe  for  bellowing  its  annual  product  on  a corpo- 
ration, or  for  excluding  it  from  the  catalogue  of  taxes. 

If  the  fa£t  had  Supported  the  excufe,  it  might  have 
been  illullrated  by  a comparison.  When  the  Pope  was 
felling  his  paper  indwgencies  over  all  Europe,  did  it  not 
operate  as  a tax  ? Did  it  not  enrich  the  church  and  im- 
poverish the  laity  ? And  was  the  fraud  jullifiable,  be- 
caufe  it  was  voluntarily  fubmitted  to  ; If  So,  let  us  join 
in  one  general  condemnation  of  our  anceltors,  for  rid- 
ding themfelves  of  the  impofition.  If  not,  fnall  we 
tolerate  a political  papacy,  which  is  eternally  felling 
its  paper  indulgencies  to  our  ruin,  and  their  own  emolu- 
ment ! Especially  as  it  is  eafier  to  detect  a fraud,  pre- 
tending to  be  the  difpenfer  of  temporal  advantages, 
than  to  explode  a promife  of  eternal  happinefs.  The 
priefthood  in  both  cafes  put  on  myltery,  the  vail  of 
prieftcraft,  and  in  both  call  in  the  aid  of  excom- 
munication. In  one  an  opponent  w^s  branded  with  the 
epithet  of  heretic,  and  excluded  from  the  pale  of  the 
church  ; in  the  other,  antifederal  is  vociferated,  drowns 
argument,  and  excludes  from  civil  offices. 


t « ] 

But  the  falfhood  of  the  excufe  will  appear,  from 
an  aflimilation  of  the  bank  tax  to  the  import.  The 
merchants  who  advance  the  import,  do  not  pay  it.  Re- 
iinburfement,'  and  often  with  a profit  on  the  advance, 
is  received  by  them  from  labour.  Is  the  import  a vo- 
luntary or  a necetfary  tax  ? The  bank-tax  is  higher  upon 
the  capital,  than  the  import.  The  capitals  of  all  the 
banks  now  operating,  probably  exceed' the  whole  a- 
mount  of  foreign  articles  imported,  and  their  annual 
profits,  the  whole  amount  of  the  annual  import.  Had 
the  mercantile  interert  exclufively  borne  the  burthen 
of  the  import,  would  it  not  have  been  unjult  and 
ruinous  P Does  this  interert  bear  a heavier  tax,  without 
complaint  or  ruin  ? If  not,  who  does  ? Both  conftitute 
national  burthens  indiftinguifhable  in  their  effetls,  for 
neither  can  be  paid  but  by  a national  effort  ; yet  more 
than  half  of  the  total  is  received  by  private  individuals. 
If  no  occafion  for  the  import  had  exifted,  could  it 
conrtitutionaily  have  been  impofed  for  twenty  years,  and 
bertowed  upon  private  perfons,  for  the  bleiled  national 
purpofe  of  creating  an  arirtocracy  ? 

All  taxation  is  limited  by  the  ability  of  the  nation 
to  pay.  Ability  is  labour.  Whatever  of  it  fruits  be- 
yond its  furtenance,  labour  can  fpare,  is  ability.  An 
honert  policy  leaves  to  labour  which  earned  it,  as  much 
of  this  ability,  as  is  not  rendered  indifpenfable  by  a 
real  national  neceflity.  A difhonert  policy  comprifes 
its  principles  in  its  motto.  It  exclaims  “ A national 
debt  is  a national  hleffing,”  and  it  filches  all  it  can  get. 
In  private  life,  an  individual  is  defervedly  detefted,  who 
grinds  the  face  of  the  poor,  for  the  purpofe  of  buying 
power,  influence  or  fplendour.  Airy  trifles,  weighed 
againrt  moral  redtitude  ! What  can  be  faid  of  a policy, 
which  grinds  a nation  for  fuch  objects  ? It  fays  for  it- 
felf,  “ A nation  cannot  pay  too  much  for  an  arifto- 
cracy.” 

Can  a minifter  create  a national  ability  to  pay  taxes, 
by  paper  flight  of  hand,  or  cunning  contrivances  ? If 


r « 3 

/ he  can,  fuch  taxes  may  not  fall  on  labour.  If  he  can,., 
a poor  nation  may  pay  as  much  as  a rich  one,  or  moro 
if  its  minilter  is  molt  cunning.  If  he  can,  taxation 
has  no  boundary,  but  may  be  multiplied  as  indefinitely 
as  human  artifice.  Then  the  beft  conjurer  is  the  wifeft 
minifter,  and  it  would  be  right  to  collect  all  the  tum- 
blers, flight  of  hand  men,  and  fhifters  of  cups  and  balls 
in  the  nation,  into  an  academy  or  corporation,  for 
the  inrtruclion  of  a diplomatic  corps,  who  will  be 
matter  of  aftonifhment  in  the  prefent  times,  and  of 
wonder  in  future  ages* 

Suppofe  it  had  been  propofed  to  Great  Britain,  when 
flie  commenced  the  fubjugation  of  America,  to  erect 
a debt  in  the  very  fame  mode,  equal  to  the  prefent 
amount  of  circulating  bank-paper  in  America,  to  have 
bellowed  upon  her  a monopoly  of  the  circulating  medi- 
um— and  to  have  inverted  her  with  the  profits  of  the 
contrivance  to  all  eternity.  Would  not  Great  Britain 
have  clofed  with  the  propofition?  Would  not  the  pro- 
fits of  the  banking  bufinefs  have  been  to  her  a conqueft  ? 
What  did  (he  fight  for  ? Tribute.  If  it  had  been  paid 
in  this  way,  would  it  not  have  impoverifhed  America,, 
and  enriched  Britain  ? Is  not  this  the  direft  operation 
of  a tribute  ? America  has  defeated  a nation,  but  is 
fubdtied  by  a corporation.  She  defended  her  property 
againft  open  violence,  to  be  cheated  of  it  by  private 
fraud.  iShe  was  too  hard  for  her  enemies,  but  a junto 
of  falfe  friends  are  too  hard  for  her.  The  bank  with- 
out a pretence  of  claim  upon  the  community,  has  found 
means  to  occupy  the  ftation  precifely,  which  Great- 
Britain  was  ftriving  to  fill. 

And  if  America  had  fubmitted  to  pay  a tribute  to 
Britain,  fucb  a mode  of  railing  it,  wrould  have  been 
the  worft  poffible  tax,  which  could  have  been  impofed. 
No  check  upon  the  quantity  of  paper  circulated  would 
have  exirted,  except  the  extent  of  the  national  ability 
to  pay  for  it ; and  the  tax  might  have  been  fecretly  in- 
creafed,  by  increafing  this  paper.  So  rtands  the  tax 


C «s  ] 

paid  to  the  corporation.  Its  books  are  placed  by  law, 
beyond  the  reach  of  legiflative  infpection,  and  an  intire 
union  of  interefts,  among  every  member  of  the  junto, 
is  a motive  ftrong  enough  to  produce  an  increafe  of  the 
tax,  and  a concealment  of  its  extent. 

The  people  have  not  intrufted  the  S nate  of  the 
United  States,  with  a power  of  originating  money-bills, 
from  a jealoufy  in  the  tender  cafe  of  taxation,  again!! 
the  leaf!  degree  of  ariftocratical  afcendency.  But  this 
ariftocratical  corporation,  containing  no  reprefentative 
feature,  can  increafe  or  diminifh  a tax  at  plea fu re, 
without  the  alfent  or  knowledge  of  the  people.  They 
polfefs  this  important  legiflative  power,  fubject  to  one 
only  reftraint.  The  quantity  of  paper  is  unavoidably 
limited  by  the  national  ability  to  pav  for  it.  How 
came  this  limit  to  exifl,  if  the  profits  of  the  bank  arofe 
out  of  paper  flight  of  hand,  and  were  not  bunhenfome 
upon  the  national  ability  ? Scepticifm  itlelf,  will  no 
longer  deny  that  they  are  a tax. 

Is  this  a fyftem  of  national  charity  ? To  filch  from 
the  poor  principalities  for  the  rich,  whence  princes 
themfelves  naturally  fprout  up.  Is  the  religion  of  re- 
velation, or  the  religion  of  nature,  acting  as  it  does  by 
an  hidden  impulfe  upon  the  mind,  fatisfied  with  fuch 
charity  ? Is  the  tribute  due  to  Cefar,  or  are  the  fcanty, 
uncertain,  occafional  donations  of  oftentation,  a rcim- 
burfement  for  a permanent  and  growing  oppreflion  ? Is 
the  confcience  of  this  fyftem  fatisfied,  by  the  fubflitu- 
tion  of  hard  gotten  private  alms,  of  a penny  for  each 
pilfered  pound,  in  the  place  of  political  juftice,  which 
filches  nothing? 

The  maxim  “ that  an  individual  had  better  fufter  a 
misfortune,  than  a whole  community,”  is  rcverfed.fmce 
the  community  is  facrificed  for  the  emolument  of  a few 

j 

individuals.  Morals  and  maxims  withdraw  from  the 
defence  of  the  contrivance,  and  a mii'conllruction  of 
the  fcripture  which  faith,  “ unto  every  one  that  hath 


t 14  J 

/hall  be  given,  and  he  /hall  have  abundance,  but  from 
him  that  haih  not,  fliall  be  taken  away  even  that  which 
he  hath,”  is  the  only  remaining  fubterfuge. 


SECTION  VI. — The  same  subject  continued. 

AND  yet  its  continuance  fliall  not  be  commenfu- 
rate  with  the  frauds  of  a bank.  I would  not  im- 
pofe  on  my  readers  an  endlels  talk.  It  is  only  defign- 
ed  to  felect  and  exhibit  fo  many  of  its  mifchiefs  as  will 
illuftrate  the  adminiflration.  For  this  a pamphlet  will 
fuflice,  whereas  a Ample  vocabulary  of  its  tricks  and 
fins  would  fill  a volume. 

The  contrivance  is  now  to  be  exhibited  in  a point  of 
view  yet  more  alarming.  ’Tis  thefummit  of  a climax, 
fufficient  to  ftrike  a whole  community  with  confirma- 
tion. 

If  a'number  of  the  members  of  Congrefs  are  flock- 
holders,  or  bank  directors,  then  an  illegitimate  intereft 
is  operating  on  the  national  legislature — then  the  bank 
hath  feduced  away  from  their  natural  and  conftitutional 
allegiance,  the  representatives  of  the  ftafes — and  then, 
even  foreigners — our  late  moft  malignant  and  inveterate 
enemy — have  obtained  an  influence  on  our  national 
councils,  fo  far  as  they  have  obtained  bank  flock.  The 
Englifli  w'ho  could  not  conquer  us,  may  buy  us.  Foolilh 
Fnglifli,  to  expend  an  hundred  millions  in  fighting  for 
the  power  of  legiflation,  when  a twentieth  part  of  the 
money,  will  peaceably  obtain  it  by  purchafe  ! But  you 
have  feen  your  error,  whereas  we  are  entering  into  ours 

But  fuppofe  for  argument  fake,  that  a majority  of  fuch 
members  did  not  exifl.  It  is  owing  only  to  the  curtefy 
of  the  fcheme,  fince  in  addition  to  the  flockholders,  the 
bank  could  elect  all  its  directors  out  of  Congrefs,  of 
which  it  regularly  gives  us  fix  famples,  three  in  each 
houfe.  And  more  it  would  elect,  if  more  it  needed,  for 


[ »S  ] .•  ... 

a 

there  is  no  conftitutional  or  legal  reftraint  upon  its  oc- 
cafions.  To  what  an  humble  Ration  hath  the  American 
legiflature  dwindled  down,  within  four  years  of  its  crea- 
tion $ its  independency  is  held  by  curtefy  of  a corpora- 
tion : And  an  adminiftration  will  call  itfelf  federal,  and 
3 lover  of  liberty,  when  it  has  deftroyed  its  fundamental 
principle. 

An  exclufive  private  intereft,  too  often  outweighs  a 
common  public  obligation.  What  we  can  enjoy  alone 
we  value  mod,  and  are  mod  eager  to  attain.  Each  man’s 
ihare  of  liberty,  is  held  in  fo  general  a partnerfhip,  that 
it  is  often  difregarded,  under  a fhonger  inducement.  It 
cannot  be  depofited  in  a vault,-  nor  will  it  produce  him. 
an  enormous  annuity  in  hard  money. 

Hence  when  paper  men  get  into  Congrefs,  or  mem- 
bers are  metamorphofed  into  paper  men  after  they  get 
there,  it  is  obvious  that  they  will  be  influenced  by  their 
perfonal  private  interefl:,  producing  them  an  immenfe 
profit  in  cafh,  rather  than  the  public  good.  If  the  latter 
fuffers,  they  will  confider  their  own  acquifitions  in 
money,  as  a kind  of  boot,  compenfating  them  abundant- 
ly for  their  portions  of  the  common  lofs.  One  partner 
may  thrive  and  the  reft  be  ruined.  And  upon  fuch  prin- 
ciples it  is,  that  exclufions  from  the  legiflature  are  jufli- 
fied.  •*' 

That  an  abundance  of  paper  men  have  been  in  Con- 
grefs, can  never  be  denied.  An  unnatural  alliance  exifts 
between  certificate  and  ftockholders  ; unnatural,  as  I 
fhall  take  occafion  to  fhew.  But  the  interpofition  of  a 
third  power  will  often  reconcile  contradictions,  and  a 
fovereign  hath  been  known  to  manage  two  kingdoms, 
of  different  languages. 

• The  public  money  is  lodged  in  the  bank.  The  higher 
the  taxes  are,the  more  of  this  money  is  therein  depofiteeb 
The  more  of  this  money  is  depofited  in  the  banks, 1 the 
more  paper  the  bank  can  circulate  on  its  credit,  and  the 

E 


t **  1 

greater  will  be  its  profits.  If  the  bank  will  ftiek  by  a mini- 
der,  a minifter  may  flick  by  a bank.  The  amount  of  taxes 
and  loans  are  propofed  by  the  minider’s  eftimates. 
When  thefe  get  into  Congrefs,  they  meet  with  a great 
number  of  paper  men,  who  have  a private  intereft  in 
the  accumulation  of  public  burthens,  and  thus  efcape  the 
Uriel  difcuflion,  to  be  expected  from  unbiafled  reprefen- 
latives.  if  a minifler  fhould  in  this  way  douctur  the 
bank  and  member-dockholders,  the  bank  and  fuch  mem- 
bers may  in  fome  other  douceur  him  and  his  friends. 
Occaficnal  accommodations  of  money,  operating  to  ac- 
quire an  influence  in  Congrefs,  may  be  eafily  obtained 
by  means  of  a good  ur.derftanding,  and  a good  under- 
flanding  is  eafily  formed  between  good  friends,  united 
by  the  flrongeft  of  all  ties mutual  fupport. 

And  mutual  fupport  is  neceflary.  The  egregious 
impofitions  of  a bank,  cannot  expert  a long  continuance, 
but  by  the  help  of  ininifterial  influence  ; and  minifterial 
influence  reds,  for  its  fupport,  on  paper  evolutions. 
'1  hey  are  partners  in  a game,  knowing  each  other’s 
hands,  and  playing  into  them.  Let  us  win  the  public 
money,  fays  the  bank,  and  you  fhall  certainly  win  an  ari- 
docracy  out  of  the  flockholders.  Befides  you  may 
fcatter  the  public  money  in  the  bank  and  its  branches, 
from  Bofton  to  Charleflon,  fo  that  it  never  can  be 
counted  ; perplex  your  ftatements,  fo  that  nobody 
can  underftand  them,  and  we  can  always  bring  you 
off  without  detection,  by  beading  of  an  intuitive 
knowledge,  or  inward  light,  making  the  whole  matter 
as  pellucid  as  the  meridian  fun.  Our  votes  in  Congrefs 
count  as  well  as  others. 

It  is  to  be  obferved,  that  poflibilities  are  here 
dated.  When  fads  are  afierted,  they  refult  from  the 
datutebook,  or  are  of  public  notoriety.  Apprehenfions 
are  hazarded,  for  the  purpofe  of  fubmiting  it  to  the 
public  mind,  whether  it  will  remain  expol'ed  to  the 
mod  imminent  danger,  or  rid  itfelfoffo  difquieting  a 
dtuation,  by  fubjoining  new  checks  for  the  recovery  of 


C 27  ] 

violated  rights,  and  the  reftraint  of  unconftitutional  de- 
figns.  Such  would  be' only  an  expolition  of  the  conlll- 
tution,  which  never  contemplated  a fyftem  ftriking  at 
the  root  of  liberty. 

A nation  rifks  too  much,  by  laying  heaps  of  public 
wealth  in  the  way  of  her  fervants,  which  they  may 
take  up,  and  put  in  their  pockets,  without  being  feen, 
and  without  account.  Such  trials  of  integrity,  involve 
too  ferious  and  fatal  confequences  for  national  amufe- 
ment. 

A part  of  the  paper  fyftem,  as  the  minifter  hath  pub- 
licly announced,  contemplated  the  introduction  of 
foreigners  into  the  American  fpeculations — Conlider 
the  effect  of  this.  Paper  men  get  into  Congrefs,and  go- 
vern the  legiflature — The  bank  governs  the  paper  men 
— -A  majority  of  ftockholder-s  govern  the  bank — And 
foreigners  may  conftitute  this  majority — Therefore  fo- 
reigners may  guide  the  legiffature  of  America.  Every 
great  national  queftion  maybe  influenced  by  them.  Is 
a treaty  to  be  made  refpefting  commerce  or  territory — 
are  regulations  concerning  trade  under  confideration — 
or  is  a propofition  for  abolifhing  banks  and  {lockjobbing 
to  be  decided  upon,  and  a Britifh  influence  may  poflibly 
give  the  catting  vote  in  every  queffion.  If  the  queftion 
fliould  relate  to  a war  with  Britain,  the  public  fituation 
would  be  abfolutely  farcical.  Specie  being  expelled 
by  bank  paper,  a war  could  not  be  carried  on,  but  by 
the  help  of  fuch  paper.  A majority  of  the  flock  may 
be  held  by  Britifh  fubjefts,  who  would  be  more  likely 
to  embarrafs  public  ineafures,  by  demanding  the  debt 
due  to  the  bank,  into  which  the  nation  is  already 
plunged,  than  to  furnifh  'the  means  of  attacking'  them- 
felves.  What  a train  of  humiliating  reflections  are 
fuggefled  by  this  idea  ? Forbear  to  indulge  your  grief. 
Let  an  effeminate  impreffion  be  fuppreffed  by  a manly 
refolution,  to  lend  your  aid  in  deftroying  a fyftem,  by 
which  even  Britain  may  be  better  reprefented  in  Con- 
grefs,  and  have  more  influence  in  the  great  queftion  of 
peace  or  war,  than  any  Angle  ftate. 


[ *8  1 

The  paper  fyftem  poflefles  more  than  a prefidential  or 
triBlinitial  veto.  Thefe  were  only  powers  of  prevention, 
or  fufpenfion.  Whereas  the  paper  fyftem  in  its  majo- 
rity, hath  acquired  that  tempting  power,  for  which 
Britain  wafted  her  blood  and  treafure  in  vain,  “ of  bind- 
ing us  in  all  cafes  whatsoever.” 

Paufe  reader,  and  awfully  recollect,  that  the  govern- 
ment is  in  the  hands  of  Speculators.  Is  an  inordinate 
love  of  money,  a proper  principle  for  legiflators  or  ma- 
giftrates  of  any  kind  ?;  Does.hiftory  record  the  benefits 
which  fuch  a -political  principle  hath  procured  for  man- 
kind ? What  author  hath  celebrated  this  new  fpecies  of 
government — this  money-cracy  ? What  ought  to  be  the 
predominant  principle  of  a politician  ? Ought  the  chief 
Spring  of  government,  to  derive  its  movements  from 
the  engine  of  corruption  itfelf,  or  from  the  immutable 
principles  of  moral  re&itude  ? , . . . , l ; ; . 

< > ; ' • 


SECTION  VII. — The  foregoing  facts  applied  to 

THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  INVESTIGATION. 

BUT  it  is  neceflary  to  unload  the  memory,  before 
we  proceed  farther,  by  an  application  of  the  facts 
which  have  been  difclofed  and  imprefled,  to  the  text 
yhich  was  fele£ted  as  a guide  for  our  enquiries. 


It  was  affirmed  as  a pofition,  “ That  the  conftitution 
contemplates  a republican  form  of  government,  flowing 
from,  and  depending  on  the  people,  and  that  a mode 
of  adminiftration.deftructive  of  fuch  dependence,  and 
introductory  of  monarchical  ingredients , innovates  upon, 
and  Subverts  the  conftitution.” 


r 


Now  let  me  afk,  whether  an  ariftocracy,  is  net  only 
an  ingredient,  but  the  harbinger  of  monarchy  ? In  this 
view  it  is  unimportant  to  decide,  whether  the  profits 
of  the  bank,  are  actually  a tax  upon  the  people  or  not. 
It  is  enough  for  our  purpofe,  that  the  inftitution  tends 


[ 29  3 

to  accumulate  great  wealth  in  the  hands  of  a few  indi- 
viduals ; and  that  it  is  only  calculated  for  the  admifiion 
of  the  rich.  Nor  is  it  necelTary  here  to  contend,  that 
it  adts  with  double  force,  in  continually  reducing  the 
poor,  whilft  it  is  exalting  the  rich. 

Let  me  further  demand,  what  conftitutes  a real  arif- 
tocracy?  Names,  or  wealth  united  with  exclufive  pri- 
vileges. America  recoils  againft  tides.  A confcioufnefs 
of  this,  hath  arrefted  a propofition  in  the  Senate  for 
their  introduction,  which,  it  is  faid,  came  from  a mem- 
ber of  Virginia,  in  violation  of  the  fentimenc  of  that 
ftate,  and  remains  yet,  to  be  decided  upon  when  occa- 
fion  fhall.be  ripe.  Though  the  Senate  did  not  dare  to  pafs 
it,  they  could  not  bear  to  reject  it.  Is  it  not  puerile  to 
fpurn  at  the  fhadow*  whilft  we  eredt  by  law  the  fub- 
ftance  ?' Which  is  moft  to  be  dreaded ; titles  without 
wealth,  of  exorbitant  wealth  without  titles  ? Have  the 
words , prince j lord,  highnefs '■  or  proteftor,  a magical  in- 
fluence upon  our  minds,  or  can  they  lay  a fpell  upon 
our  exertions  ? The-  molt  honorable  and  bed  earned 
title  exifting  (and  to  the  propriety  even  of  this,  I do 
not  mean  to  fubfcribe)  is  that  of  the  Cincinnati.  This 
title  does  neither  influence  the  legiflature,  nor  plunder 
labour.  Who  are  mofl  to  be  dreaded,  the  nominal  or 
real  lords  of  America  ? It  is  evident  that  exorbitant 
wealth  conftitutes  the  fubftance  and  danger  of  ariftocra.- 
cy.  Money,  in  a ftate  of  civilization  is  power.  If  we 
execrate  the  fhadow,  what  epithet  is  too  hard  for  an 
adminiftration,  which  is  labouring  to  introduce  the  fub- 
ftance ? * The  fhadow  is  an  ugly,  yet  harmlefs  picture, 
fit  only  to  frighten  children  j the  fell  monfter  itfelf  is 
good  caufe  of  alarm  to  men.  In  a land  of  liberty,  the 
pidture  difgufts,  though  incapable  of  doing  mifchief, 
and  is  therefore  excluded.  Shall  we  confult  our  fjenfa- 
tions,  and  yet  neglect  our  fafety  ? Whilft  the  conftitu- 
tion  inhibits  a nobility  even  nominally , are  its  principles 
permiflive  of  its  erection  in  reality  ? Does  it  rejedt  the 
term  “ murder,”  and  yet  allow  the  crime  to  be  perpe- 
trated ? 


[ 3°  ] 

A democratic  republic  is  endangered  by  an  immenfe 
difproportion  in  wealth.  In  a (late  of  nature,  enor- 
mous ftrength  pofftfled  by  one  or  feveral  individuals, 
would  conflitute  a monarchy,  or  an  ariftocracy — in  a 
Hate  of  civilization,  fimilar  confequences  will  refult 
from  enormous  wealth.  But  the  deity  feems  to  have 
indicated  his  will  in  favour  ol  liberty, -by  equalifing  the 
one,  and  limiting  the  other.  The  acquifitions  of  an 
honejl  induflry  can  feldom  become  dangerous  to  public 
or  private  happinefs,  whereas  the  accumulations  of fraud 
or  violence , conftantly  diminilh  both.  And  providence 
vifibly  exprelfes  its  difapprobation  of  fuch  attempts,  by 
raifing  up  an  extravagant  heir  to  diftipate  ill-gotten  and 
difproportionate  wealth  ; a natural  eff'ecl,  of  w hich  arif- 
tocracies'are  lb  fenfible,  that  thev  conftantlv  counteract 
it  by  artificial  regulations,  eftablilhing  perpetuities. 

Tyrants  and  flaves — an  ariltocracy  enormoufly  rich, 
and  a peafantry  wretchedly  poor,  approximate  in  morals.. 
Is  it  from  a fociety  thus  compofed,  that  the  blefilngs  of 
political  morality  are  expe&ed  to  refult?  The  compo- 
sition is  Healing  upon  us  like  death.  The  bank  is  the 
time  of  the  body  politic.  It  will  lead  it  immaturely  to 
the  decrepitude  of  old  age,  and  defert  it  in  the  hour  of 
dilfolution.  Is  this  a direction  for  a wife  people  to  pro- 
ceed in  ? If  the  community  will  madly  prefs  forward  to 
this  goal,  the  fooner  fhe  arrives  the  better  ; there  Phoc- 
nix-like  fhe  will  expire,  with  a confolatory  hope  that  a 
founder  offspring  will  arife  out  of  her  allies. 

A miniffer  intoxicated  with  influence,  will  exclaim, 
“ Public  debt  is  a public  blefling,”  for  taxes  are  an  in- 
citement to  induftry.  Where  does  the  conflitution  con- 
template an  influential  character  in  the  perfon  of  a 
Secretary  of  the  Treafury,  entitling  him  to  preferibe  to 
Cortgrefs  political  dogmas  ? Or  whence  arifes  the  right 
of  the  federal  government,  to  apply  llimulants  to  induf- 
try ? Does  the  conflitution  invefl  it  with  fuch  a power  ; 
if  fo,  what  is  become  of  the  liberty  of  labour  ? A whore 
will  adminifler  provocatives  to  luff,  by  the  rule  of  her 


C 3*  ] 

own  infatiable  appetite,  and  not  the  ability  of  her  para- 
mour  ; and  when  his  drength  and  health  are  exhauded, 
will  defert  him  with  contempt.  Did  labour  intend  to 
plan  itfelf  under  the  whip  of  an  avaricious,  infatiable, 
and  luxurious  aridocracy  ? 

Labour,  in  the  erection  of  a government,  after  deduc- 
ting the  necefi'ary  expence  of  fupporting  it,  defigned  to 
fecure  fafety  to  itfelf,  in  the  enjoyment  of  its  own  fruits. 
The  ftimulating  fyltem  frudrates  this  object,  and  changes 
government  into  its  mailer,  brandifhing  the  lalh  of  legif- 
lation,  and  leaving  to  labour  what  mealurc  of  fullenance 
it  pleafes.  Inllead  of  the  owners  fparing  to  government, 
government  fpares  to  the  owners.  The  fyltem  it  is  true, 
will  make  men  lefs  indullrious  in  the  prefervation  of 
liberty.  An  urgent  prelfure  for  food  and  raiment,  is  un- 
likely to  indil  into  the  mind  the  liberal  fentiments  of 
freedom.  A bead  of  burthen  is  more  remarkable  for 
its  patience  than  its  l’pirit.  An  aridocracy,  therefore 
have  good  reafon  to  exclaim  “ a national  debt  is  a na- 
tional bleding,”  and  in  purfuance  of  their  maxim,  to 
create  one  that  is  fictitious,  payable  to  themfelves  out  of 
the  hard  earned  fruits  of  labour.  To  them  it  is  a mine, 
vielding  gold  without  work.  By  loading  labour  with 
dimulants,  a coinage  for  their  ufe  is  continually  proceed- 
ing, and  a tame  and  broken  fpirited  fubmidion  to  the  im- 
polition,  will  be  effectually  fecured. 

A nation  opprelfed  by  debt,  real  or  fictitious,  is  a na- 
tion of  Haves. 

The  plebians  of  this  age  are  too  wife  to  be  individually 
cozened  by  the  patricians,  fo  that  the  latter  are  obliged 
to  create  a fictitious  debt,  by  the  help  of  law,  impofing 
generally  upon  the  former,  both  an  ufurious  and  com- 
pound intered.  It  is  time  to  retreat  to  the  facred  mount, 
if  no  other  expedient  is  left,  and  there  aifert  the  rights 
of  judice. 

But  perhaps  benevolence  is  at  the  bottom  of  this  bank- 
ing contrivance,and  though  the  aridocracy  are  fpurring 


[ 32  3 

•up  labour  to  induftry,  by  large  annual  draughts  from  its 
product,  they  may  entertain  a fecret  purpofe  of  making 
an  unexpected  reftoration  of  thefe  draughts  to  the  true 
owners.  A furprife  fo  agreeable,  would  create  a day 
of  jubilee,  and  perhaps  the  community,  in  its  hour  of 
good  humour,  might  prefent  the  feveral  banks  with'  a 
continuation  of  their  charters,  provided  they  would 
thenceforward  pay  all  the  expences  of  government.— 
But  what  a degree  of  prodigality  would  it  be,  to  farm 
out  a revenue  for  half  its  annual  product  ? 

The  fecond  propofition  aflumed,  was,  “ that  Congrefs 
can  impofe  taxes  for  the  common  defence  and  general 
•welfare  of  the  United  States,  but  not  for  the  benefit  of 
individuals,  or  their  own  private  emolument.” 

Although  in  applying -the  faCts  to  the  firft  propofi- 
tion, it  was  not  necefiary  to  aiTertr  that  the  profits  of 
the  bank  are  fubftantially  a tax,  yet  we  muft  now  re- 
collect the  arguments  urged  to  prove  it,  and  rely  that 
they  have  left  on  the  mind  of  the  reader  an  indelible 
conviction.  ■. 

And  then  it  follows,  that  the  moll  alarming  infringe- 
ment of  the  conftitution,  in  the  molt  dangerous  and 
tender  point,  exiits  in  the  bank  law. 

To  thofe  recolle&edi1;  fubjoin  another  argument. 
Banks,  all  confefs,  banilh  fpecie.  It  is  the  nature  of 
fpecie  to  equalize  itfelf  throughout  the  commercial 
world,  and  therefore  whatever  is  banifhed  from  any 
country,  creates  a neccjjity  pro  tanto.  This  nccejfity  can 
only  be  fupplied  by  iome  fubfliUitc>  and  bank  paper  is 
with  us  the  only  fubftitute.  The  nation  therefore,  by 
the  contrivance,  is  compelled  either  tofuffer  th enecejfity, 
or  refort  to  the  fubftitute.  If  the  lofs  refulting  from  the 
want  of  a circulating  medium,  is  greater  than  the  price 
demanded  by  the  bank  for  its  paper,  people  are  impelled 
by  the  motive  of  intereft  to  buy  it.  A want  is  artifici- 
ally created,  producing  an  alternative,  confining,  oa 
both  fides,  of  evil  -t  the  bank  calculating,  that  of  twe 


C 33  1 

evils,  the  leaft  would  be  chofen.  When  all, the  circulating 
fpecie  is  banifhed,  the  nation  mujl  pay  for  the  whole 
of  its  circulating  medium.  If  a part,  they  mujl  pay  for 
fo  much  as  will  fupply  that  part.  In  proportion  as  a 
bank  can  inflift  on  the  community,  the  misfortune  of 
lofing  its  circulating  fpecie,  will  its  profit  accumulate. 
A total  lofs,  the  depth  of  misfortune  to  the  one,  is  the 
fummit  of  profperity  to  the  other.  In  an  affair  of  the 
utmoft  national  confequence,  the  intereft  of  a corpo- 
ration, and  the  intereft  of  the  nation,  are  precifely  in 
oppofition,  and  the  affair  is  managed  exclufively  by  the 
corporation.  So  long  as  there  is  fpecie  enough  for  the 
national  occafio'ns,  bank  paper  will  bear  no  price,  or 
but  little  can  be  fold.  Is  not  a preffing  need,  a tax  ? 
An  import:  is  founded  on  a need  for  imported  articles. 
Home  manufactures  or  forbearance,  may  evade  it. 
Which  will  prefs  moft,  the  need  for  imported  articles, 
or  for  a circulating  medium,  and  how  is  the  latter  to 
be  evaded  ? 

Life  and  property,  are  the  two  great  objefts  of  hu- 
man folicirude.  Government  feldom  delights  in  hu- 
man blood,  and  hence  our  fafety  on  that  fcore.  But 
its  bowels  often  yearn  for  human  wealth.  Checks 
againft  this  unhappy  inclination,  are  confidered  as  the 
moft  important,  and  are  the  moft  numerous  in  our  con- 
ftitution.  It  exhibits  a degree  of  caution,  amounting  to 
fufpicion. 

Of  what  avail  are  thefe  checks,  if  they  are  to  be  eva 
ded  by  mere  names  ? Inftead  of  ufing  the  wrord  “ tax,’* 
the  word  “ bank,”  is  reforted  to.  Suppofe  the  title 
of  the  law  had  been,  “ An  aft  for  railing  an  annual 
“ fupply  of  money  for  public  purpofes,  by  the  efta- 
“ blifhment  of  a bank.”  Would  the  money  railed 
have  been  a tax  ? Or,  fuppofe  the  law  had  been  en- 
titled, “ An  aft  for  taxing  the  community  by  the  efta- 
“ blifhment  of  a bank,  and  dividing  the  money  fo  raifed, 

F 


£ 54  3 

u among  fundry  members  of  Congrefs,  and  certain  other 
“ individuals  therein  named.”  This  title  precifely  fits 
the  law  as  it  fiands,  and  as  it  operates. 

What  then  has  become  of  the  confiitution  ? The  rai- 
fing  of  money  is  the  efience  of  a tax  law ; this  aft:  raifes 
money,  pofleffing  the  efience,  though  not  the  name. 
Sundry  members  of  the  legiflature  who  impofe  the  tax, 
receive  a portion  of  it,  and  private  individuals  the  re- 
fidue.  How  does  this  redound  to  the  common  dcfcncer 
or  general  welfare  of  the  United  States  ? 

In  a ftamp  aft,  the  word  tc  tax,”  might  be  avoided, 
and  that  contrivance  might  be  as  conftitutionaliy  re- 
fortcd  to,  for  the  emolument  of  Congrefs  and  com- 
pany. 

And  if  a depofit  fliould  be  necefiary,  permit  me  to 
fuggeft  an  admirable  hint.  By  the  bank  law,  three 
fourths  of  the  depofit,  might  confift  of  certificates, 
which  are  evidences  of  a depofit,  heretofore  made  for 
public  fervice.  When  a depofit  of  thefe  is  made  in  the 
bank,  an  evidence  is  received  of  this  fecond  depofit. 
Let  this  feccnd  evidence  be  depofited,  as  ftock  in  the 
Lamp-office,  and  a third  evidence  taken  out.  Ereft 
a new  contrivance,  where  this  third  evidence  may  be 
depofited  as  fiock  alfo,  and  fo  on  ad  infinitum.  For  the 
one  fourth  fpecie  depofited  in  the  bank,  the  proprietors 
do  not  probably  nowr  gain  a profit,  of  above  cent,  per 
cent.  Whereas  one  or  two  other  depofitories  of  evidence 
as  fiock , will  produce  an  appreciating  efieft,  the  reverfe 
of  the  depreciating  operations  during  the  late  war.  Or 
the  idea  will  be  better  exemplified,  by  reminding  my 
readers  of  doubling  the  grains  of  corn,  for  every  nail 
on  a horfe’s  Ihoe.  This  fimilitude  will  fit  at  both  ends. 
It  exhibits  the  ftock  necefiary  to  fet  cut  with,  and  alfo 
the  gainfulnefs  of  fuch  operations. 


'.yyr:;. 

. * - 

• r. 

•:  J'  ' 

• v ' - 

■ 

-Jwx-'C' 

u_K  ■>■ 

Cv.-V 

f 35  1 


SECTION  VIII. — The  same  subject  continued. 

IT  was  farther  affumed,  “ that  the  right  of  legiflation 
“ refided  and  yet  refides,  in  the  people  of  the  United 
“ States.  That  this  right  is  periodically  delegated  by 
“ election  to  their  reprefentatives.  That  the  right  of 
“ election  is  a fubftance  and  not  a form,  and  that  a fe- 
“ gitimate  reprefeniation  implies,  an  cxijiir.g  principle , 
“ operating  upon  the  reprefenting,  impelling  them  for 
“ the  good  of  the  reprofented.  And  that  whenever 
“ this  principle  ceafcs  to  exijl , government  is  converted 
“ into  an  ufurpatian 

Can  you  poffibly,  reader,  comprehend  a difference 
between  the  good  of  bank  dirc&ors  and  flock  holders, 
and  the  good  of  the  community  ? Arc  the  burthens  and 
profits  of  this  corporation,  the  burthens  and  profits  of 
the  nation  ? May  not  the  good  of  the  one,  be  the  harm 
ofahe  other  ? And  may  not  a flockholding  bank-direc- 
ting member  of  Congrefs,  legiflate  harm  to  the  one, 
that  he  may  fhare  in  the  good  with  the  other  ? 

Reafoning,  to  prove  felf  evident  propofitions,  though 
apparently  fuperfluous,  may  yet  be  neccffiiry  by  way  of 
parapet,  to  defend  them  agaiaft  the  affaults  of  overbear- 
ing wealth  and  power. 

The  confiitution,  thoroughly  impreffed  with  the  opi- 
nion, that  a fimilitude  of  intcreffs,  of  burthens,  of  be- 
nefits, and  even  of  habits,  between  the  people  and  their 
reprefentatives,  was  effentially  ncceffary  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  liberty,  and  the  diipcnfation  of  civil  happinefs, 
reforts  to  numerous  precautions  for  its  attainment. 

Having  this  end  in  view,  it  preferibes, 
i.  That  no  perfon  fhall  be  a reprefentative,  who 
has  net  been  feven  years  a citizen  of  the  United  States. 

i.  That  each  reprefentative,  muft  be  an  inhabitant 
of  the  hate  in  which  he  is  chofen. 


[ 3«  1 

3.  That  the  reprefentation  {hall  be  in  proportion  to 
numbers.  < 

4.  That  no  reprefentative  (hall  be  appointed  to  any 
office  created,  or  the  emoluments  whereof  have  been 
increafed,  during  the  period  for  which  he  was  ele&ed  ; 
and  that  no  perfon  holding  an  office  ffiall  be  a repre- 
fentative. - 

The  purpofe  of  thefe  fundamental  rules,  was  to  fe** 
cure  a legitimate  legiflature,  by  excluding  every  fpecies 
of  undue  influence  then  forefeen. 

The  idea  of  a bank,  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
contemplated  or  difeuffed  in  the  minuted:  degree  by  the 
convention  which  framed  the  cbnftitution.  And  not  a 
trace  of  fuch  an  idea,  is  to  be  found  in  the  inftrument 
refulting  from  their  deliberations. 

Thofe  who  argue  in  favour  of  the  conftitutionality  of 
the  corporation,  are  reduced  to  the  narrow  grouncTof 
afferting,  that  a power  is  tacitly  implied,  conflifting  and 
fubverting  the  moft  fundamental  principles,  earneflly 
and  loudly  expreffed. 

Conftru&ive  powers,  are  like  conflru&ive  treafons. 
Have  we  fecured  our  lives  againft  the  latter,  and  left 
«ur  property,  which  fupports  life,  expofed  to  the  for- 
jner  ? 

From  the  bank  contrivance,  the  following  infra&ions 
of  the  cleared:  conflitutional  principles,  obvioufly  enfue. 

1 . Members  of  Congrefs  may  vote  for  the  ereftion  of 
a gainful  projeft,  and  be  the  receivers  of  the  gain. 

2.  They  may  impofe  a tax  on  the  community  or  a 
a part  of  it,  and  inftead  of  fharing  in  the  burthen,  fhare 
in  the  plunder. 

3.  The  higher  and  more  unneccffiiry  the  taxes  and 
loans  are,  the  more  public  money  will  be  depoftted  in 
the  bank,  and  the.  greater  will  be  the  profit  of  the  bank? 


r 37  i 

members  of  Congrefs,  who  neverthelefs  vote  for  taxes 
and  loans. 

4.  A member  of  Congrefs,  debauched  by  a profit- 
able banking  interefl,  ceafe3  to  be  a citizen  of  the  U- 
nion,  or  an  inhabitant  of  the  ftate  which  choofes  him, 
as  to  the  purpofes  of  the  conftitution.  He  becomes  a 
citizen,  and  inhabitant  of  Carpenters  Hall. 

5.  Being  a member  of  a corporation,  confiding 
chiefly  or  in  part  of  foreigners,  he  is  more  under  ;he 
influence  of  foreigners,  than  of  thofe  who  elc&cd  him. 

6.  The  conftitution  aims  nt  a real  reprefentation  of 
the  dates  in  proportion  to  numbers,  making  no  pro- 
vifion  for  members  from  corporations ; and  yet  if  the 
members  of  this  corporation  keep  their  feats  in  con- 
grefs, it  is  moderate  to  aflert  that  it  will  be  better  re- 
pfefented  than  any  date.  For  furely  it  will  be  admir- 
ed* that  a man  poflefles  as  much  fidelity  to  his  own 
interefl,  as  to  the  interefl  of  his  condiments.  And 
hence  the  evident  druggie  in  the  conflitution  to  fecure 
a common  interefl. 

7.  The  bank  can  only  gain  its  reprefentation,  by  fe- 
ducing  the  reprefentatives  of  the  ftates  from  their  natu- 
ral allegiance;  thus  a date  may  be  deprived  of  the 
whole  or  a part  of  her  reprefentation,  and  the  appor- 
tionment according  to  numbers  is  defeated.  It  would 
be  better  to  allow  the  bank  members,  than  to  permit  it 
to  plunder  the  dates  of  their  feveral  quotas. 

8.  It  was  evidently  defigned,  that  the  Senate  as  judges 
of  impeachments,  fiiould  be  conjlitutionaliy  preferved 
in  a ftate  of  impartiality.  Impeachments  originate  in 
the  houfe  of  reprefentatives,  and  the  crimes  to  be  re- 
frained by  this  procefs,  will  moftly  be  comprifed  in  a 
mifapplication  of  public  money.  But  if  thofe  who  are 
to  inquire  into  fuch  mifapplications,  to  impeach,  and  to 
decide  upon  impeachments,  may  in  coafequence  of 


C 33  3 

banking  and  paper  fyftems,  be  gainers  by  the  mifappli- 
cations,  it  is  obvious  that  the  check  provided  by  this 
article  of  the  conflitution,  upon  a fpecies  of  criminali- 
ty, fo  dangerous  as  to  have  attratted  the  particular 
attention  of  a general  convention,  is  intirely  defeated. 
If  accomplices  are  to  fet  enquiries  on  foot, — to  accufe 
— and  to  decide,  no  prophetical  fpirit  is  necefiary  to 
forefee  the  decifion.  Can  a contrivance  be  conllitu- 
tional,  by  which  a judiciary,  the  power  of  which  ex- 
tends even  to  the  punifhment  of  undefined  crimes,  may 
be  influenced  out  of  its  integrity  and  independence  ? 
The  fountain  of  juftice  ought  to  be  pure  and  uncorrupt. 
An  influence  which  may  fway  a fearful  tribunal,  not 
only  for  the  acquital  of  the  guilty,  but  for  the  condem- 
nation of  the  innocent,  was  never  contemplated  by  the 
conflitution.  Bank  direflors,  flock  holders,  and  a pa- 
per interefl,  may  be  more  likely  by  their  judgments  to 
difqualify  honefl  patriots  from  holding,  “ any  office  of 
honour,  trufl  or  profit  under  the  United  Sates,”  who 
{hall  obfiruft  peculations  from  public  labour  in  any 
flrape,  than  to  remedy  frauds  favouring  a monied  in- 
terefl: in  general,  and  accruing  to  their  own  emolument 
in  particular.  A tribunal,  which  may  try  a president, 
ought  to  be  ns  free  from  fufpicion,  as  Cxfars  wife. 

But  leaving  an  endlefs  enumeration  of  conftitutional 
violations,  we  will  adventure  a general  obfervntion  ; 
that  the  contrivance  is  a vehicle  of  undue  influence,  ope- 
rating fenfibly,  and  often  irreflftibly,  upon  almofl  every 
important  queflion  which  can  occur  in  Congrcfs.  It 
remains  with  the  community  to  decide  whether  the 
iippulfe  tends  to  their  good,  and  whether,  if  it  does  not, 
government  is  not  converted  into  an  ufurpation,  in  one 
of  its  mod  effential  qualities  ? 

Members  of  Congrefs,  who  arc  alfo  members  of  the 
bank,  arc  under  a triple  bondage.  If  they  difpleafe  the 
ininifter,  he  may  not  only  lefien  the  trade  in  public  mo- 
ney, which  the  bank  now  monepolifes,  bat  he  may  re- 


r 39  1 

move  the  money  to  another  place  of  depofif,  and  he 
niay  refufe  the  inftitution  his  fupporting  influence,  when 
its  conftitutionality  is  queftioned.  The  minifter  is  by- 
law, let  into  a confidcrable  portion  of  bank  fecrets. 
This  knowledge  is  a conjurer’s  wand,  with  which  the 
fpirits  may  be  raifed  or  exorcifed,  juft  as  the  magician 
pleafes.  Such  reprefentatives,  whilft  they  are  making 
laws  to  govern  a nation,  are  themfelves  liable  to  laws 
enabled  by  a corporation  ; for  the  bank  can  make  bye 
Jaws.  And  if  the  national  laws  do  not  pleafe  the  cor- 
poration, it  may  revenge  itfclf  through  the  medium  of 
its  bye  laws,  upon  the  national  reprefentatives  for  en- 
abling them.  But  a cclliflon  of  this  kind  is  not  likely 
to  happen,  as  a common  intereft  guides  the  corporation 
collectively  and  individually.  A third  mafter,  the  pub- 
lic intereft  prefents  itfelf.  It  does  not  offer  the  influ- 
ential elaftic,  which  the  others  can  liber'ally  be  flow, 
and  is  to  maintain  a combat  at  the  odds  of  two  to  one. 
Xo  bondage  is  fo  feldom  rebelled  againft,  as  one  which 
produces  money.  Mankind  daily  fell  their  beft  fervices 
and  exertions,  and  the  higheft  bidder  is  ufually  the  pur- 
chafer. 

The  bank  realizes  the  doCtrine  of  tranfubftanria-.ijn 
upon  a member  of  Congrefs.  He  goes  one  thing,  and 
by  adminiftering  to  him  quantum fufficit  of  paper,  he  is 
converted  to  another.  A tranfubftantiated  or  vir- 
tual legiflature,  was  juft  what  the  F.nglilh  defigned  to 
impofe  on  America.  In  what  part  of  the  conftitution 
is  a dodrine  fanclioned,  which  juftifics  the  epithet  of 
rebel,  beftowed  during  the  war  by  the  enemy,  upon 
thofe  who  oppofed  fuch  a legiflature  ? 

If  the  bank — the  paper  fyftem — and  the  minifter, 
can  influence  a majority  of  the  members  of  Ccngrefs, 
or  even  a Angle  member,  where  are  fuch  reprefenta- 
tives of  the  ftates,  as  are  clearly  contemplated  by  the 
conftitution  ? Againft  the  evil  not  a Angle  check  cxifts. 
Influence  is  a courtly  term  for  corruption.  It  is  never 


L 40  l 

ncceffary  to  induce  a national  reprcfentation,  to  purfue 
the  national  good.  And  although  it  is  only  ufed,  for 
the  purpofe  of  obtaining  exclufivc  benefits  for  the  few 
at  the  expence  of  the  many,  yet  the  few,  counting  up- 
on the  reconciliation  to  abufes,  produced  by  habit,  will 
loon  begin  to  infinuate,  that  influence,  alias,  corrup- 
tion, is  an  indifpenfable  attribute  of  good^government. 

Even  fchool  boys  ridicule  and  contemn  the  corrup- 
tion which  guides  the  Britifh  parliament,  according  to 
the  will  of  a minifler.  They  have  fufficient  penetra- 
tion to  difeern,  that  the  fyflem  is  a cheat,  exhibiting 
the  picture  of  liberty,  in  lieu  of  the  fubftance.  Com- 
pare the  two  cafes,  and  point  out,  if  you  can,  a differ- 
ence. 

Antient  and  modern  tyranny  have  reforted  to  differ-  ^ 
ent  modes  for  effecting  the  fame  end.  The  former, 
unpractifed  in  the  arts  of  diffimulation,  ufed  open  vio- 
lence. The  latter,  lkilful  in  deception,  has  changed 
the  old  fyftem,  and  reforts  to  the  wily  tricks  of  private 
influence.  One  depended  upon  downright  fighting,  1 
and  an  action  in  the  open  field,  generally  proclaimed 
the  tyrant ; the  other  prefers  the  generallhip  of  fifeal 
arubufeade,  and  the  tyrant  is  often  concealed  from  pub- 
lic view,  long  after  he  is  defpotic.  A defeat  could  on- 
ly deftroy  the  one,  but  a detection  may  overfet  the  o- 
ther.  Search,  and  you  will  inevitably  find  a prefent 
acting  ufurpation  ; for  if  the  proceedings  of  govern- 
ment are  inconfiftent  with  the  principles  of  ihe  confti- 
tution,  there  is  nothing  to  jullify  them. 

Slaver}',  when  impofed  by  antient  ambition,  wasf 
foftened  by  a military  generofity  of  difpofition  ; but 
from  the  modern  fordid,  money-loving  meannefs  of 
mind,  what  melioration  can  be  expected  ? 


E 41  ] 


SECTION  IX. — The  Funding  System. 

IT  hath  palled,  irrevocably  paffed.  Being  compound* 
ed  of  materials  originally  honell,  and  confifting  at 
this  time  in  a great  mfeafure  offuch  materials,  it  is  pro- 
bably impoffible  to  unravel  and  remedy  the  intermedi- 
ate fraud. 

It  remains  however  an  indelible  hieroglyphic  of  the 
principles  and  defigns  of  adminillration,  and  in  that 
view  deferves  to  be  decyphered. 

The  perfon  who  framed  the  fyftem,  was  certainly  ca- 
pable of  contemplating,  and  of  guiding  its  effects.  Had 
a motive  of  impartiality  and  public  good  prefided  at  its 
formation,  the  feveral  Hates,  the  commercial,  the  a- 
gricultural,  mechanical  and  profeflional  interefts,  all 
of  which  are  too  bufily  engaged  in  a variety  of  ufeful  oc- 
cupations, to  hunt  out  minifterial  fecrets,  would  have 
been  plainly  forewarned  of  the  defign,  and  publicly 
cautioned  to  preferve  their  paper  property.  But  this 
would  have  yiolated  the  minifterial  defigns.  It  would 
have  obviated  the  contemplated  intention,  of  ere&ing 
an  enormous  ariftocracy  or  monied  intereft,  becaufe  the 
public  debt,  like  other  property,  would  have  remain- 
ed confiderably  dilperfed. 

It  was  and  is  the  fafhion  of  thinking,  that  a public 
debt  unequally  held,  gives  permanency  and  weight  to 
government.  That  is,  to  ufe  plain  terras,  it  will  ena- 
ble government  to  controul  the  will  of  the  people,  by 
counterbalancing  it  with  the  weight  of  wealth.  The 
' conftitution  is  compiled  upon  a principle  precifely  in  00- 
pofition  to  this  idea.  The  fovereignty  of  the  people 
gave  it  birth,  and  it  acknowledges  their  parental  au- 
thority. This  is  a defign  of  a few  individuals,  exclu- 
fively  to  appropriate  to  themfelves  the  management  of 
the  national  offspring,  that  they  may  change  its  nature, 
and  debauch  its  affections  from  the  great  ob)e£t  of  it" 

G 


[ 42  ] 

political  duty.  It  is  an  attempt  to  tranfplant  the  confti- 
tution  from  democratic  ground,  in  which  it  might  flou- 
ri(h,  to  an  ariftocratical  foil,  in  which  it  muft  perifh. 

And  hence  the  funding  fyftem.  It  was  lo  contrived 
as  to  enable  {peculators  and  monied  men,  to  defraud 
the  great  bulk  of  the  community  of  their  paper  proper- 
ty.  As  to  transfer  it,  from  thofe  who  earned  it,  to 
thofe  who  pilfered  it,  either  by  fuggefting  falfehoods 
or  concealing  truths.  As  to  concentrate  it  in  a few 
hands,  fo  that  it  could  be  applied  with  impreffion,  and 
poflefs  activity  as  a political  machine.  And  as  to  leave 
the  true  owners,  by  way  of  retribution  for  their  pro- 
perty, a burthenfome  tax. 

Speculators  could  calculate  events  in  Congrefs. 
They  had  leifure  to  pry  into  accounts.  They  could  even 
interpret  the  filence  of  a minifter  by  watching  indica- 
tions. Silence,  was  a negative  confecration  of  the  un- 
informed multitude  to  the  lull  of  rapacity.  A general, 
taking  a city,  condemns  it  to  be  plundered,  if  he  does 
not  actively  interpofe  for  its  protection.  1 

The  nation,  but  juft;  emerged  from  the  unforefeen 
misfortunes  of  paper  money,  are  fuddenly  overwhelmed 
by  the  ruin  of  a paper  policy.  The  accidental  bril- 
liancy of  paper  acquifitions,  gave  the  hint  for  a fyftem. 
It  fet  out  with  the  plaufible  pretence  of  curing  an  evil, 
and  it  applies  a worfe  evil.  As  if  fire  would  cure  a 
burn.  The  wounds  fuffered  by  individuals,  from  paper 
money, were  healing;  but  an  accidental  misfortune  is  now 
convened  into  a fyftem,  by  which  a few  individuals 
{peculate  on  a nation  ; the  old  wounds  are  made  to* 
bleed  afrefh,  and  new  ones  are  indiferiminately  inflict- 
ed. 

Of  this  fyftem,  the  affumption  is  a ftriking  feature. 
For  this  there  was  no  general  petition  from  the  people. 
No  urgency  prefled  it.  But  it  favoured  the  objeCt  of 


C 43  ] 

adminirtration.  State  debts  fold  at  a low  rate,  and 
therefore  might  eafily  be  monopolized.  To  dilfolve  all 
money  relationftiip,  between  individuals,  and  the  fepa- 
rate  ftates,  would  on  the  one  hand  diminifh  the  date 
power,  and  tend  to  confolidation,  and  on  the  other  cre- 
ate an  undue  influence,  by  which  the  confolidated  pow- 
er might  be  managed. 

If  the  payment  of  public  debts  had  been  an  objeft, 
accident  had  already  effe&ed,  that  which  fuch  a mo- 
tive would  have  dictated.  Congrefs  poflefs  the  power 
of  indirect,  and  the  States  that  of  diredi  taxation.  Hence 
the  public  debt  could  have  been  diflfufed  upon  the  re- 
fources  of  the  nation,  fo  as  to  have  been  lefs  burthen- 
fome  upon  an  excluflve  branch  of  thofe  refources,  by 
leaving  the  States  refpe&ively  to  provide  for  State 
debts.  And  an  import  might  have  been  equivalent  to 
thofe  of  the  union. 

A recurrence  to  direct  taxation  by  Congrefs,  will 
fwaJlow  up  the  little  fovereignty,  now  left  to  the  once 
fovereign  individual  States  ; and  every  accumulation  of 
the  debts  of  the  union,  is  an  impulfe  towards  that  end. 

Hence  all  aflumptions,  and  hence , the  enormous 
loans  which  have  been  negociated.  In  the  power  of 
money,  is  the  confidence  of  adminiftration  placed.  f»y 
afluming  all  money  negociations,  a face  of  bufinefs, 
and  a&ivity,  will  be  beftowed  on  the  Federal  govern- 
ment. The  excluflve  payment  of  debts,  and  impofition 
of  taxes,  will  exhibit  it  as  the  only  political  objeft,  to 
intereft  the  attention  of  individuals whilft  the  ftate 
governments  will  become  only  fpeculative  common- 
wealths, to  be  read  for  amufement  like  Harring- 
ton’s Gceana,  or  Moore’s  Utopia.  Without  pulfation, 
without  elafticity  they  will  dwindle  gradually  into  a 
tale  that  has  been  told,  and  their  parts  will  crumble  and 
diflipate,  like  a corporation  of  beavers,  whofe  w-aters 
have  been  drained  away. 


. t 44  1 

Does  this  fyftem  comport  with  the  conftitution, where 
it  guarantees  to  each  State  a republican  form  of  govern- 
ment : If  the  term  “/or;;;,”  means  Jhadow , it  does; 
but  if  the  guarantee  extends  to  fubftance , we  may  bold- 
ly aflert,  that  it  does  not. 

A money  fyftem  may  be  called  the  natural  enemy  of 
State  conftitutions — of  State  laws — of  State  police  (for 
we  dare  not  afpire  to  an  higher  expreflion)  and  of 
State  difpofitions.  Accumulations  of  enormous  wealth 
in  a few  hands,  by  legal  legerdemain,  is  deftru&ive  of 
that  equality  among  citizens,  which  the  State  conftitu- 
tions contemplate — is  worfe  than  liviited  finecures, 
which  they  reprobate — defeat  the  effcfts  of  State  lawrs 
for  the  divifion  of  property  in  cafes  of  inteftacy — and 
wound  our  feelings,  by  converting  our  equals  of  yefter- 
day,  into  our  lords  of  to-morrow.  A few  dwaris  are 
fuddenly  metamorphofed  into  giants,  by  a paper  necro- 
mancy, and  the  reft  of  the  community  whom  it  makes 
more  dwarfilh,  both  really  and  comparatively,  are  in- 
chanted  by  fyren  notes,  into  an  infenlibility  of  their  dan- 
ger. 

If  many  individuals  in  four  years,  have  acquired  from 
ioo,coo  to  i,coo,ooo  of  dollars,  how  much  will  they 
gain  in  twenty  years  ? What  has  been,  and  will  be  the 
impreflion  upon  the  community  ? Which  is  moll  to  be 
deplored  ; Great  Britain,  opprefled  for  the  fupport  of 
her  royal  brood,  or  America,  fleeced  by  her  brood  of 
fpeculators  ? 

A lineament  of  the  fyftem,  is  alfo  exhibited  in  the 
finking  fund.  Even  its  name  was  a fraud  upon  the 
community.  It  ought  to  have  been  denominated  Ct  the 
raifing  fund,”  for  it  was  defigned  to  raife  the  price  of 
certificates.  It  is  the  pap  of  paper,  upon  which  the 
child  was  to  fubfift,  until  it  was  old  enough  to  be  w7ean- 
ed.  This  artifice  is  fo  grofs,  that  it  will  at  once  be  feen 
through  a few  plain  facis.  * * 


n 45  3 

The  finking  fund  was  ere&ed  in  1790,  confiding  of 
about  1,300,000  dollars,  which  the  minifler  then  re- 
ported, as  a furplus  of  revenue,  beyond  the  public  oc- 
cafions.  Lefs  than  1,000,000  of  it  had  been  applied  in 
Tanuary  1793  ; between  which  time,  and  the  erection 
of  the  fund,  nearly  that  fum  was  expended  in  periodical 
purchafes  of  certificates.  In  1790  alfo , the  miniller 
commenced  the  bprrowing  of  money  in  HollanJ,  and 
drawing  it  to  this  country,  without  law,  and  without 
the fanhion  of  the  Prefidcnt ; by  which  means,  continu- 
ed even  to  the  prefent  year,  monies  have  been  obtained 
to  a much  greater  amount,  than  the  whole  finking 
fund. 

Apply  to  thefe  fatts,  the  following  queftions. 

If  the  furplus  of  revenue  exifted,  why  was  the  mo- 
ney borrowed,  and  drawn  illegally  hither  from  Hol- 
land ? If  not,  why  was  the  fa£t  officially  aliened  l 
How  was  the  debt  funk , by  the  ereftion  of  a fund, 
producing  the  neceffity  of  incuring  a new  debt,  to  a 
greater  amount  than  the  fund  itfelf?  If  finking  the 
debt  was  the  fimple  objeft,  why  is  it  that  the  Jinking 
fund  has  not  been  fooner  applied  ? Does  the  paying  fil- 
tered: in  Holland  for  monies  to  replace  this  fund,  whilft 
the  fund  is  lying  dead  here  at  a lofs  of  filtered,  contri- 
bute towards  finking  the  debt?  Was  the  minifter  fo 
wide  of  the  truth,  when  he  called  the  finking  fund  “ a 
furplus ,”  as  to  have  been  obliged  to  divert  both  that, 
and  monies  borrowed,  for  the  preferibed  purpofe  of  pay- 
ing the  French  debt,  to  current  governmental  occa- 
fions  ? or  were  no  certificates  to  be  purcliafed  ? 

But  if  keeping  up,  or  raffing  the  price  of  certificates 
be  confidered  as  the  primary  objeft,  all  thefe  difficulties 
are  folved.  The  occafional  recurrences  to  the  finking 
fund  are  explained.  And  the  miniftcrial  financiering?, 
(brink  to  political  artifices,  which  incurred  an  enormous 
national  expence,  in  the  purchafe  of  the  aridocratical 


[ 46  ] 

defideratum.  Artifices,  turned  into  laws,  by  an  illegiti- 
mate legiflature. 

The  refemblance  between  monarchical  or  aridocra- 
tical  contrivances,  and  the  adminidration  of  the  govern- 
ment, is  not  leflened,  by  playing  off  upon  America,  the 
Englilh  bubble  of  a finking  fund.  When  theirs  was 
cdablilhed,  their  debt  was  moderate,  but  fince  this  fpe- 
cies  of  fund  hath  been  operating,  it  has  fwelied  to  a- 
bove  three  hundred  millions  of  pounds  derling.  Under 
the  operation  of  our  finking  fund,  the  public  debt,  has 
been  continually  accumulating  alfo,  and  a proportional 
augmentation,  will  undoubtedly  in  lefs  than  a century, 
enable  us  to  contend  with  England  itfelf,  for  the  fird 
rank  among  the  honourable  fociety  of  national  fpend- 
thrifts. 

The  asra  when  the  government  began  to  aft,  was  the 
moment  of  lead  fufpicion.  At  that  unwary  moment, 
an  ufurping  fydem  could  be  moll  fafely  introduced,  and 
precedents  for  expounding  the  conditution  edablilhed, 
which  might  be  afterwards  quoted.  Relying  upon  the 
unlimited  national  confidence  which  then  exided,  the 
fydem  diftated  an  attempt  to  bind  future  legidatures, 
and  to  fecurc  perpetually  to  the  nation  the  blejjing  of  a 
public  debt,  by  rendering  a great  proportion  of  it  ir- 
redeemable. The  conditution  limits  the  power  of  Con- 
grefs  “ to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  the  United 
States,”  and  whilli  the  echo  of  the  mandate  is  yet  vi- 
brating in  our  ears,  the  funding  fydem  declares  that 
they  fliall  not  be  paid.  What  barrier,  will  not  rapaci- 
ty and  ambition  overleap  ? 

Funding,  banking,  afluming,  loaning,  have  compi-  i 
led  a fifeal  and  political  perplexity.  The  fifeal,  which 
could  mod  eafily  have  been  explained,  fince  figures  can 
exhibit  an  account  of  money,  is  not  even  underdood  by 
the  members  of  Congrefs.  And  the  political,  though 
better  underdood,  is  dill  a capital  auxiliary  towards  the 


C 47  J 

general  obfcurity.  Perplexity  in  money  ftatements  is 
ground  enough  for  fufpicion.  Detection  would  expel 
fufpicion  to  make  room  for  certainty.  And  the  want  of 
ilmplicity  in  politics,  ‘is  ever  a badge  of  defign. 

The  funding  fyftem  was  intended  to  effect,  what  the 
bank  was  contrived  to  accelerate. 

1 . Accumulation  of  great  wealth  in  a few  hands. 

2.  A political  moneyed  engine. 

3.  A fuppreffion  of  the  republican  hate  aflemblies, 
by  depriving  them  of  the  political  importance,  refulting 
from  the  impofition  and  difpenfation  of  taxes. 

And  hence  the  tone  of  this  inllrument  alfo,  in  its  fe- 
veral  vibrations,  harmonizes  with  the  perilous  defign, 
radically  to  deftroy  the  conftitution,  and  to  ere<ft  upon 
its  ruins  an  ufurpation,  not  fanttioned  by  the  national 
will,  or  acknowledging  the  fundamental  principle ; 
that  the  people  are  the  only  legitimate  fountain  of  civil 
government. 


SECTION  X. — The  remedy. 

TO  determine  whether  a remedy  to  thcfe  threatening 
evils  is  neceffary  or  not,  the  inquiry  ought  to  be 
brought  to  the  following  fimple  point.  Whether  Ame- 
rica is  now  governed  according  to  the  fyftem  of  the  con- 
flitution,  or  the  fyftem  of  an  adminiftration. 

This  latter  fyftem  is  indeed  a riddle,  but  its  efFefts 
furnifh  the  folution.  By  its  fruits  {hall  it  be  known. 
Effetts  are  the  language  in  which  a political  defign 
fpeaks,  and  furnifh  a conftruftion,  furpafting  prof  efforts 
in  veracity,  as  far  as  the  permanency  of  things,  ex- 
ceeds that  of  words. 

If  the  conftitution  meditates  the  producing  of  great 


: 48  j 

inequality  of  wealth  among  citizens — the  enriching  of 
a favoured  few  at  the  public  expence — the  impofition  of 
an  enormous  tax  for  private  benefit,  and  not  for  the  ge- 
neral welfare — the  eflablifhment  of  corporations,  with 
gainful  rights  and  privileges,  which  neceffarily  dimi- 
nifh  the  general  flock  of  rights  and  privileges,  from 
whence  they  are  deduced — the  transferring  of  the  pa- 
per property  of  the  citizens  into  a few  hands  without 
value  received — the  ere&ion  of  a fund,  under  a pre- 
tence of  finking  the  public  debt,  whereas  its  true  de- 
lign  was  to  raife  the  value  of  that  very  paper,  thus  filch- 
ed from  the  real  owmers,  at  the  public  expence — the 
rendering  the  debt  of  the  United  States  irredeemable  by 
law — the  giving  to  foreigners  an  immenfe,  indirect  and 
fccret  influence  over  our  national  counfels — and  above 
all,  the  introduflion  of  a monied  anil  undue  influence 
into  the  legiflature  ; an  influence  which  fubfifls  at  the 
public  expence,  inflead  of  being  a&uated  by  the  public 
good  ; if  the  conflitution  meditates  fuch  defigns,  then 
the  point  is  determined  one  way,  and  it  mufl  be  conce- 
ded that  America  is  governed  according  to  the  conflitu- 
tion ; if  it  does  not,  candor  will  acknowledge,  that  A- 
merica  is  governed  according  to  a fyflem  of  an  admini- 
flration. 

To  come  at  the  truth,  fearch  our  political  fcripture, 
confider  it  text  by  text,  and  difcover  where  thefe  defigns 
have  been  fo  covertly  concealed,  as  to  have  efcaped  the 
penetration  of  every  convention  wrhich  fifted  and  confi- 
dered  the  inflrument ; and  as  to  remain  a monument  of 
a treafonable  intention  in  the  general  convention,  to  de- 
ceive and  impofe  upon  their  conflituents. 

If  we  rely  on  the  united  integrity  and  wifdom  of  Ame- 
rica, we  fhall  rejeft  overflrained  conflruiftions,  tending 
to  impeach  thefe  qualities,  and  feek  for  the  plain  and 
confiflent  meaning. 

After  having  afeertained  the  principles  of  the  confu- 
tation, let  it  be  confidered,  whether  the  fyflem  of  the 


r 49  ] 

adminidration  may  not  be  overturned,  and  the  conditu- 
tion  Hill  remain  unhurt  ? If  fo,  is  not  that  fydem  a vi- 
olation of  the  conditution  ? 

Then  it  ought  to  be  dedroyed.  America  has  aflum- 
ed  a character  upon  the  theatre  of  the  world,  which  ho- 
nour— fame  and  political  pliilofophy,  call  upon  her  to 
fupport.  She  is  the  inventor  of  principles,  aflerting 
the  equal  rights  of  man,  and  exploding  king-craft, 
pried-craft,  nobility-crhft  and  minider-craft.  It  is  in- 
cumbent upon  her  to  prove  by  example,  that  her  the- 
ory is  practically  found.  Otherwife  Ihe  betrays  man- 
kind, after  having  condituted  herfelf  the  vindicator  of 
their  rights.  Indead  of  honour,  die  will  then  deferve 
reproach  ; and  her  future  fame  will  be  that  of  a gene- 
ral Arnold  for  indance,  who  has  betrayed  the  caufe 
he  undertook  to  defend,  and  deferted  over  to  the  ene- 
my he  engaged  to  defeat. 

A divifion  of  power  among  king,  lords,  and  com- 
mons, is  fetting  out  in  government  with  an  allotment  of 
parties.  It  is  providing  the  materials  for  civil  diffen- 
tion.  Power  will  fluctuate  like  wealth,  if  it  is  propofed 
as  the  fubjeCI  of  controverfy  among  three  contending 
intereds.  And  every  fluctuation  mud  diforder  the 
fanciful  idea  of  the  bala?ice.  A precife  equipoife 
among  thefe  three  intereds,  from  which  only  the  pub- 
lic good  is  expeCted  to  refult,  could  not  exid  above  a 
moment  in  an  age.  Whereas  by  taking  the  people  as 
the  only  genuine  and  legitimate  fountain  of  power,  and 
,by  avoiding  legal  artifices  producing  an  inequality  of 
wealth  or  privileges,  we  efcape  the  black  train  of  evils 
recorded  in  liiflory,  as  having  been  in  mod  ages  and 
governments,  engendered  by  combinations  of  nobles  to 
opprefs  the  people  ; and  by  more  judifiable  combina- 
tions of  the  people  to  reduce  the  nobles.  Evils,  which 
are  the  natural  efFect  of  the  whimfical  balancing  notion, 
and  which  invariably  end  in  defpotifm.  Nobility  is  the 
.caufe  of  thefe-  evils,  and  of  courfe  the  feed  of  tyrannv, 

11 


C 50  ] 

As  a rivalfliip  for  power,  is  the  uniform  confequence 
of  three  brancheslof  government,  it  mull  inevitably  de- 
ftroy  the  balance,  and  produce  a continual  political 
fermentation.  And  the  conteft  will  not  be  allayed  by 
refle&ing,  that  thofe  for  whofe  good  the  fcheme  is  faid 
to  have  been  invented,  are  fure  of  being  degraded  to 
the  defpicable  (late  of  a mere  tool,  to  be  ufedby  ambi- 
tion and  artifice,  for  the  attainment  of  their  own  felfilh 
purpofes. 

The  people  are  the  natural  body  politic  ; king,  lords 
and  commons,  are  artificial  llructures.  Thofe  who  fa- 
vour art  at  the  expence  of  nature,  confider  the  people 
as  a mere  mafs  of  matter,  upon  parts  of  which  they  ex- 
ert a plaftic  political-craft,  and  lorm  a fort  of  intaglio. 
The  refidue  of  the  mafs  is  confidered  only  as  a ftore- 
houfe  of  materials,  to  mend,  patch,  and  fupport  thefe- 
lecled  or  fecreted  parts,  as  they  happen  to  impair  each 
other  by  their  collifions. 

King,  lords  and  commons  are  a fleet,  confifling  of 
an  admiral  fibip,  firft  rates  and  frigates,  and  the  people 
are  the  forefls,  out  or  which  this  fleet  is  built  and  re- 
paired ; to  be  cut,  hacked  and  hewed,  as  the  occafions 
of  the  fleet  fhall  require.  Further  by  way  of  accommo- 
dating myfelf  to  thofe  poifing  ideas  ; the  people  in  fuch 
a fyftcm,  may  be  likened  to  a balance  mailer,  dag- 
gering about  with  a ladder  upon  his  chin,  a chair 
mounted  on  the  ladder,  and  a fword  on  the  chair. 
Can  the  equilibration  be  long  fuftained  ? Inllead  of 
fuch  mountebank  pantomimes,  is  it  not  advifable,  left 
they  fall  upon  you,  to  flip  from  under  them,  and  fo  let 
all  three  fall  to  the  ground.  And  then,  a natural  pofi- 
tion,  which  only  can  produce  liability,  may  be  relum- 
ed. 

This'balancing  whimhath  been  tried  by  many  nations, 
and  if  all  have  failed  either  to  find  or  maintain  the  ba- 
lance, it  is  time  to  conclude,  that  it  is  an  attempt  to  put 


C 51  1 

fetters  on  air,  or  a fearch  after  the  philofopher’s  done. 
That  it  is  founded  in  fpeculation  and  not  in  principle. 
That  the  idea  of  forming  a government  by  the  help  of 
a pair  of  fcales,  condru&ed  for  weighing  power,  is  more 
fanciful  than  folid.  And  that  the  multiplied  examples 
of  thofe  who  have  failed,  ought  to  deter  the  flighted 
degree  of  prudence,  from  renewing  an  experiment, 
invariably  unfuccefsful. 

By  adhering  to  the  idea,  that  the  people  are  the  only 
genuine  fountain  of  power,  a conditution  is  immortal  ; 
for  if  a change  is  made  in  its  parts  by  the  public  will, 
it  only  proves  that  fundamental  principle  continues 

unimpaired.  Such  would  be  a plain  conditution,  not  poi- 
foned  by  the  drugs  of  a fpeculating  policy.  A change  of 
times,  temper,  and  circumdances,  may  often  require  a 
change  of  political  regulations.  By  clinging  to  this 
Ample  principle,  a peculiar  fltuation  may  be  gratified. 
Without  internal  commotion  ; -whereas  a mixed  prin- 
ciple— a political  falmagundi,  is  feldom  brought  back 
to  its  primitive  parts  but  by  a civil  war. 

Who  is  to  fuperintend  the  political  tripod  ? If  a 
member  of  it  is  from  time  to  time  to  adjud  the  weights, 
he  will  be  for  ever  filching  from  the  other  two,  to  add 
to  his  own  fcale.  Thus  the  equilibrium  is  lod  and 
then  the  effects  of  the  machine  are  wide  of  every  calcu- 
lation. 

The  perplexity  of  this  mechanifm  requires  frequent 
repairs,  and  yet  its  delicacy  makes  it  unfafe  to  mend  it.- 
Whereas  from  fimplicity,  both  ffrength  and  duration, 
are  mod  likely  to  refult. 

The  precife  adjudment  of  tiled  Balances,  is  an  at- 
tainment, furpaflnlg  human  intellectual  powers,  as  far 
as  the  precife  adertainment  of  the  true  religion.  As  to 
both,  no  two  perfons  would  hardly  agree  in  every  par- 
ticular, and  when  there  are  as  many  opinions  as  there 


r 52  ] 

are  men,  what  is  the  chance  for  Rumbling  on  the  right  ? 
Sincerity  in  political  error,  will  not  render  its  confe- 
quences  to  focicty  lbfs  baneful. 

The  doftrine  of  the  graces — the  graces,  may  be  per- 
petually rung  in  our  ears,  but  conveying  no  perfpicu- 
cus  idea,  the  manners  it  will  produce  can  never  be 
forefeen  ; and  if  one  in  a thoufand  fucceeds,  all  he  ac- 
quires is  a fpecies  of  ceremonious  tinfelled  frippery  of 
gcRure  of  little  worth  either  to  himfelf  or  others  ; 
whereas  a deportment,  founded  in  moral  re&itude,  is 
the  bafts  of  individual  happinefs,  and  the  difpenfer  of 
bleflings  to  others.  The  balances — the  balances,  are 
the  graces — the  -graces  of  government.  They  are  a 
confufed  aifcmblage  of  notions,  conveying  no  diRinfr 
idea,  and  compofed  by  the  rule  of  fancy.  The  prin- 
ciple,  “ that  the  people  are  the  only  legitimate  foun- 
e;  tain  of  power,”  and  of  courfe  the  only  fafe  corrector 
of  its  abufe,  is  a political  guide,  furpamhg  the  one  in 
point  of  public  fafety,  as  far  as  true  morality  exceeds  the 
other  in  refpect  to  private  manner^. 

Obvious  is  the  vanity  of  an  expectation,  that  one  equal 
conflituent  member  of  a government,  is  a fufficient  and 
fafe  check  upon  two  others  ; as  is  the  folly  of  depofit- 
ing  all  focial  and  natural  rights,  under  a Reward -fliip,, 
as  unreRrained,  as  if  the  proprietors  had  travelled  into 
a far  country.  Whether  is  it  moR  likely,  that  one 
member  will  enter  on  the  perilous  undertaking  of  con- 
trouling  the  wicked  defigns  of  the  other  two,  or  that 
motives  of  intereR  and  fafety  flrould  dictate  to  all,  the 
policy  of  a triple  alliance  ? The  example  of  Great  Bri- 
tain carries  this  idea  beyond  conjecture. 

Can  the  majority  of  the  people  defign  to  opprefs  ? 
Does  hiRory  exhibit  fuch  a cafe  ? The  writers  in  favour 
of  monarchy  are  reduced  to  the  miferable  Riift,  of  fub- 
Rituting  the  mobs  of  cities  in  the  place  of  nations,  in 
order  to  conjure  up  the  idea  of  a popular  defpotifm, 
which  cannot,  as  America  is  fituated,  exiR.  ri  lie  many 


% 


L 53  1 

have  no  motive  to  opprefs  the  few.  Temptations  to 
fraud  are  in  an  inverfe  proportion,  to  the  multitude 
who  are  fharers  in  the  plunder,  and  the  diminution  of 
the  booty  to  be  divided.  A combination  of  the  great 
bulk  of  the  community,  to  ereft  adefpotifm  over  an  in- 
confiderable  number  of  individuals,  though  it  would 
not  exhibit  the  extreme  cafe,  of  a tyrannic  nation,  do- 
mineering over  one  man,  would  yet  prefent  the  ridi- 
culous objeft,  of  an  hundred  perfons,  owning  a linglc 
{lave. 

But  whither  are  we  going  ? Did  America  fight  for  a 
revolution  of  dominating  families,  or  of  principles  ? If 
of  principles  define  and  compare  them  with  the  fenti- 
inents  now  avowed,  by  words,  in  books,  in  news- 
papers, and  by  actions,  all  evincing  a concerted  defign. 
Serioufly  concerted  as  the  defign  is,  I will  believe  that 
America  is  not  fufficiently  regenerated,  for  the  intro- 
duction of  king,  lords  and  commons.  She  yet  knows 
well,  that  eftabtifhed  religions — bilhops — tythes — and 
{landing  armies,  being  feions  of  the  fame  frock,  ine- 
vitably fprout  up  together  with  ariftocracy. 

The  people  are  the  only  fafe  guardians  of  their  own 
liberty,  and  the  focial  jurifdi&ion,  the  only  impartial 
corrector  of  unconftitutional  political  defigns. 


SECTION  XI. — The  same  subject  continued. 

THE  people  are  the  only  fafe  guardians  of  their  own 
liberty.  The  component  parts  of  government  are 
the  creatures  of  the  conftimtion.  A fubjettion  of  the  cre- 
ator to  the  created,  is  a reverfal  of  the  courfe  of  nature. 
The  conilitution  is  a limitation  to  legiilative  power.  It 
iniulates  arbitrary  defigns,  and  continually  pronounces, 
“ thus  far  {halt  thou  go.”  Butfuppofe  a legiflaturefhoul'd 
go  further.  Is  the  veto  abortive  ? Is  it  only  an  empty 


[ 54  ] 

echo  of  a nation’s  laft  dying  words?  or  is  it  to  be  cn* 
forced  and  by  whom  ? 

Without  legiflative  encroachment  or  connivance,  no 
infringement  upon  the  conflitution  can  happen.  The 
laws  will  act  upon  and  reflrain  individuals,  by  the  en- 
forcement of  the  courts  of  juflice  ; but  the  conflitution 
only  can  aft  upon  the  legiilature,  by  the  enforcement 
of  the  focial  jurifdiftion.  The  laws  being  competent 
to  every  other  objeft  of  good  government,  the  confli- 
tution mufl  have  been  exclufively  defigned  for  the  cafe, 
to  which  ic  is  now  applied.  Until  a violation  of  the 
principles  of  the  conftitution  appears,  no  occafion  for 
xeforting  to  the  remedy  exifls ; and  when  it  does  ap- 
pear, to  affert  that  there  is  no  mode  of  getting  at  the 
remedy,  or  that  the  body  prefuppofed  by  the  violation, 
to  be  vitiated,  are  yet  to  enforce  it  upon  themfelres,  is 
making  the  conflitution  a dead  letter. 

Therefore  if  liberty  is  a national  objeft,  the  nation 
itfclf  mufl  watch  over  the  conflitution,  preferve  it  from 
violation,  and  i'upply  its  defefts,  or  admit  it  to  be  the 
Lethe  of  the  community,  producing  an  intire  forgetful- 
ncl's  of  the  rights  of  man. 

The  national  judgment  or  will  may  be  brought  to 
aft  in  two  modes,  without  recurring  to  a general  con- 
vention. 

i.  By  cautioufly  elefting  members  of  Congrefs,  of  a 
fimilarity  of  interefls — of  burthens — of  benefits — and 
of  habits  with  the  eleftors.  For  an  unbiaffed  judgment 
upon  good  information,  will  correft  political  abufes, 
and  invent  new  checks  againft  their  repetition. 

i.  Through  the  organs  of  flate  legiilature  s. 

The  firfl  will  operate  flowly.  The  people  may  be 
deceived  by  profeflions,  and  a reprefentative  though 
found  at  firil  is  fometimes  debauched.  But  yet  as  the 


\ 


[ 55  J 

people  when  informed,  arealmoft  invariably  right,  and 
as  a reprefentative  is  often  firm,  it  deferves  the  moft 
fedulous  attention. 

The  feeond  is  a fecurity  for  liberty  of  the  happieft 
texture  which  could  have  been  devifed. 

The  ftatc  legiflatures  are  the  people  themfelves  in  a 
fine  of  refinement,  poffe fling  fupcrior  information, 
and  exhibiting  the  national  fufirage  in  the  fairefi  and 
fafeft  mode. 

They  are  annual  conventions,  fubjeCt  to  no  undue  in- 
fluence, not  participating  of  loaves  and  fifhes,  and  aCtua- 
ted  by  the  motive  of  public  good. 

Holding  their  powrer  by  an  annual  tenure,  they  are 
frequently  accountable  to  the  people,  often  changed, 
and  incapable  of  forming  combinations  for  their  private 
emolument,  at  the  public  expence. 

Being  more  immediately  within  the  view  of  their  con- 
fiituents,  fhauld  they  mifinterpret  the  doings  of  the 
national  government,  or  mifreprefent  the  public  mind, 
a detection,  or  a contradiction,  would  be  almofi  infian- 
taneous. 

As  electors  of  fenators,  they  conftirute  a chief  link 
conneChng  the  general  and  hate  governments,  through 
which  the  conduct  of  the  former  may  be  better  under- 
ftood,  and  the  will  of  the  people  readied  ; fo  as  to  fill 
up  in  fome  meafure,  the  great  fpace  between  Congrefs 
f and  the  people. 

They  may  operate  decifively  upon  the  general  govern - 
vient,  by  conjlituting  the  fenute  according  to  a republican 
Jlanaard . 

And  finally  the  ftate  legiflatures  have  at  leaft  as  good 
a right  to  judge  of  every  infraction  of  the  conftitution, 
as  Congrefs  itfelf. 


[ ] 

The  alarming  mode  of  thinking  avowed  by  the  arifto- 
cracy,  “ that  they  are  only  refponfible  to  God  and  their 
“ own  confciences,”  inllead  of  weakening  the  argument, 
is  an  additional  reafon  for  clinging  to  every  means,  tend- 
ing to  produce  an  effedual  refponfibiliry  in  the  mem- 
bers of  Congrefs,  to  the  conflitution,  and  to  the  people 
who  made  it.  Whilft  the  avowal  goes  to  the  fubver- 
lion  of  every  principle  of  liberty — to  the  annihilation  of 
the  conflitution — and  is  in  fact  a rebellion  again  ft  the 
firft  principles  of  liberty,  the  act  of  (hutting  the  fenate 
doors  accords  with  the  doctrine,  and  exhibits  one  of  its  v 
effects,  by  obflrucling  the  evidence  upon  which  a re- 
fponfibility  can  only  be  enforced.  If  a jurifdiftion  is 
compelled  to  decide  upon  incomplete  evidence,  a power 
to  impofe  fuch  a neceflity,  inllead  of  being  amenable  to 
that  jurifdiiftion,  is  fuperior  to  it ; and  by  concealing  a 
part,  a 'fumes  a right  of  with-holding  the  whole  teflimo- 
ny.  Of  what  avail  is  a right  of  decilion,  when  the 
grounds  upon  which  to  exert  human  reafon  and  reflec- 
tion, arc  with-held  either  completely  or  partially  ? 

A aifavowal  of  every  fpecies  of  refponfibility  to  focial  \ 
obligations,  is  a difavowal  of  all  claim  to  focial  confi- 
dence. 


SECTION  XII. — The  same  subject  continued. 

Unconstitutional  defigns  have  been 

demonflrated  ; the  corrective  power  is  found  ; 
and  it  now  remains  to  fpecify  the  remedies. 

The  natural  intercjl  of  every  country,  ought  exclu- 
fively  to  legiflate.  A complete  transfer  of  this  power 
to  an  artificial  inter cji,  is  a thorough  legislative  corrup- 
tion. A partial  transfer,  is  a legiflative  taint.  The  na- 
tural interefl  of  a country  includes  whatever  may  fub- 
fiil,  without  the  direft  aid  of  municipal  law,  as  agricui- 


[ 57  ] 

ture,  commerce,  manufactures  and  arts.  An  artificial 
intereft,  whatever  is  immediately  created  by  law.  As 
public  debt,  public  officers,  and  private  banks. 

If  this  idea  is  not  a principle  of  the  conftitution,  and 
a neceflary  one  for  the  prefervation  of  liberty,  upon 
what  grounds  were  public  officers  excluded  from  Con- 
grefs,  and  a variety  of  precautions  introduced  for  the 
purpofe  of  preventing  an  undue  influence  from  creeping 
into  that  body  ? No  admiffion  of  an  artificial  intereft  in- 
to the  legiilature,  is  recognized  by  the  conftitution,  and 
unlefs  the  principle  of  the  exclufion,  and  not  the  exam- 
ples adduced,  is  conlidered  as  fundamental  (the  gift  of 
prefcience  not  having  prefided  at  the  formation  of  the 
conftitution)  then  the  legiflative  branch  may  evade  it 
without  reftriftion,  by  creating  an  artificial  intereft  not 
forefeen  or  contemplated,  and  beftowing  upon  it  a legif- 
lative influence. 

For  example.  Congrefs  impofe  taxes  and  borrow 
money.  The  higher  the  tax,  and  the  more  they  bor- 
row, the  more  they  may  receive  as  flock-holders. 
Which  violates  the  principle  of  the  conftitution  mod 
forely,  the  cafe  it  dates,  of  excluding  a member  becaufe 
he  receives  a fixed  falary  as  an  officer  of  government ; 
or  the  cafe  unforefeen,  of  a member’s  receiving  uncer- 
tain and  unlimited  gain  from  the  public  labour,  and  in 
part  from  the  public  purfe,  depending  on  his  own 
vote  ? 

Again.  Public  monies  are  to  be  accounted  for  to 
Congrefs.  Suppofe  they  fhould  be  employed  in  favori- 
tifm  to  the  bank,  or  in  keeping  up  the  price  of  certifi- 
( cates.  Will  certificate  or  dock-holders,  who  receive 
the  money,  be  very  inexorable  in  detecting  and  punifh- 
ing  fuch  a mifapplication  ? Or  being  bound  by  number* 
lefs  ties  of  the  ftrongeft  intered,  in  the  clofed  alliance 
with  a minider  of  finance,  is  not  an  explanatory  and  en- 
lightening effect  upon  their  minds  rather  to  be  expect- 

J 


C S3  ] 

cd,  if  incomprehenfible  accounts  of  public  monies 
fhould  be  exhibited. 

It  is  the  chief  principle  of  the  conftitution,  that  the 
natural,  and  not  an  artificial  intereft,  fhould  be  repre- 
fented  in  the  legiflaturc.  They  are  ufually  in  oppofition 
to,  if  not  at  enmity  with,  each  other  ; becaufe  the  lat- 
ter conftantly  fubfifts  upon  the  former.  Therefore  the  lat- 
ter, ought  to  be  limited  and  reftrained  by  the  fimple 
rule  of  the  public  good.  But  if  it  legiflatcs,  it  is  fubjec- 
ted  to  no  rcflraint  or  limitation. 

Slavery  is  only  a domination  of  an  artificial,  over  the 
natural  intereft  of  a nation.  In  whatever  fhapethat  ar- 
tificial intereft  appears,  the  effeCt  is  the  fame.  And  if 
the  artificial  intereft  poffeffes  a power  of  erefting  itftlf, 
and  of  legiilating  to  preferve  and  fupport  itfelf,  the  na- 
tion is  already  enflaved. 

Public  creditors  and  ftock-holdcrs  ought  to  be  ex- 
cluded from  Congrefs,  upon  the  fame  principle  as  pub- 
lic officers  are  excluded,  becaufe  all  may  acquire  pub- 
lic monies  by  their  own  votes,  and  the  acquifiti- 
ons  of  the  two  former  being  behind  the  curtain,  are 
molt  to  be  apprehended.  Would  fuch  characters 
have  been  fit  perfons  to  form  a conftitution  for  America, 
and  if  not,  are  they  proper  guardians,  of  that  which 
they  could  not  have  been  entrufted  to  enact  ? 

Suppofe  for  inftance,  wliilft  the  funding  and  affump- 
tion  laws  were  under  difeuflion,  members  of  Congrefs 
had  held  paper,  the  value  of  which  was  to  be  greatly 
enhanced  by  funding  and  affiaming.  Would  fuch  mem- 
bers have  been  impartial  judges  of  the  propriety  of 
thefe  meafures  ? or  of  the  propofition  to  make  fome  re- 
tribution to  the  original  holders  for  their  lofs,  leaving 
ftill  to  the  purchafers  a handfome  gratuity  ? Could  not 
members  of  Congrefs  upon  that  occafion  have  been  in- 
terwoven by  fpeculators,  with  their  projects  ? Or  whilft 
the  queftions  were  under  confideration,  if  members  had 


[ 59  J 

drawn  the  wages  paid  by  their  country  for  impartiality, 
and  inverted  them  in  the  purchafe  of  a perfonal  interelt 
on  one  fide  of  the’queftion,  could  a greater  degree  of 
legiflutive  corruption  have  been  conceived  ? When  the 
bank  law  was  before  Congrefs,  were  certificate  holders 
impartial  legislators,  fince  an  effect  of  it,  was  to  increafe 
the  interert  on  7,500,000  dollars  of  certificates,  from 
fix  to  at  leart  twelve  per  centum  ? 

Illurtrations  refulting  from  an  actual  rtate  of  things, 
and  drawn  from  laws,  fo  important  in  their  conie- 
quences,  enable  us  to  look  forward  for  future  effects, 
upon  better  grounds  than  conjecture,  and  bring  the 
queftion  to  this  iffue.  Ought  Congrefs  to  decide  upon 
the  mort  important  national  regulations,  from  motives 
of  public  good,  or  ought  they  to  be  governed,  or  even 
biaffed  by  thofe  of  private  interert  ? 

Natural  deafnefs  would  be  confidered  as  an  unan- 
fwerable  objection  to  a candidate  for  a feat  in  Congrefs, 
and  yet  it  would  be  preferable  to  an  artificial  deafnefs, 
as  far  as  an  equal  chance  of  doing  right,  is  preferable  to 
an  automaton  member,  whofe  motions  are  governed  by 
a fecret  impulfe,  when  that  impulfe  is  felf-intereft. 

Laws  then  ought  to  be  made  by  the  natural  or  gene- 
ral interert  of  a nation,  and  every  artificial,  local  and 
particular  interert,  ought  to  depend  upon  the  juflice 
and  integrity  of  that  which  is  natural  or  general,  be- 
caufe  of  this  every  individual  participates,  whereas  a 
few  perfons  only  are  concerned  in  the  others  ; becaufe 
the  fmaller  the  number,  and  the  more  exclufive  the  in- 
terert, the  greater  the  temptation  to  injuftice  and  par- 
tiality ; becaufe  national  confidence  in  the  important 
matter  of  legillation,  can  only  refide  in  the  nation  itfelf; 
and  becaufe,  when  a power  to  legislate,  is  the  offspring 
of  legislation  and  not  of  the  conftitution,  legillation' 
which  gave,  can  refume  the  power,  can  transfer  it  from 
one  exclufive  interert  to  another,  and  can  caufe  politi- 


[60]. 

cal  principles,  intended  to  be  made  conftirutionally  per- 
manent, to  flufluate.  The  power  of  legiflation,  by  the 
feveral  paper  laws,  is  in  fact  and  fubftance  (for  we  are 
tegardlefs  of  form)  transferred  from  the  nation  to  a 
paper  junto.  And  if  the  bank  and  certificate  artificial 
interefts,  were  in  a ftate  of  warfare,  legal  transfers  of 
this  power,  and  fluctuations  of  political  principles, 
would  prefently  exemplify  the  objefts  of  a legiflative 
power,  flowing  in  fa<ft,  though  not  in  form,  out  of  le- 
giflation. 

If  this  is  not  the  principle  of  exclufions  from  the  le- 
giflature,  upon  what  bafis  do  they  reft  ? Admiting  it  to 
be  fo,  is  not  the  artificial,  exclufive,  private  paper  in- 
tereft  completely  embraced  by  it  ? 

When  fuch  an  intereft  feduces  a part  of  the  repre- 
fentatives  of  the  general  or  national  intereft,  into  its 
views  or  defigns,  liberty  is  dangeroufly  wounded ; 
but  when  a majority  of  fuch  reprefentatives  is  thus  fe- 
duced,  liberty  is  theoretically  annihilated. 

An  unanfwerable  illuftration  of  this  doftrine  refults 
from  the  recolle&ion,  that  the  paper  intereft  is  tranfi- 
tory.  It  is  a bird  of  paflage,  regardlefs  of  climes,  in- 
capable of  national  feelings — of  national  attachments — 
or  of  that  amor  patriae,  which  is  the  moft  tender  pledge 
of  legiflative  kindnefs.  Inftead  of  poffeffing  perma- 
nency, it  may  connect  itfelf  occafionally  with  French, 
Spanifti,  Dutch,  or  Englifti  politics.  Are  thefe  fuch 
fupports  as  the  conftitution  folicits  ? And  what  muft  be 
the  view’s  of  an  admir.iftration,  which  has  feletted  an 
itinerant,  unfeeling  vifitant,  as  the  guardian  of  its  de- 
figns ? Of  the  public  good,  paper  is  a moft  unnatural 
guardian.  It  is  a rapacious  calculator  of  intereft, 
whofe  confluence  is  feared  by  its  acquifitions  and  its 
hopes.  In  Congrefs,  it  is  an  inexorable  creditor,  with 
an  execution  or  a deed  of  truft  in  its  hand,  ready  to 
feize  and  fell — with  a power  to  borrow  money  for  its 


L 61  ] 

own  purpofes,  at  any  lofs  to  the  debtor — and  able  to 
perplex  its  demands  and  add  to  its  ufury,  by  fly  tricks 
or  legiflative  contrivances. 

Hence  the  depofiting  of  certificates  in  the  national 
bank,  by  which  the  paper  more  than  doubled  intereft 
- — hence  the  enormous  loans  made  of  the  bank,  carry- 
ing intereft,  whilft  it  poflefled  and  ufed  an  enormous 
fum  of  public  money,  carrying  no  intereft — hence  the 
continual  foreign  loans,  whilft  the  nation  is  amufed 
with  a finking  fund,  with  compliments  to  the  trade  of 
financiering,  and  with  official  recommendations  from 
the  minifter,  conveyed  through  the  pureft  channel,  to 
commence  the  aifeharge  of  the  public  debt — and  hence 
that  afiemblage  of  contrivances,  placing  the  people  in  a 
ftate  of  utter  darknefs,  as  to  the  difpofition  of  their 
money. 

If  we  tempt  men’s  defires,  by  hopes  of  boundlefs  ac- 
quifitions,  the  conftant  incitements  of  private  intereft, 
will  leave  no  interval  of  time  or  reflection,  to  be  ap- 
propriated to  the  public  good  ; a reflection,  out  of 
which,  if  it  is  juft,  arifes  a ftrong  argument  for  expel- 
ling every  fpecies  of  private  undue  influence  out  of 
Congrefs,  that  the  attention  of  this  body  may  be  bent 
to  the  nati ' sal  welfare. 

The  ex]  '■  Ion  of  paper  men  out  of  Congrefs  would 
brin  < thole  obfervationc  to  the  teft  of  an  impartial  le- 
gitimate iegiflature.  Is  fuch  an  event  deiirable  ? An- 
ticipate it,  and  behold  its  efteCfs.  If  the  paper  intereft 
would  be  expe’led  from  Con  grefs — if  the  incorporating 
ufurpation,  and  all  conitruftive  contrivances,  violating 
republican  principles,  would  be  reftrained — if  any  other 
mifeonftrued  or  doubtful  expreffions  in  the  conftitution 
would  be  explained,  and  new  fecurities  for  liberty  de- 
viled— and  if  fimplicity  in  the  finances  would  be  en- 
forced ; fuch  decinons  would  prove  the  truth  and  juft- 
nefs  of  my  arguments.  ] challenge  the  ariftocracy  to 


C 62  ] 

fubmit  to  this  fair  and  honed;  trial.  A decifion  by  pa- 
per in  its  own  favour,  is  no  proof  at  all.  If  they 
flirink  from  fo  unexceptionable  a proportion,  and  will 
continue  both  judge  and  jury  in  their  own  caufe,  it  can 
only  flow  from  a confcioufnefs , which  will  not  efcape  the 
notice  of  the  community,  in  confldering  whether  real 
reforms  are  deftrable,  and  whether  it  will  Hop  at  ima- 
ginary anticipations  of  its  willies.  Such  a legiflature 
•mould  alfo  repeal  the  bank  lam. 

What ! exclaims  the  appalled  ariilocracy,  will  you 
alfo  invade  rights  of  private  property,  as  by  law  ejta- 
blijhed?  Yes,  If  they  are  interdicted  by  the  principles  of 
the  conjlitution , they  are  wrongs , and  not  rights. 

This  fubje£t  deferves  a further  examination.  It  may 
illuftrate  and  unravel  the  unconftitutional  deflgns  of  a 
monarchical  faction. 

We  hear  on  all  hands  of  the  [acrednefs  of  private 
property,  held  by  legijlative  finch  on  ; of  the  inviolabi- 
lity of  legiflative  faith ; and  it  is  even  afferted,  that 
Congrefs  ought  never  to  repeal  a law,  by  which  they 
have  bellowed  a valuable  boon  upon  an  individual. 
Congrefs  have  themfclves  plainly  expreffed  their  fuf- 
frage  in  favour  of  thefe  doctrines,  by  pledging  the  pub- 
lic faith,  that  the  exclufive  privileges  of  the  bank  Ihall 
be  enjoyed  for  twenty  years  unrivalled , and  by  making 
a portion  of  the  public  debt  irredeemable , in  virtue  of 
their  conftitutional  power  to  redeem.  It  is  evident 
that  thefe  doctrines  are  invented  to  prop  the  laws,  and 
the  laws  grounded  in  a contemplation  of  the  do&rines. 
Whence  both  the  doctrines  and  the  laws  are  clearly  a- 
fcribable  to  a common  fource. 

A legiflature  influenced  by  private  motives,  will  ex- 
alt legiflative  fanctions,  and  debafe  conftitutional  barri- 
ers. Thofe  who  invent  wrongs  for  their  own  ufe,  will 
alfo  invent  doctrines  to  fupport  thofe  wrongs. 


[ 63  : 

Combining  the  do&rine  and  laws,  they  engender  a di- 
reft  claim  by  .the  legiflature  of  a power  to  ufurp  upon 
the  rights  of  the  nation,  Provided,  the  depredation  is  fold 
or  given  to  an  individual  or  a corporation.  It  is  a doc- 
trine which  proflrates  every  conftitiitional  fence,  dcvi- 
fed,  or  capable  of  being  deviled  lor  the  prefervation  of 
liberty  and  property,  at  the  feet  of  a leg'flature.  They 
may  parcel  out  public  property  and  public  rights,  which 
are  the  only  wares  they  deal  in,  until  none  worth  having 
remain.  They  may  endow  an  arillocracy  at  the  nation- 
al expencc,  and  if  the  inviolability  of  legifla  rive  faith  is 
to  obviate  a reclamation,  then  the  arillocracy  is  per- 
petual. Congrefs  may  even  distribute  among  their  baf- 
tards  the  revenues  of-  cities,  countries  or  Sates  in  perpe- 
tuity, through  the  medium  of  paper,  banks,  coals,  or 
any  neceflary  of  life  ; and  an  example  for  it  is  to  be 
found  in  a fyftcm,  which  is  obviouSy  the  polar  Star  of 
the  politics  of  government.  Nay  they  may  divide  the 
fruit  of  the  national  labour  among  themfelves,  not  for 
twenty  years  only,  but  for  ever.  The  limitation  of  the 
bank  tax  was  merely  arbitrary  ; and  if-thc  inviolability 
of  legiSative  faith,  is  to  fan&ion  the  contrivance  for 
twenty  years,  a precedent  exiSs  for  conveying  the 
whole  national  ability  to  a Single  corporation,  in  tail 
fucceffional,  for  all  eternity. 

This  legal  immutability,  fuppofes  conSitutional  mu- 
tability. Congrefs  are  mounted  by  it  to  a pre-emi- 
nence over  a national  convention.  It  goes  to  the  pre- 
fervation of  legal  wrongs,  beyond  a revolution  itfeif. 
It  is  an  affumption  of  a power,  not  actually  poflefled  by 
anyexiSing  generation  of  mankind,  and  which  the  na- 
tion itfeif  could  not  beSow  even  on  a general  conven- 
tion. It  renders  conSitutional  ri:  ! its  vi '.-table , l y af- 
ferting  that  legal  rights  are  invi'J;i!;!c  ; thus  in  a mari- 
ner repealing  political  gofpcl,  by  form  of  law.  And  is 
indeed  a doctrine  fo  replete  with  evil  and  uhfurdity,  as 
to  have  been  avowed  but  Seldom,  lince  the  ti  nes  of  the 
Medes  and  Perfians. 


C 6+  ] 

But  the  Medes  and  Perfians  were  more  confident  than 
Congrefs.  Immutability  was  a concomitant  of  their  laws 
univerfally.  Whereas  with  us  the  whole  doftrine  is 
monopoliic  by  thofe,  who  can  drip  the  nation  of  its 
wealth  or  rights  by  form  of  law.  Laws  of  this  kind 
are  called  deeds,  and  the  fign,  feal  and  deliver  of  Con 
grel',  clofes  the  conveyance  for  ever.  As  if  all  laws 
did  nor  in  fame  way  affect  private  perfons.  As  if  to  fe- 
core  the  nation  individually , they  mud  be  plundered  col- 
lectively. As  if  it  was  a confolation  to  a man,  whom 
you  are  about  to  dedroy  on  one  fcore,  to  declare  him 
fafe  as  to  another. 

The  conditution  empowers  Congrefs  to  make  laws, 
not  to  make  deeds.  Mutability  is  attached  to  legifla- 
tion.  Otherwife  each  fucctffive  Congrefs  would  have 
its  power  narrowed  by  the  preceding,  though  derived 
from  the  fame  fource,  and  held  by  the  fame  tenure.  To 
keep  faith  to  the  bank  law,  we  mud  be  guilty  of  a 
breach  of  faith  to  the  conditution. 

To  return  more  immediately  to  the  fubjech  The 
conditution  in  the  fifth  article,  recognizes  the  date  le- 
giflatures,  as  date  conventions,  and  Congrefs  as  a ge- 
neral convention.  Congrefs,  united  with  two  thirds 
of  the  date  legillatures,  may  alter  the  conditution.  Con- 
templated, as  they  are  in  this  important  indance,  as  the 
organs  of  the  people,  can  it  be  improper  for  them  to 
make  knowm  the  public  will,  or  to  reconfider  emenda- 
tions of  the  conditution,  of  which  they  are  ultimately 
to  judge  ? The  power  of  forcing  Congrefs,  by  the  man- 
date of  twm  thirds,  immeafurably  tranfeends  a mere  re- 
commendation. 

A genuine,  impartial,  unadulterated  legiflature, would 
fairly  confider,  and  impartially  determine  quedions  of 
a national  magnitude,  exceeded  by  none.  Therefore 
the  remedies  prefenting  themfelves  are  ; 

u.  In  all  elections,  to  exclude  paper  men  of  every  de- 


nomination,  and  alfo  every  fpecies  of  artificial  interest 
created,  or  to  be  created. 

‘2.  To  compile  the  Senate  by  a republican  Jlandard. 

3.  To  recommend,  through  the  medium  of  ftate  le- 
gifiatures,  explanations  of  the  conflitution,  according 
with  its  fpirit — its  conflru&ion  when  adopted — its  un- 
trained conflru&ion  now — and  with  republican  princi- 
ples. 


SECTION  XIII. — The  subject  cf  the  Bank  re- 
sumed. 

IT  is  refumed  to  evince  the  integrity  of  the  obferva- 
tion,  intimating  the  exigence  of  numerous  frauds 
in  this  contrivance,  not  yet  adduced. 

National  wealth,  and  national  rights,  tottering  on 
the  brink  of  perdition,  irrefiflibly  folicited  our  firfi:  at- 
tention ; and  all  poflible  hafte  was  made  to  exhibit  their 
danger,  without  ditlratting  the  public  attention,  by 
compelling  it  to  view  the  Proteus  in  too  great  a variety 
of  fhapes. 

This  important  duty  being  difeharged,  it  may  not  be 
amifs  to  continue  our  enquiries  concerning  the  public 
or  private  morality  of  this  inftitution. 

The  bank  may  buy  and  fell  lands  including  their  ca- 
pital to  the  amount  of  15,000,000  of  dollars.  But  if 
they  exceed  their  capital,  who  is  to  know  it  ? They 
are  not  to  difclofe  the  extent  of  their  landed  eftate,  even 
to  the  miniftcr  ; and  no  power,  can  require  fuch  a dif- 
clofure  of  them.  If  an  excefs  is  difeovered,'  and  could 
be  proved,  which  is  almofl  impoffible,  no  penalty  is  fub- 
joined  or  forfeiture  incurred  ; and  the  effett  of  fuch  a 
difeovery  would  have  been  eafily  fruftrated,  had  a for- 
feiture followed  it,  bv  a fraudulent  exercife  of  the  pow- 

K ^ 


I 66  ] 

er  to  fell.  In  this  view  the  bank  law  is  a ftatute  of 
mortmain,  and  the  land;  of  the  community  may  be  gra- 
dually fwallowed  up  by  a corporation,  which  does  not 
propofe  in  exchange  for  them,  either  political  or  eter- 
nal falvation.  Perpetuities  of  landed  eftates.  devolving 
by  fucceffion,  are  eftabiifhed,  to  the  difeouragement 
of  commerce  and  induftry;  to  the  impoverilhment  of 
the  laity  ; and  to  the  aggrandifement  of  the  bank  mili- 
litant  miniltry.  It  is  an  incorporated  feudal  tenure,  and 
the  community  is  fubje&ed  to  homage  and  fealty,  for 
their  circulating  medium,  as  well  as  their  lands. 

The  bank  dividends  are  not  to  be  coextenfive  with  the 
real  profits,  but  are  to  be  regulated  by  the  direftors. 
Hence  the  extent  of  the  impofition  is  concealed  from 
the  public.  The  community  lofe  the  chance  of  having 
all  they  pay  thrown  back  into  circulation,  by  the  extra- 
vagance or  luxury  of  individuals.  An  accumulating 
fund,  which  may  make  the  corporation  richer  than  the 
nation,  and  of  courfe  more  powerful,  is  a branch  of  the 
fcheme.  It  may  conftantly  retain,  what  the  nation  a- 
lone  fupplies.  Thus  the  amufements  of  mathematici- 
ans, in  calculating  the  elP&s  of  compound  intereft,  are 
to  be  realized  at  the  national  expence  ; and  a fund  is 
fecured  for  extending  the  mortmain  bufinefs,  or  with 
which  to  buy  a new  charter  at  the  end  of  twenty  years 
by  public  or  private  negociations,  if  the  bank  fliould  not 
then  have  members  enough  in  Congrefs  to  give  it  to  it- 
felf.  The  body  corporate  can  either  extend  or  diminifh 
its  profits.  This  is  a kind  of  lafh  capable  of  being  ap- 
plied to  their  refractory  bodies  natural,  either  in  or  out 
of  Congrefs,  to  whip  them  in,  to  the  incorporated  mea- 
fures.  ri  he  fupremacy  of  the  body  politic  over  its  mem- 
bers is  by  this  means  effectually  eftablilhed,  and  a uni- 
ted impetus  fecured  to  it.  Ip  this  part  of  the  fcheme  is 
alio  to  be  difeerned  an  unnecefiary  precaution,  as  expe- 
rience has  evinced,  in  cafe  things  Ihould  go  badly.  In 
this  event,  the  corporation  by  its  dire&ors,  had  nothing 
to  do,  but  to  declare  ail  exorbitant  dividend,  and  then 


[ ] 

to  fell  out  individually  to  the  unwary,  the  bank  ftock, 
thus  enhanced  in  price. 

Thedebtsarenot  toexceed  10,000,000  of  dollars,  over 
and  above  the  money  depcfited  in  the  bank  for  fafe-kecping , 
and  over  and  above  5,000,000  worth  of  lands.  Diffi- 
cult  as  it  is  to  afcertain  what  may  be  the  flock,  property 
and  debts  of  the  bank  by  law,  yet  no  penalty  exifls  for 
enforcing  obedience  to  the  law,  except  that  if  the  bank 
incurs  debts  beyond  10,000,000,  they  fhall  attually 
pay  them.  The  profit  of  the  bank  arifes  out  of  paper, 
money,  or  debts,  bearing  no  interefl.  Where  is  the  pe- 
nalty of  paying^ ico,  and  receiving  £ icC  for  fo  doing? 
The  traffic  of  the  bank;  is  under  no  limitation,  but  the 
national  ability  to  bear  it.  The  partial  power  of  in- 
fpe&ion,  conferred  upon  a member  of  the  coalition,  by 
way  of  national  fecurity,  might  have  been  exemplified 
by  a common  proverb,  except  for  the  indelicacy  of  the 
terms. 

Why  does  the  law  hold  out  an  idea  of  limiting  the 
acquifitions  of  the  bank  ? If  they  are  honeft,  to  limit 
them  was  urjufl;  if  difhoneft,  it  fliould  acquire  nothing. 
If  the  gain  came  from  abroad,  it  was  reflraining  a na- 
tional good;  but  if  the  reflraint  admits  that  it  was  to 
come  out  of  the  nation,  it  is  a tax  when  not  a penny  was 
due,  and  not  a penny  of  public  money  could  Congrefs 
bellow,  in  liberality  to  the  rich.  If  the  gain  was  not  like 
to  be  fo  enormous,  as  to  endanger  the  common-wealth,  it 
required  no  limitation,  if  it  was,  why  erc<5t  a mifehief  in 
order  to  reflrain  it — why  extend  it  fo  enormoully — or 
why  reflrain  it  with  fetters  of  fand  ? This  pretence  of  a 
limitation  tells  a tale.  It  confefTes  that  the  gain  is  enor- 
mous— that  it  is  paid  at  the  public  expence — and  that 
the  contrivance  contains  fomc  lurking  mifehief. 

Eut  the  huv  prevides  that  the  bank  may  lend  to  go- 
vernment to  any  amount.  Its  acquifitions  in  this  mode 
are  rendered  indefinite,  if  any  definition  could  before 
have  been  difeerned.  And  here  the  contrivance,  ex- 


C 68  1 

panding  its  views,  exhibits  an  unlimited  fcope  of  defigns, 
and  contemplates  a direCt  operation  on  government  it- 
felf.  Bank  people  in  Congrefs,  may  in  this  cafe,  vote 
that  government  fhould  make  unneceffary  loans  of  them- 
felves,  for  the  purpofes  of  extending  their  capital — en- 
creafing  their  profits — and  acquiring  an  influence.  The 
eagernefs  to  put  this  part  of  the  fyftem  into  a train, 
hath  already  explained  its  objeCts.  Two  millions  four 
hundred  thoufand  dollars  have  been  already  borrowed 
by  government  of  the  bank  upon  intereft,  and  a further 
loan  of  800, coo  dollars  was  fanCtioned  at  the  laft  Con- 
grefs, although  above  1,300,000  dollars  of  public  mo- 
ney was  at  that  time  lying  dead  in  fundry  banks.  By  a 
fimilar  trick,  the  bank  of  England  has  indiffolubly  con- 
nected itfelf  with  that  government,  and  a perpetual  re- 
newal of  its  charter  is  infured.  Although  its  dividends 
have  never  been  lower  than  five  and  an  half  per  centum , 
it  hath  alfo  gotten  more  than  cent,  per  cent,  on  its  capital 
in  a government  debt.  Great  as  this  property  is,  it  is 
far  outftripped  by  the  American  bank,  as  will  prefently 
be  fhown.  In  that  country,  an  enormous  profit,  and  an 
undue  legiflative  influence,  have  flowed  from  the  contri- 
vance. In  this,the  ufe  of  fimilar  means,  clearly  indicates 
an  intention  to  attain  fimilar  ends.  With  this  difference, 
that  our  inflitution  exceeds  enormity  itfelf. 

The  twenty  five  bank  directors  may  be  paid  by  the 
corporation  much  or  little  as  they  choof*  ; and  whether 
paid  or  not,  the  whole  of  them  may  be  taken  out  of  the 
Senate,  which  confifls  of  thirty  members.  Even  the 
prefident  of  the  United  States  may  be  chofen,  and  aCt 
as  a bank  director.  In  what  part  of  the  conftitution  is 
the  flaw  to  be  found,  permiting  infractions  of  its  own 
principles,  fo  egregious  ? If  bank  directors  ferve  the 
bank  without  wages,  whilft  they  demand  wages  of  the 
nation,  their  affeCtion  for  or  interefl  in  the  one,  muff 
be  greater  that  their  affeCtion  for,  or  intereft  in,  the 
other.  And  if  wages  are  their  objeCt,  they  will  be  pro- 
portioned to  their  earnings.  Something  beyond,  “ Well 


[ «9  J 

done  thofe  good  and  faithful  fervams,”  will  be  expefted 
for  doubling  the  talents. 

The  intimation  that  the  profits  of  the  bank  are  ex- 
travagant, deferves  an  expofition  by  items.  Premiiing, 
that  a perfon  out  of  the  fecret,  is  confined  to  fuch  items 
only,  as  are  of  public  notoriety,  fo  that  thofe  of  a pri- 
vate nature,  will  remain  uncalculated 

Three  fourths  of  the  bank  depofit,  are  to  confifl  of 
certificates, and  one  fourth  of  fpecie.  Suppofe  £ 1 oo  thus 
depofited.  The  dividend  at  the  end  of  the  year  was 
was  eight  per  centum.  The  £75  of  certificates  were 
gaining  an  interefl  of  fix  per  cent  per  annum , fo  that 
the  whole  profit  is  made  out  of  the  £25  fpecie,  which 
is  all  the  perfon  making  the  depofit  lofes  the  ufe  cf.  Up- 
on this  fum  the  profit  in  one  year  is  above  thirty  per 
centum.  But  the  bank  began  to  operate  when  only  one 
fourth  of  the  flock  fubferibed  was  depofited,  four  in- 
ftalments  of  fix  months  each  being  allowed,  and  yet  the 
dividends  have  been  made  upon  the  total  flock  fubferi- 
bed. Hence  only  £12  10  o.  attual  cafh  for  each 

£\oo  fleck,  was  depofited  during  the  whole  of  the 
rirft  year,  and  this  received  an  ufance  of  ^8,  as  regu- 
lated by  the  directors,  exclufive  of  the  gain  in  lands, 
debts,  fpcculations,  and  loans  for  the  incorporated  be- 
nefit. Are  not  the  talents  doubled  ? and  may  not  the 
bank  exclaim,  “ Well  done  thou  good  and  faithful  fer- 
vantsr” 

Though  the  fix  per  centum  upon  certificates,  confli- 
tuted  a portion  of  the  total  gain,  made  by  the  corpora- 
tion, yet  there  was  gain  enough  to  conllitute  the  dhi- 
dends,  exclufive  of  this^.v  per  centum. 

It  would  hardly  be  afferted,  that  the  profit  of  a bank, 
favoured  of  government,  would  be  only  t-u  o per  centum , 
fuppofing  the  flock  to  have  confifted  of  fpecie,  fo  as  not 
to  get  an  interefl,  both  by  circulating  paper  on  its  cre- 
dit, and  alfo  as  a debt  due  by  government. 


[ 7°  ] 

But  the  fact  fhould  not  reft  upon  a fuppolnion  which 
can  be  denied. 

Exclufive  of  the  dividends,  and  all  other  gains,  the 
bank  had  already  lent  to  government  on  the  firft  of  Ja- 
nuary 1793,  2,400,000  dollars,  for  which  it  was  then 
receiving  intereft. 

Therefore  the  profits,  fupplying  not  only  this  loan, 
but  alfo  the  dividends,  it  follows  obvioufly,  that  the 
intereft  upon  the  certificates  was  more  than  doubled  at 
the  national  expence  ; 'and  confequently  that  the 
7,500,000  dollars  of  public  debt  deposited,  was  inftan- 
taneoufly  conjured  up  by  what  is  called  financiering  /kill 
and  federation,  to  between  fifteen  and  thirty  millions. 

The  precife  amount  cannot  be  afeertained,  becaufe 
both  the  item  of  lands  acquired,  and  that  important  ar- 
ticle of  private  debts  due  to  the  bank,  are  left  out  of  the 
calculation  ; both  being  of  a fecret  nature. 

As  the  republic  did  not  depofit  her  two  millions  of 
(lock,  all  the  fpccie  of  the  whole  bank  fubfeription, 
fuppofing  every  fhilling  paid,  amounted  to  2,000,000 
of  dollars  ; and  out  of  it  the  dire&ors  have  not  only 
made  a dividend  of  eight  per  centum  on  10,000,000 
which  is  a gain  of  800,000  dollars  per  annum,  but  have 
alfo  lent  the  government  2,400,000  dollars.  The  ta- 
lents are  trebled  in  two  years.  It  is  not  faid,  that  the 
bank  had  fold  its  certificates  previous  to  January 
1 793* 

The  capital  of  the  bank  of  England  was^  10,000,000 
fterling.  It  has  only  been  able  to  lend  to  that  govern- 
ment from  its  inftitution,  about  £.  12,000,000,  and  its 
dividends  have  long  been  as  low  as  jive  and  an  half  per 
centum.  Thefpecie  capital  of  theUnited  States  bank  was 
only  2,000,000  of  dollars,  and  in  lefs  than  two  years, 
it  lent  2,400,000  to  government,  and  divided  eight  per 


[ 7*  1 

centum  on  10,000,000.  How  far,  arithmeticians,  does 
the  copy  outftrip  the  original  ? 

Did  or  did  not  the  bank  lend  to  the  public  2,000,000 
in  aflual  fpecie,  to  depoiit  for  the  public  hock.  If  it 
did,  ignorant  as  we  are  of  the  other  items  of  profit,  its 
enormity  is  fulficiently  evinced.  If  it  did  not,  the  re- 
public was  defrauded  in  a variety  of  ways. 

1.  Had  attual  cafli  been  borrowed  elfewhere  and  de- 
pofited,  the  bank  might  have  extended  its  bufinefs,  to 
the  increafe  of  the  profits,  of  which  the  public  would 
have  received  a fifth  part  ; whereas  60,000  dollars  are 
now  annually  paid  for  no  advantage,  four-fifths  of 
which  are  divided  among  the  private  fubferibers. 

2.  The  credit  of  the  bank  refts  upon  the  credit  of 
the  republic,  as  to  7,500,000  dollars  of  certificate 
flock,  and  whilfl  individuals  are  depofiting  the  credit 
of  the  republic  for  three-fourths  of  their  fubferiptions, 
the  republic  is  prohibited  from  depofiting  her  own  cre- 
dit, for  any  proportion  of  hers. 

3.  Further,  although  the  credit  of  the  bank  refts  up- 
on the  credit  of  the  government,  yet  the  government 
is  made  to  borrow  2,000,000  of  bank  credit,  which 
itfelf  eredled,  fuftains  and  can  annihilate,  and  for  thefe 
nothings,  to  pay  annually  60,000  fomethings.  When 
this  is  done  upon  an  affertion,  “ that  the  credit  of  the 
bank  is  necefifary  to  fupport  the  credit  of  the  nation,” 
precifely  the  reverfe  of  the  truth,  may  it  not  be 
pronounced,  that  there  is  verity  in  the  charge,  “ that 
the  public  good  is  facrificed  to  this  inflitution.” 

4.  But  that  which  carries  the  impoficion  to  the  moft 
extravagant  degree,  is,  that  the  public  (if  the  bank  did 
not  lend  aclua!  cafh)  pays  interefl  for  the  credit  of 
the  bank,  whilfl  the  bank  pays  none,  for  the  monc'j  of 
the  public.  The  fecretary  reported,  that  on  the  ill  of 


L 72  ] 

January  1793,  1,2 29,  <517  dollars  20  cents,  of  public 
money,  in  the  bank  of  the  United  States,  exclusive  of 
614,^93  dollars  2 cents,  which  he  reported  to  be  due 
for  bills  drawn  for  foreign  loans,  negociated  by  that 
bank  ; and  exclufive  of  158,778  dollars  25  cents,  de- 
pofited  in  other  banks.  And  on  that  day  the  public 
was  paying  intereft  to  the  bank  of  the  United  States  for 
2,400,000  dollars. 

If  the  bank  advanced  this  large  fum  to  the  public  in 
aftual  cafli,  whilft  it  was  hourly  lending  to  individuals 
a!fo,  it  muft  either  have  been  drained  of  its  cafh,  or  its 
profits  muft  have  exceeded  imagination  ; it  is  therefore 
probable,  that  it  was-  difeounting  from  the  ufe  of  the 
1.229,517  dollars  20  cents  of  public  money,  whilft  it 
was  receiving  intereft  of  the  public.  If  it  lent  only 
2;OCO.oeo  of  credit,  and  laid  out  the  2,000,000  of  cafh 
which  it  ought  to  have  lent  in  certificates,  and  depofi- 
ted  the  certificates  as  a fund  upon  which  to  circulate 
paper,  what  would  be  the  annual  gain  upon  the  fame 
2,000,000  ? Anfwer.  60,000  dollars  intereft  for  the 
credit  lent,  6o,oco  for  the  certificates  bought,  and 
t 20.000  for  4,000,000  of  paper  circulated  on  the  de- 
polit.  Excluding  the  idea  of  certificates,  eighteen  per 
centum  per  annum  is  paid.  The  refources  of  no  body 
muft  be  very  great.  I acknowledge  that  one  fifth  of 
thefe  gains  conftitute  an  article  of  thofe  refources. 

Let  the  fact  be  either  way,  the  enormity  of  the  im- 
pofition  is  evinced  by  lefs  than  a moiety  of  the  items. 
Suppofe  we  had  the  reft  P It  is  not  furprifing,  that 
the  public,  thought  one  fifth  owners  of  the  machine, 
are  allowed  no  directors.  For  what  would  come  of  it, 
if  the  v.  hole  fecret  was  known  ? 

And  this  is  a contrivance  for  creating  “ >1  attive  ca- 
pita!.” It  is  indeed  an  appofire  expreftion.  In  activity 
it  is  a perpetual  motion,  collecting  wealth  for  an  arifto- 
cracy,  and  impoverifliing  all  other  claffes  of  the  com- 
munity. IIow  does  the  filching  annually  an  enormous 

2 


[ 73  ] 

fum  from  their  capitals,  to  conditute. annual  dividends 
for  a few  rich  individuals,  and  to  erect  an  incorporated 
monger,  fecretly  and  condantly  ingulphing  real  proper- 
ty, and  national  refources,  in  the  abyfs  of  perpetuity, 
favour  agriculture,  commerce  or  manufactures  ? 

It  would  be  better  for  the  community,  if  fuch  con- 
tributions were  thrown  into  the  fea.  Though  the  pro- 
perty would  be  loll,  liberty  would  be  preferved.  Now 
its  wealth  foders  its  natural  enemy,  whild  the  general 
welfare  is  impoverilhed,  and  the  common  drength,  dif- 
abled.  The  finew  of  defence  is  transfering  to  thofe, 
from  whom  we  have  molt  caufe  to  fear  offence.  And 
the  dud  of  a few  new  terms,  interfperfed  with  the  jargon 
of  a fyflcm,  whofe  principle  is  perplexity,  and  whofe 
defign, is  treachery,  is  expelled  to  hide  from  the  public 
view,  the  ambufeade  which  lurks  behind. 

The  bank  having  the  monopoly  of  the  bulk  of  the 
circulating  medium,  may  occafionally  increafe  or  dimi- 
nilh  the  quantity.  It  may  diminilh  the  quantity,  thus 
enhance  its  value,  and  purchafe  with  its  own  paper,  cer- 
tificates or  other  property,  which  are  depreciated,  in 
the  fame  proportion,  as  the  medium  is  appretiated. 
It  may  then  increafe  the  quantity  of  this  circulating  me- 
dium, leffen  its  value,  appretiate  certificates  or  other 
property  of  courfe,  and  then  fell  a portion  of  the  fame 
certificates  or  other  property,  to  take  in  the  paper  which 
the  whole  cod.  If  the  law  prohibiting  this  incorpora- 
ted traffic  in  certificates , could  even  difeover  the  faft, 
yet  the  traffic  would  dill  have  open  to  it,  the  endlcfs 
lid  of  whatever  is  valuable.  And  the  individual  mem- 
bers are  not  even  nominally  redrained. 

This  is  a compleat  commercial  defpotifm.  Every  mer- 
chant is  fc  ired  beyond  the  reach  of  government,  and 
yet  the  bank  can  ruin  almod  any  merchant,  without 
even  a power  in  government  to  fave  him.  A refpefta- 
ble  clafs  of  citizens,  are  thus  cajoled  by  a few  of  its  mem- 

L 


I 


C 74  ] . 

bers,  who  enjoy  Tome  exclufive  fruits  from  the  contri- 
vance, into  an  approbation  of  the  mod  unreflrained  fpe- 
cies  of  indirect  and  fecret  power  over  their  property  ; 
whilft  the  fame  men  would  fpurn  at  the  fame  thing,  if 
exhibited  in  a fimple  incorporated  fociety,  for  enriching 
or  impoverifhing,  whomfoever  it  might  pleafe  the  direc- 
tors. Honefty,  induftry,  and  pun&uality,  are  no  lon- 
ger a fecurity  for  fuccefs.  Profit  is  to  be  made  by  fu- 
perior  cunning  and  intrigue  in  finding  out  bank  fecrets. 
The  profits  of  trade  will  no  longer  be  an  honourable 
compenfation,  for  fupplying  the  mutual  wants  of  diftant 
nations.  They  will  confifl:  chiefly  of  mean  pilferings 
from  our  next  neighbours.  The  reputable  and  ufeful 
fociety  of  merchants,  will  dwindle  into  adifhonefi:  aflo- 
ciation  of  fpecularors,  for  tricking  each  other,  as  well 
as  the  whole  community,  of  their  money,  by  a trade 
in  ideas. 

The  circulating  medium  is  the  foul  and  food  of  com- 
merce.  A corporation,  pofiefling  a powrer  over  the 
loul,  can  animate,  or  annihilate  the  body  at  pleafure. 
By  with-holding  its  food,  they  may  flarve  commerce  ; 
by  glutting  it,  they  may  produce  a mercantile  pletho-  < 
ra.  A foreknowledge  of  thefe  efFeCts,  is  an  unlimited 
power  of  taxation.  In  a civilized  fociety,  the  circula- 
ting medium,  is  alfo  the  foul  of  agriculture.,  arts  and 
manufactures.  All  the  faculties  of  the  nation  are  fub- 
je£t  to  the  regimen  of  an  incorporated  quackery,  in- 
llead  of  purfuing  a natural  impulfe,  in  fearch  of  their 
own  fubfiflence.  If  the  phvfician  was  honefl:,'  yet  an 
artificial  regimen  in  a ft  ate  of  health,  produces  debility, 
and  haflens  diiTolution  ; but  Tthen  his  fees  depend  on 
the  irregularity  of  his  preferiptions,  and  when  he  is  a 
mere  Hiccius  Doccius  of  a fellow,  he  will  foon  deftroy  • 
the  founded:  conllitution. 

A monopoly  of  the  circulating  medium,  is  an  uni- 
verfal  power  of  embargo,  over  trade,  agriculture,  and 
manufactures,  depofited  in  the  hands  of  a few  private 


L 75  1 

citizens.  In  what  place  does  the  conftitution  contem- 
plate fuch  a power,  and  if  the  place  can  be  found, 
why  does  it  fo  cautioufly  devife  checks  retraining  go- 
vernment'within  certain  limits,  whilft  this  power,  fo 
greatly  tranfcending  any  right  devolved  upon  govern- 
ment itfelf,  is  left  uncontrolled? 

Suppofe  a monopoly  of  gold  was  bellowed  on  one 
corporation — of  filver  on  another — of  the  Englifh  and 
French  trades  on  others  ; proceeding  to  parcel  out  all 
the  branches  of  trade,  agriculture,  arts,  and  almoll 
fciences,  among  fo  many  limilar  minifterial  contri- 
vances. It  might  enrich  the  members  of  the  feveral 
corporations,  but  the  public  would  exclaim,  trade  is 
ruined — the  national  happinefs  is  deftroyed.  And  yet 
fuch  a fyftem  would  be  more  juft  than  the  bank  contri- 
vance, in  being  more  general — in  producing  fome  little 
competition — and  in  being  lefs  an  engine  of  political 
defigns  and  legiflative  corruption.  The  monopoly  of 
the  circulating  medium  involves  a monopoly  of  all  thefe 
objedls.  The  bank  has  a flulla  of  trumps,  with  palm, 
the  knave,  at  their  head,  which  loos  the  reft  of  the 
community  ; and  if  it  does  not  fcize  the  whole  ftake  at 
one  grafp,  it  is  on  account  of  the  obvious  impolicy  of 
deftroying  the  hen  which  lays  the  golden  eggs. 

The  little  fpecie  left  by  the  fyftem  in  circulation,  is 
only  a kind  of  fmall  change,  or  a fort  of  permiflive 
bank  alms,  as  it  pays  them  no  tax,  and  is  too  inconfi- 
derable  in  its  amount,  to  impugn  a fingle  important  ef- 
fefl,  flowing  from  the  monopoly  of  the  circulating  me- 
dium. 

The  calamities  of  the  laft  war,  refulting  from  the 
banidiment  of  fpecie  by  a paper  medium,  were  proba- 
bly equivalent  to  thofe  produced  by  the  fword.  The 
banking  contrivances  are  rapidly  reducing  us  again,  to 
the  fame  ruinous  and  raiferable  fituarion. 


[ 7«  ] 


SECTION  XIV. — The  same  subject  continued. 

TH  E tax  paid  to  the  bank  as  inevitably  falls  upon 
labour  ultimately,  as  the  import  does  ; nor  has 
labour  in  either  cafe  the  fmalleft  chance  of  exerting  any 
degree  of  volition  ; it  can  only  exert  its  induftry,  to 
pay  a debt  impofed  upon  it  by  law,  which  it  muft  ne- 
ceflarily  difcharge. 

The  whole  grofs  value  of  the  exports  from  the  Uni- 
ted States,  for  twelve  months  previous  to  October 
1791,  was  17,371,551  dollars.  This  was  the  produft 
of  labour,  exclufive  of  its  food.  And  out  of  this  a- 
mount  muft  be  deduced  the  freight,  commiflions, 
clothing,  tools,  liquors,  and  other  necefiaries,  which 
it  muft  pay  for.  Conjecture  that  an  annual  profit  is 
made  by  labour  beyond  its  annual  needs,  even  of 
8,000,000.  One  days  profit  requires  four  day’s  work. 
Taking  thefe  data,  and  narrowing  the  profit  of  the 
bank  down  to  itsfimple  annual  dividend,  labour  muft 
toil  at  leaft  forty-nine  days  in  each  year  to  raife  the  di- 
vidend of  the  bank  of  the  United  States,  amounting  to 
800,000  dollars.  And  if  the  profits  of  all  the  banks 
amount  to  2,000,000  annually,  labour  muft  toil  ninety- 
one  days  every  year  to  pay  them.  Recoiled  that  the 
prefent  annual  expenditure  of  the  nation,  intereft,  and 
the  expences  of  government  included, exceeds  5,000,000 
of  dollars,  and  then  confidcrthe  prefent  ftate  of  labour. 
Suppofe  a law  was  propofed,  a neceffary  effeCt  of 
which  would  be,  that  a few  rich  men  fliould  work 
ninety-one  days  in  the  year  for  the  reft  of  the  commu- 
nity. Both  the  oppreftion  and  the  gain  would  be  in- 
finitely contracted.  But  the  principle  would  remain 
unchanged,  though  the  cafe  would  be  altered  greatly 
for  the  better.  If  the  profit  made  by  labour  extended 
even  to  10,000,000  annually,  the  bank  of  the  United 
States  would  be  receiving  eight  per  centum  annually,  in 
its  dividends  only,  out  of  this  profit.  And  if  the  capj- 


L 77  2 

tals  of  this,  and  the  other  banks,  extend  to  17,371,551 
dollars,  and  their  dividends  amount  to  eight  per  centum 
upon  an  average,  then  labour  pays  that  enormous  iute- 
reft  to  banks,  upon  the  grofs  amount  of  her  exports. 
Buf  if  we  add  to  the  dividends,  every  other  item  of 
profit,  and  allow  the  community  a maintenance,  it  is 
within  bounds  to  conjecture,  that  forty  per  centum  up- 
on her  nett  profit,  is  annually  paid  by  the  community  to 
the  feveral  banks. 

And  what  compenfation  do  the  banks  make  to  the 
community  for  thofe  enormous  gains  and  exclufive  privi- 
leges ? Have  they  made  a bufhel  of  wheat  or  a horn 
tooth  comb  ? ACtual  fpecie  is  but  a reprefenraiive  of 
real  wealth.  But  it  is  equivalent  thereto,  becaufe  it  can 
transfer  real  wealth  to  us  from  a foreign  nation  ; where- 
as bank  paper  can  neither  increafe  our  exports^  or  pay 
for  our  imports,  fince  its  currency  is  local.  The  bank 
is  therefore  an  incorporation  of  finecures,  quartered 
upon  labour,  and  may  be  jultly  ftiled,  the  Irilh  eftablilli- 
ment  of  America. 

Debt  is  fervice  or  labour,  and  fervice  or  labour  is 
flavery.  And  fo  is  flavery  defined  in  the  fourth  fec- 
tion  of  the  conflitution.  For  money  being  the  repre- 
fentative  oflabour,  and  the  only  medium  by  which  debt 
can  be  paid,  the  creditor  is  in  faCt  the  mailer  of  the 
debtor,  for  the  quantum  of  fervice  or  labour,  nectf- 
fary  to  difcharge  that  debt.  If  fo,  the  United  States 
are  by  the  bank  contrivances,  placed  precifeiy  in  the 
fituation  of  a Have,  who  has  purchafed  of  his  mailer 
about  four  day’s  freedom  in  each  week  j becaufe  lor 
more  than  one  day  in  each  week,  they  owe  fervice  to 
the  bank  of  the  United  States,  and  for  about  tw'o  days, 
to  the  feveral  banks  no\v  operating.  How  improperly 
then  do  we  fpeak  ? Inftcad  of  faying,  “ the  bank  of  the 
United  States,”  it  would  be  more  proper  to  fay,  the 
United  States  of  the  bank,” 


[ 78  ] 

And  the  law  enacts  that  weihall  be  the  United  States 
of  the  bank  for  twenty  years.  During  fo  long  a leafe 
without  impeachment  of  wafte,  the  tenant  will  either 
ruin  the  eflate,  or  provide  for  the  purchafe  in  fee.  If 
the  product  of  the  eflate,  and  not  its  improvement,  had 
mot  been  the  object,  wherefore  were  other  tenants  ex- 
cluded ? This  wife  exclufion  of  partners  in  fpoiling  the 
nation,  evinces  the  truth  of  the  line  of  argument  I have 
adopted  by  dil'clofing  the  defign  of  the  contrivance. 

The  law  of  primogeniture  and  firft  fruits  is  revived. 
The  bank  is  the  firfl  born  of  legiflation,  with  an  intail 
for  20  years,  and  more  than  a chance  for  the  reverfion 
in  fee.  Or  it  is  rather  an  heir  apparent,  in  pofifefiipn 
of  the  regency,  on  account  of  the  parent’s  idiocy. 

A pretence  of  rendering  fome  compenfation  to  the 
community,  for  its  pre-eminent  powers,  and  exorbitant 
acquilitions,  was  neceffary  to  lull  enquiry  into  a coraa- 
tofe  flate.  And  therefore  it  is  alleged  that  the  inflitu- 
tion  enables  merchants  to  extend  commerce,  to  give 
better  prices  for  commodities,  and  to  encourage  indu- 
flry.  And  England  is  reforted  to,  as  an  example  pro- 
ving thefe  allegations. 

Merchants  are  brokers,  honourable  and  ufeful,  whilfl 
adhering  to  a heady  line  of  commerce,  and  fupplying 
the  wants  of  a nation  ; but  pernicious  and  dangerous, 
whilfl  fpeculating  indiferiminately  on  foes  and  friends  for 
the  acquilition  of  wealth,  and  afpiring  to  exclufive  pre- 
vileges  and  prerogatives. 

They  are  of  a clafs  unproductive,  and  therefore  if  ca- 
pitals are  to  be  raifed  at  the  public  expence,  it  would 
be  more  beneficial  to  commerce,  to  beflowthem  on  agri- 
culture or  manufactures,  which  alone  create  the  real 
fund  for  an  extenfion  of  commerce,  for  the  purpofe  of 
enabling  them  to  make  lading  and  productive  improve- 
ments. Taking  from  the  productive  clafs  therefore,  to 


■5 


[ 79  3 

beftotf upon  the  unproductive  is  inverting  the  courfe  of 
nature,  when  an  extenfion  of  commerce  is  the  objeCt. 

A reaction  of  thefe  capitals  as  an  incitement  to  indu- 
ftry,  cannot  be  a permanent  effect  from  a bank.  The 
quantity  of  paper  which  can  be  circulated,  is  limited  by 
the  national  ability  to  pay  for  it,  and  the  employment  it 
can  find.  Specie  is  liable  to  the  latter  limit  only,  and 
therefore  more  fpecie  than  paper,  can  find  employment 
in  a nation,  becaufe  for  fpecie  there  is  nothing  to  pay. 
If  a member  of  the  commercial  world,  poflefles  fpecie 
fufficient  for  its  oceafions,  and  banks  are  eftablifhed 
which  emit  paper  equal  in  amount  to  this  fpecie,  the 
latter  mud  depart  for  want  of  employment.  If  more  pa- 
per is  emited,  a momentary  and  unnatural  fpur  may  be 
given  to  induftry,  at  the  commencement  of  the  operati- 
on ; but  it  would  be  fleeting  and  tranfitory,  for  the  in- 
leant  the  true  level  of  circulating  medium  has  regulated 
itfelf,  things  at  beft,  would  fubfide  to  their  ufual  courfe. 
But  they  will  fink  lower,  becaufe  the  community  having 
exchanged  fpecie  for  paper,  hath  loll  a long  firing  of 
advantages  poflefled  by  the  former  over  the  latter  ; and 
becaufe  worfied  as  it  is  in  numberlefs  ways  by  the  ex- 
change, labour  will  moreover  be  burthened  with  an  in- 
terefi  of fix  per  centum  on  the  amount  of  the  circulating 
paper,  whereas  the  national  labour  paid  nothing  for  fpe- 
cie. How  compleatly  is  fucha  community  jockeyed  ? 

Again.  Lq/iing  improvements  can  never  be  produced 
by  bank  contrivances,  on  account  of  the  rapidity  with 
which  bank  paper,  whilfi  it  is  alive,  is  pafled  from  hand 
to  hand.  Lading  and  productive  improvements  in  ma- 
nufactures and  agriculture,  require  the  ufe  cf  a capital 
for  feveral  years,  becaufe  profit  from  labour  flows  in 
flowly.  And  fuch  capitals  our  banks  never  furnifh. 
The  contrivance  is  only  adapted  for  fudden  fpeculati- 
ons  ; to  favour  a quick  and  rapid  fitcceflion  of  good 
bargains  ; and  to  enable  the  bank  to  gain  compound  en- 
tered:, by  renewing  its  paper  three  or  four  times  a year. 


r *°  j 

The  medium  for  fuch  a traffic  being  local  alio,  the 
gain  refulting  from  it  mull  not  only  be  filched  from  citi- 
zens, but  inftead  of  producing,  it  muft  obdruefc  lading 
improvements,  and  difeourage,  by  impoverifliing,  in- 
dustry. And  merchants,  from  an  honourable  profef- 
fion,  will  be  converted  in  a fet  of  ^contemptible  gam- 
blers. 

Suppofe  two  or  three  large  dates,  Mafiachufetts 
and  New-York,  or  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  for 
indance,  ffiould  dedroy  banks,  and  inhibit  the  circula- 
tion of  all  bank  notes  by  making  it  felony  ; would  not 
fuch  dates  become  a refervoir  for  the  fpecie  of  the  uni- 
on ? And  would  not  the  effects  be.  fo  forely  felt  by  the 
fidcr  dates,  as  fbon  to  dedroy  tlie  banking  fydems 
throughout  the  union  ? The  United  States,  as  a mem- 
ber of  the  commercial  world,  will  fpeedily  occupy  a fi- 
milai  pre-eminent  dat ion,  over  fider  nations,  by  abo- 
lifhing  banks.  For  fpecie  will  ever  flow,  where  it  can 
find  emoicvment. 

A -• 

Tn  lieu  of  this  fydem  is  fubdituted  a corporation  of 
rich  men,  podeffing  a power  of  expelling  the  only  uni-  ( 
verfal  medium  of  commerce,  of  fubdituting  a local  me- 
dium in  its  dead,  having  a monopoly  of  this  local  medi- 
um, and  thus  compleatly  enabled  to  regulate  the  price 
of  every  fpecies  of  produce.  The  lower  this  produce 
can  be  bought,  the  higher  are  their  gains  ; becaufe 
thofe  who  buy  bank  paper  at  a premium,  cannot  pay  the 
premium,  and  mud  ceafe  to  deal  at  the  paper  diop,  un- 
lefs  they  can  fell  it  at  a higher  price  than  they  gave. 
The  bank  fells  the  commodity  bv  wholefale,  and  are 
paid  a wholefale  profit.  The  dealers  will  then  retail 
it,  getting  an  advance  upon  the  whole  fird  cod,  and 
fmee  the  commodity  will  not  do  for  tranfportation,  the 
nation  as  the  only  ccnfumers,  pay  this  double  profit. 
Will  the  bank  exert  the  power  of  regulating  the  price 
of  labour,  for  the  purpofe  of  railing  it ; and  is  a mono- 
poly a good  fubditute  for  a competition  r Reflect.  Can 


[ 8.  3 

.the  bank  caufe  the  price  of  produce  or  of  paper,  to 
fluctuate  ? What  mult  be  the  effect  of  this  power  ? and 
compare  the  price  of  wheat  in  1789,  when  there  was  a 
partial  and  local  Scarcity  in  France,  with  the  price  ot 
the  fame  article  in  1 792,  when  a general  European  lcar- 
city  and  warfare  united  to  enhance  it.  Not  forgetting 
that  many  of  thefe  contrivances,  have  been  erected  in 
the  interim. 

'The  truth  is,  that  the  price  of  our  exports  abroad, 
arid  not  the  banking  operations  at  home,  can  only  en- 
hance their  value.  Out  of  that  price  mull  be  deduced, 
freight,  profit  and  commifiion;  and  to  thefe  deductions 
are  fuperadded  the  dividends  and  other  profits  of  banks. 
Will  deductions  raife  the  price  ? 

Mercantile  or  fpeculating  people  can  only  borrow  of 
the  bank,  becaufe  of  its  fhort  credit ; and  to  lend  to  o- 
thers,  fo  as  to  aid  lading  improvements  or  encourage 
indultry,  is  never  a purpefe  of  thole  who  deal  in  bank 
paper.  In  no  Hate  does  the  legal  intered  for  money 
exceed  Jix  per  centum , and  this  intered  mull  be  paid  to 
the  bank  ; therefore  no  perfon  will  borrow  of  the  bank 
to  lend  again,  when  he  can  gain  nothing.  In  all  dates, 
where  the  legal  intered  is  dill  lower,  a lofs  would  obvi- 
oufly  enfue.  As  would  alfo  be  the  cafe,  wherever  that 
is  the  legal  rate  ; becaufe  the  bank,  by  calling  in  loans 
feveral  times  a year,  manages  to  gain  more  than  Jix  per 
centum  per  annum,  which  being  a fhift  to  evade,  would 
not  in  a private  cafe  be  tolerated  by,  a datute  of  ufury. 
Therefore  bank  paper  is  a proper  medium  for  fudden 
Jlrokcs  at  good  bargains  only.  Thefe  drokes  fall  upon 
citizens  only , and  conditute  a mode  for  the  encourage- 
ment of  indudry,  novel  and  incomprehenfible  to  thefe 
who  receive,  but  clear  and  confpicuous  to  thofe  who 
infli<d  the  droke. 

Labour  is  burthened  with  a compound  intered  on 
this  bank  medium,  under  the  pretences  of  encouraging 
indudry,  and  furnifliing  a capital  for  improvement, 

M 


r «j  ] 

which  are  obvioufly  deceitful  and  fallacious.  If  labour 
had  received  the  loans  of  the  bank,  and  had  thus  efca- 
ped  the  gain  which  it  pays  to  thofe  who  do,  yet  it  mull 
have  paid  the  bank  profits.  The  dividends  are  eight  per 
centum , exclufive  of  other  great  acquifitions  before  Ha- 
ted. Can  agriculture  or  manufa&ures  afford  to  pay 
fuch  an  interell  for  a capital  ? The  returns  made  by 
lading  improvements,  bear  no  Cmiltude  to  thofe  of  fpe- 
culating  rogueries.  Who  will  lend  for  the  pilrpofe  of 
encouraging  induftry,  or  to  aid  lading  improvements, 
at  five  per  centum , when  by  inveding  his  money  in  bank 
ftock,  he  will  certainly  gain  above  eight  per  centum  ; 
Private  loans  are  thus  annihilated,  and  no  fubditute  for 
the  attainment  of  fuch  objefts  propofed.  A rate  of 
bank  profit,  exceeding  the  rate  of  legal  intered,  mull 
draw  the  national  money  to  this  vortex  of  impofition. 

Banks  are  money  brokers,  receiving  exorbitant  com- 
miflions.  A kind  of  treafurers  of  the  whole  circula-  | 
ting  medium,  receiving  annually  of  the  nation,  among 
whom  it  circulates,  above  fix  per  centum  on  its  amount. 

In  lefs  than  feventeen  years,  they  gain  the  intire  total. 
Enough  to  fupport  at  lead  a feven  years  war,  with  1 
20,000  men  condantly  in  the  field.  What  an  alarm- 
ing idea  ? Suppofe  government  and  the  bank  fliould 
coalefce,  and  form  a treaty  with  fome  foreign  poten- 
tate, to  dedroy  what  they  have  already  united  to  in- 
fringe ? Are  ufurpations  more  eafily  corrected  in  a 
date  of  maturity,  than  at  their  commencement  ? 

It  is  pleafant  to  obferve  the  dilemma  to  which  Con- 
grefs  are  reduced  by  the  contrivance.  The  conftitu- 
tion,  in  terms  framed  from  a confideration  of  the  mif- 
chiefs  heretofore  produced  by  paper  mediums,  drives  i 
mod  carefully  to  interdict  them  in  future.  In  dealing 
out  power  to  Congrefs  relative  to  a currency,  it  permits 
that  body  “ to  coin  money  ;**  and  in  refraining  the 
power  of  the  dates,  it  prohibits  them  from  “ coining 
money,  emitting  bills  of  credit , or  making  any  thing  a 


C 83  3 

tender  but  gold  and  filvcr.”  In  not  giving  the  power 
of  eflablilhing  a paper  currency  to  the  one,  and  in  ta- 
king it  exprefly  from  the  other,  the  conllitution  defign- 
cd  to  fecure  the  focicty  againfl  the  frauds  and  vices  of 
paper  tricks.  That  a circulating  paper  medium  of  eve- 
ry kind  was  intended  to  be  inhibited,  is  obvious  from 
the  diftin&ion,  between  fuch  a medium,  and  making 
any  thing  a tender.  Both  are  feparately  condemned  ; 
and  the  medium,  though  unaccompanied  with  the  ten- 
der, is  exprefsly  forbidden.  The  tender  is  indeed  an 
aggravation  of  that  which  is  mifehievous  without  the 
tender.  The  Hates  being  reHrained  from  eHabli  thing 
a paper  currency,  could  not  empower  a corporation  to 
do  it.  They  could  not  bellow,  what  they  did  not  pof- 
fefs.  But,  alas ! poor  Congrefs  ! having  broken  the 
conllitution  themfelves,  they  are  obliged  to  wink  upon 
its  flagrant  breach  by  moll  of  the  Hates,  which  have, 
without  any  bad  intention,  followed  their  baneful  ex- 
ample. With  grief  mull  Congrefs  fuffer  their  twenty 
years  monopoly  to  be  broken  in  upon,  and  fnacks  of 
the  national  plunder  to  fall  to  the  lhare  of  rival  corpo- 
rations. It  mull  however  be  confefled,  that  the  contell 
is  unequal,  fince  the  good  things  redounding  from  the 
public  purfe,  are  exclufively  enjoyed  by  the  purfe  bear- 
ers. Had  the  Hates  gone  into  the  fyflem  of  tljeir  own 
head,  and  not  as  blind  tranferibers  of  the  example  fet  by 
the  higher  powers,  we  fltould  hive  heard  clamourings, 
■which  could  not  now  be  uttered  by  a party  of  the  cho- 
rus. 

Ignorant  as  we  are  of  the  efl'e&s  of  banking  in  Eng- 
land, it  is  necefiary  to  take  fomc  notice  of  an  example 
quoted  in  favour  of  the  contrivance.  Bold  aflertions 
may  be  hazarded,  when  the  proof  is  beyond  our  reach ; 
and  therefore  the  quotation.  But  if  England  may  be 
likened  unto  a feigniory  poflelTed  of  profitable  eilates, 
pouring  into  its  lap  their  products  in  conHant  flreams 
of  wealth — if  the  riches  of  the  EaH  and  Well-Indies  roll 
into  her  treafnry- — if  Ihe  is  the  tax  gatherer  of  Ireland 


[ 34  ] 

and  Scotland — if  (he  fhares  in  the  fifheries — if  (he  is  al- 
moft  unrivalled  in  manufactures  and  unequalled  in  com- 
merce— if  her  labouring  clafs  of  citizens  arc  induffrious 
and  her  foil  exuberant,  why  is  her  prbfperity  (if  (he 
profperous)  attributed  to  her  banking  ctmtrifcmcfes.’ 
Whilfl  a glare  of  imaginary  profperity  is'painted  by 
terms,  the  offsprings  of  invention,  to  tempt  the  hation, 
a produttivc  caufe  equally  falfe  is  credited‘for  it,  r'd 
miflead  us.  If  effects,  bearing  a faint  refembfahce,rTQ 
the  high  colourings  in  which  they  are  depicted’  do  *(?*** 
ift,  they  are  accounted  for  by  an  unfeen  fpcculatingln- 
fluence,  without  reforting  to  a fragle  obvious  caufe. 

On  the  contra ry,  fuppofe  we  were  to  confider  the 
poor  rates,  and  the  rate  of  luxury  in  England,  as  the  ex- 
politors  of  hanking  fchemes.  Redundant  wealth  and 
pinching  want,  would  turn  out  to  be  the  effects  in  par- 
celling out  the  neceflaries  of  life  ; and  tyranny  and 
flavery  the  divifion  they  make,  of  what  the)’  term, 
fe  civil  rights.”  Nothing  could  have  deprived  the  Eng- 
lifh  (the  nation  not  the  court)  of  enjoying  diffufively 
their  exclufive  advantages,  but  a fyftem  conftantly  pil- 
laging from  labour,  to  aggrandize  wealth.  Unlefs,, 
therefore,  America  is  languifhing  for  a peafantry, 
wretchedly  poor,  and  an  aviilocracy  luxurioufly  rich 
and  arrogantly  proud,  this  Englifli  precedent  has  been 
unfortunately  adduced,  and  more  unfortunately  pur- 
fued. 

But  to  conhder  how  the  bank  will  afFeft  liberty  at  its 
extremities,  when  it  hath  (truck  at  its  heart,  by  corrupt- 
ing the  lcgillature  itfelf,  is  really  iuperfluous.  It  is 
therefore  time  to  difmifs  the  fubject. 

Subjoining,  that  the  public  wealth  is  pillaged  to  the 
extent  of  the  national  ability,  and  that  no  food  for  fpe- 
culation  remains,  except  the  public  territory. 

Ifthofe  who  have  pledged  this  territory  for  the  re- 
demption of  the  debt,  by  legiflaircc  faith , fhould  now 


[ SJ  } 

pervert  the  arms  and  treaties  of  the  nation,  to  the 
breaking  of  this  Faith,  f($r  the  purpofe  of  acquiring  ' 
principalities' ’out  of  the  national  territory  for  them-  - 
laves- -If  thofe  who  call  themfelves  federal,  thou  id  '• 
league  with  Indians  and'  foreigners,  to  remove  the  land ' 
marks  of  union,  and  to  revoke  a fundamental  ftipula- 
tion  for  the  .fecurity  of  independency  itfelf,  it  would 
both  ’explode  their  profeiTions,  and  prove  the  juftr.efs  * 
of  my  arguments. 


SECTION  XV. — The  put  sen  i state  oe  parties 

CONSIDERED, 

FROM  a collifion  of  parties'  tnith'fi allies  forth,  and 
the  community  is  the  great  arbiter  between  them. 
Parties  are  counfel  on  oppoiite  iidcs,  capable,  by  argu- 
ment and  reafoning,  of  enlightening,  or  by  buffoonery, 
fophifms  and  perplexity,  of  infuking  the  judge.  A fong 
in  the  place  of  an  explanation,  or  farcical  newfpaper 
ebullitions,  inftead  of  definitions  and  illuftrations,  mu  ft 
awaken  the  idea  of  a merry  Andrew,  entertaining  a mob 
by  his  tricks  and  grimace,  whilft  his  accomplices  are 
picking  their  pockets. 

A party  however  muft  fignifv,  a confederation  of  in- 
dividuals for  the  private  and  exclufivc  benefit  of  them- 
lelves,  and  not  for  the  public  good.  If  then  the  ob- 
ject of  this  confederation  is  in  conflict  with  the  public 
good,  thofe  who  cppofe  it,  deferve  rather  the  appella- 
tion of  “ a band  of  patriots,”  than  the  epithet  of 
“ a party,”  they  are  not  contending  for  the  benefit  of 
a part,  but  of  the  whole  community. 

It  is  of  importance  to  the  community  to  difeern,  what 
dntereft  falls  within  this  definition  of  a party,  ami  what 
line  of  politics,  as  excluded  by  ir,  is  intitlcd  to  their  con- 
fidence, . 


[ S6  ] 

And  firft  let  us  find  out  the  delign  of  thofe  who  dif- 
approve  of  the  meafures  of  adminiftration.  Are  they 
in  fearch  of  loaves  and  fiflies  ? If  fo,  let  the  community 
demand,  what  thofe  loaves  are  ? The  poffeffors  of  them 
can  bell  tell.  Legal  falaries  of  office  are  too  mo- 
derate to  conftitute  an  objeefc  for  avarice,  or  to  be  a 
fund  for  thofe  enormous  acquifition«,  which  have  not 
efcaped  the  eye  of  America.  Is  the  favour  of  admi- 
niftration  lucrative,  or  in  any  mode  beneficial  ? Tell  us, 
in  what  way,  and  to  what  extent,  ye  who  know,  that 
we  may  dilcern  the  undue  felfiffi  influence,  operating 
upon  thofe  who  complain  of  its  meafures. 

If  the  government  is  already  a government  of  loaves 
and  fiflies,  then  the  neceffity  of  an  immediate  reforma- 
tion is  admitted,  becaufe  time  fanttifies  abufes  ; if  not, 
the  motives  which  a&uate  thofe  who  are  driving  to 
prevent  its  becoming  fo,  mud  be  pure  and  patriotic. 

The  bank,  ’tis  alferted,  is  uRconftitutional — that  it 
is  a burthenfome  and  fraudulent  tax — that  it  impove- 
rilhes  all  daffies  of  the  community,  except  a fele&ed 
few — that  itfubverts  the  principles  of  reprefentation — 
and  that  udth  other  meafures  of  adminiftration,  it  pro- 
ceeds unerringly  and  infallibly  to  ariftocracy  and  mo- 
narchy. Now  what  exclujive  intereft  can  a party,  fou- 
thern  or  northern,  compounded  of  States  or  indivi- 
duals, have  in  defeating  fuch  defigns  ? There  is  no  dif- 
ficulty in  difeerning  au  intereft  of  immenfe  magnitude , 
and  of  an  exclujive  nature , refiding  in  a party,  for  fup- 
porting  a contrivance,  of  fo  gainful  a nature. 

Can  a majority  of  the  people  of  a fingle  ftate,  Maffa- 
chufetts  for  inftance,  be  interefted  in  the  fupport  of  mea- 
fures, for  amailing  wealth  in  a few  hands,  and  levelled 
at  the  fundamental  principles  of  civil  liberty  ? 

The  agricultural,  profeffional,  and  mechanical  inte- 
j-efts  of  the  community,  at  whatever  point  of  the  com. 


C 87  3 

pnfs  they  refide,  are  fo  obvioufly  in  the  fame  predica- 
ment, that  it  is  necefiary  to  difclofe  the  arts,  by  which, 
they  have  been  disunited. 

1.  Public  abufes  combine  for  mutual  fupport,  and 
the  greateft  will  be'fele&ed  as  the  patron  of  the  reft. 
Hence  not  only  ftock-holders  themfelves,  but  public 
officers  who  wifh  for  higher  falaries — paper  men  and 
lpeculators,  who  will  gain  by  an  increafe  of  the  public 
debt,  and  by  the  diftipation  of  the  finances — and  all 
who  languifh  after  ariftocracy  and  monarchy,  have  en- 
lifted  under  the  aufpices  of  a chief.  And  hence  the  in- 
duftrious  and  vociferous  cry,  in  favour  of  the'  meafures 
of  the  adminiftration.  A lift  of  dock  and  certificate 
holders  would  explain  it,  to  be  the  voice  of  private  in- 
tereft,  and  not  of  impartial  approbation. 

2.  A parry  will  receive  with  open  arms  recruits  of  e- 
very  chara&er.  Among  others  the  old  tories  are  raeft 
cordially  enlifted.  They  naturally  fall  to  thofe,  who 
are  gaining  by  intrigue,  what  they  fought  for  in  vain. 
They  are  gratifying  their  paffions  without  any  expence 
to  their  principles.  A vi&ory,  after  a defeat,  is  the 
more  pleafing,  as  being  a retaliation. 

3.  In. this  mod  worfliipful  fociery,  an  endeavour  is 
made  to  affociate  the  President.  The  affociates  afiume 
the  chara&er  of  being  the  fupporters,  of  that  which 
they  are  undermining,  becaufe  they  know  his  attach- 
ment to  the  conftitution  and  good  government.  By 
geting  polfeflion  of  the  fortrefs,  whilft  the  commandant 
is  unfufpicious  of  the  fraud,  it  will  be  more  eafy  to  be- 
tray it  to  an  enemy,  or  fieze  it  for  themfelves.  They 
ftile  themfelves  “ federalifts,”  though  it  is  obvious  that 
they  difregard  the  conftitution,  in  its  principles,  as  well 
as  letter.  The  artifice  is  ftale  ; the  Neros  and  Caligulas 
of  Rome,  were  perpetually  vociferating  the  terms  “ re- 
public and  republican,”  long  after  the  government 
was  defpotic. 


r as  ] 

4.  Honed:  men,  when  deceived,  are  the  bell  fuppor- 
ters  of  knavery  ; hence  the  party,  by  a demarcation 
of  fallacious  intercds,  is  driving  to  convert  tint  cordial 
union,  which  was  founded  in  times  of  -didrefs — ce- 
ment'ed  bv  mutual  filterings,  and  fealed  by  compact,  in- 
to the  mod  inveterate  enmity.  And  a concord  of  hearts, 
•habits — and  of intereft,  which  really  exids  between  the 
great  bulk  of  the  citizens  of  every  dare,  is  the  devoted 
victimof  machinations, defigned  to  enrich  and  aggrandize 
a few.  The  aridocratic'al  inrered  is  a kind  of  dying  fqua- 
dron,  vvhofe  object  it  is  to  divide  the  great  mafs  of  the 
peoo!e,by  a geogr  iphical  line,  and  to  cajole  one  divillon, 
that  it  ntltv  live  at  free  quarter  on  the  labour  of  both. 

e.  The  party  boad  of  the  prefent  fiouridung  condi- 
tion of  our  connttp  , and  aferibe  it  to  their  own  politics. 

Horsed v though  devoid  of  nodefty,  wouid  have  confef- 

JO  __  J'  # 

ftd,  that  peace,'  iunuitrr,  and  an  increafed  population, 
rather  than  paper  contrivance*,  were  the  real  grounds 
of  national  urofperiry.  Caufes,  which  in  many  Euro- 
pean countries,  have  fo  far  lurmountcd  politital  oppref- 
ijons,  as  to  exhibit  a high  degree  of  agricultural  and 
mechanical  improvement.  But  by  adducing  an  argu- 
ment from  a parallel  between  the  prefent  times,  and 
tiir.es  oi  wav,  :t  is  contcllcd,  that  a fuffieient  degree  of 
dmilitude  exids  to  bear  a companion.  It  is  admitted, 
that  the  community  which  is  warring  againft  monarchy 
and  aridocracy,  armed  with  paper  only,  docs  indeed 
occupy  a fituation,  preferable  to  a neceflity  of  fighting 
againft  the  fame  enemies,  armed  with  the  inftruments 
of  death  . 

6.  The  party  call  .themfidves  the  government,  and 
then  de  land  of  the  public  a confidence  in  the  magiftra- 
cy.  I I d they  demanded  a critical  invedigation  of  their 
condttid,  it  would  have  been  a better  proof  of  integrity. 
But  faith,  and  not  truth,  is  their  political  motto.  King 
crab,  like  religions  edablifhed  by  law,  fubditutes  my- 
dery  in  the  place  of  knowledge.  It  depends,  not  upon 
an  enlightened  conviction,  but  upon  a blind  idolatry. 


I 89  j 

Confidence  or  faith,  is  nod  clamourouflyinfided  on, when 
it  is  lead  merited.  Watchfulness , and  not  confidence,  is 
inculcated  by  the  conditution.  But  if  an  uninformed 
faith  is  dill  demanded,  let  us  know  with  precidion,  how 
far  it  is  to  go — how  many  arguments  it  ought  to  re- 
fute— how  many  proofs  it  can  fmother — and  how  much 
mifchief  it  can  judify.  And  the  blinded  faith  may  per- 
haps difcover,  that  it  is  already  time  to  open  its  eyes 
and  look  about. 

7.  An  unnatural  alliance  between  dock  and  certifi- 
cate holders  has  been  eftefted  ; unnatural  fo  far  excep- 
ted, as  certificates  are  depofited  as  bank  dock.  By  this 
means  a real  debt  is  interwoven  with  an  artificial  debt. 
A canditutional  demand  is  linked  in  brotherhood,  with 
an  unconditional  contrivance.  A jud  claim  upon  the 
public  ability  is  rendered  precarious,  by  burthening  that 
ability  with  an  unjud  and  exorbitant  tax.  Real  credi- 
tors are  decoyed  into  a belief,  that  the  bed  means  of 
fecuring  themfelves,  is  to  impofe  on  their  debtor  a debt 
to  a vad  amount,  founded  upon  fiction,  but  yet  fecurcd 
by  a mortgage  in  die  nature  of  a rent  charge  for  twen- 
ty years.  Thofc  who  have  the  fecurity  of  the  prefent 
conditution,  are  feduced  into  meafures,  fubverfive  of 
conditutional  fanftions,  and  if  they  fucceed,  they  de- 
ltroy  their  own  fecurity.  In  fliort,  a combination  with 
a party,  whofe  exidence  is  precarious,  hath  been  pre- 
ferred to  an  union  with  the  whole  community,  whofe 
will  is  law. 

8.  It  is  even  pretended,  that  the  community  do  not 
feel  their  taxes ; and  inferred,  that  not  feeling  they  do 
not  pay  them.  A date  of  political  apathy  is  mod  dan- 
gerous to  liberty.  If  the  community  can  only  judge  by 
their  feelings,  it  is  better  to  bring  them  to  their  fenfi- 
bility,  through  the  medium  of  their  underdandings, 
than  to  leave  them  in  fuch  a date  of  dupefa&ion,  until 
their  natural,  as  well  as  their  political  arteries,  are  pier- 
ced by  the  goads  of  defpotifm.  And  if  they  are  infenfi- 
ble  of  the  impod,  becaufe  it  operates  only  on  confu- 

N 


[ 9^  * J 

rricrs  of  imported  articles  ; yer  they  will  certainly  feel 
the  bank  tax,  which  is  mQreover  an  excife  npon  labour 
in  every  article  it  produces. 

9.  A great  merit  is  claimed  by  the  ariftocracy,  on 
account  of  their  being  addicted  to  an,  “ energetic  .go- 
vernment.” What  latitude  is  concealed  under  this  ge- 
neral expreilion,  cannot  be  difcoyered.  Judging  by 
rite  extent  to  which  they  have  already  puflied  their  ae- 
figns,  we  may  fairly  conftrue  it  thus $ “ a power  to  fup- 
prefs  difcor.tent  and  commotion,  excited  by  oppreflion, 
and  to  fuftain  the  oppreflion.”  For  when  did  a go- 
vernment want  energy  to  do  juftice,  in  times  of  peace 
and  profperity  ? “ Submit  quietly  and  peaceably  to 

to  the  bleflings  of  an  energetic  government,”  is  the 
language  of  the  king  of  Pruffia,  whilft  he  is  marching 
an  army  into  Poland,  for  the  purpofes  of  plunder  and 
defpotifm. 

When  thefe  arts  are  exploded,  tliofe  who  by  intrigue 
and  deception,  have  really  formed  themfelves  into  a pow- 
erful party,  will  turn  out  by  right  and  nature,  to  be  a 
mere  junto,  operating  upon  a whole  fociety,  for  their 
own  felfifh  purpofes.  And  however  their  leader,  like  a 
young  prince,  may  be  flattered  with  the  tongue  of  inte- 
refl  into  a good  opinion  of  himfelf ; and  though  his  de- 
pendants may  at  firfl:  pafs  him  upon  the  world  for  pro- 
digious parts  and  aftonifliing  integrity  ; yet  manhood  in 
the  one,  and  the  eflefts  of  the  other’s  policy,  will  of- 
ten unmalk  the  deception,  and  exhibit  them  as  prodi- 
gies of  another  fort. 

Raiflng  up  an  ariftocracy,  and  fevering  the  communi- 
ty into  the  two  orders  of  nobles  and  people,  is  provi- 
ding a faftion  to  teize  and  torment  the  public  mind,  by 
perpetual  tricks  and  artifices,  for  appropriating  to  them- 
felvcs  the  purfe  and  power  of  the  nation.  This  fcheme 
has  operated,  and  is  yet  operating.  The  wealth  alrea- 
dy amafied  by  fpecious  frauds,  hath  produced  vifibly  its 


C 91  1 

natural  effeCts,  by  corrupting  thofe  principles  of  mode- 
ration and  repablicanifm,  which  a-e  the  only  pledge  of 
public  liberty  and  private  happinefs. 

What  can  the  people  of  any  Hate  gain  by  ariftocra- 
tical  and  paper  reprefentatives  r Decency  and  cunning 
in  government,  is  the  utmofl:  poffible  acquilition.  Will 
a foul  be  fo  foolilh,  as  to  trull  in  a band  and  furplice  for 
falvation,  or  a body  lb  infanef  as  to  rely  for  health  in  a 
full-bottomed  wig  ? And  will  a foul,  a body,  or  a nati- 
on be  confoled  by  the  reflexion,  that  it  is  dcllroyed  J'e- 
cundum  artem. 

And  what  can  the  author  gain  by  fuccefs  ? If  he  is 
poor,  what  is  his  object  ? If  rich,  what  influences  him  ? 
If  he  is  an  olRcer  of  government,  will  he  gain  prefer- 
ment ? If  nor,  does  he  propofe  to  creel  an  cilice  for 
himfelf  ? Does  he  favour  national  profulion  ? Or  is  eco- 
nomy the  language  of  public  rapacity  ? Will  deipo- 
tifm  contend  for  liberty,  and  legal  equality  ? Do  his  ar- 
guments inlill  him  with  a party,  Hrugglingfor  exclude 
gains;  or  is  he  telling  a falvation  of  which  he  can  only 
participate  with  the  community  in  genera!  ? Is  he  not 
labouring  to  defend  the  ccnllitution  againlt  the  moll 
fatal  attacks,  and  are  not  the  remedies  propofed  of  a 
general,  and  not  a local  nature  ? Whilll  he  deplores 
his  want  of  ability  and  information,  equal  to  a talk, 
which  no  one  elfe  hath  undertaken,  and  folieirs  a cor- 
rection of  his  errors,  he  boldly  aflerts,  that  he  is  actu- 
ated by  no  unchalte  deflgn,  and  that  he  has  written  in 
the  fpirit  of  truth. 

An  adminiflration  without  a maxim,  would  be  like 
a fhip  without  a rudder.  From  the  effeCts  of  the  con- 
trivance, and  not  from  its  profeflions,  is  this  governing 
maxim  to  be  collected.  Of  the  following  maxims  l'cleCt 
the  moll  appofite.  “ Honefly  is  the  bell  policy  ? Sim- 
“ pliciry  and  knowledge  preferve  liberty.  Divide  and 
conquer.  A public  debt  is  a public  bleHing.” 


CC 


r 92  ) 

The  model  of  Nebuchadnezzar’s  image  feems  to  be 
the  idol  of  adminifl ration  ; but  although  the  head  was 
of  gold,  and  the  feet  of  clay,  let  it  be  remembered,  that 
the  clay  contained  a mixture  of  iron,  and  that  one  com- 
mon cataftrophe  humbled  the  gold  itfelf  to  the  duft. 

The  natural  interefts,  and  the  honed:  politics  of  the 
nation  will  unite,  and  prevent  the  erection  of  an  image, 
which  all  muff  fall  downwind  worfhip.  The  attempt  to 
fet  it  up,  violates  the  conftitution,  and  therefore  fede- 
j-alifm  will  be  ftrenuous  to  defend  its  own  work.  And 
even  antifederalifm  will  join  in  the  good  caufe,  fince 
the  principles  it  nrofcffes  are  alfo  violated.  The  artifi- 
ces of  a party,  foment  a difunion  between  them,  in  or- 
der to  dupe  and  to  ufe  both. 


E 

R R A 

T A. 

9» 

for 

be  fair 

read  le  as  fair 

12, 

- 

pojfefs 

pojfffes 

1 6, 

- 

doubted 

• doubled 

20, 

- 

loofe 

- lofe 

21, 

- 

it  fruit  t 

its  fruit 

3*> 

- 

flan 

- plate 

D00503269P 


T245 


345767 


